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 “In the Land of Memory, the time is always Now. 
In the Kingdom of Ago, the clocks tick… but their hands never move. 
There is an Unfound Door 
(O lost) 
And memory is the key which opens it.” 
 
– Stephen King in The Dark Tower VI: Song of Susannah –  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I don't see much sense in that,” said Rabbit. “No,” said Pooh humbly, “there isn't. But there 
was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way”. 
 
– Rabbit and Pooh in Winnie the Pooh – 
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Background 
 Intrusive memories are unwanted and uncontrollable images that pop into 
consciousness automatically, often after encounter with a perceptually matching stimulus. 
Often, these intrusions take the form of predominantly visual images (Speckens, Ehlers, 
Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). For example, gruesome images of war on the news may 
linger in the mind and intrude into consciousness even when they’re not welcome (Holmes, 
Creswell, & O’Connor, 2007). Apart from everyday life, intrusive images are prominent in 
many psychological disorders, such as bipolar disorder, depression, social phobia, and OCD 
(Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), experiencing 
intrusions is a key feature of the official diagnosis according to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Perhaps 
it is for this reason that information processing models of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) provide an elaborate and testable account of intrusion 
development in the context of psychological trauma. Several implications of these models 
have been translated into protocols for clinical practice (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, 
& Fennell, 2005), in which the reduction of intrusions is often an important theme. It is 
therefore highly surprising that these information processing models have not been 
extensively tested experimentally. The main goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the 
empirical grounding of the information processing models of PTSD on the issue of intrusion 
development. PTSD provides the clinical context in which intrusions are studied in this 
dissertation, and a brief background on the history and prevalence is provided below. The 
information processing models that provide the theoretical context of this dissertation are then 
briefly addressed. Finally, a brief outline of the chapters is provided. In Chapter 2, a full 
theoretical introduction and empirical review is provided for further reference. 
 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Clinical context 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is categorized as an anxiety disorder in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). In PTSD, a person has encountered a situation in which ‘the person 
experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or 
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self and other’ and 
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‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror’ (APA, 2000). Further 
diagnostic criteria consist of re-experiencing the traumatic event (e.g., intrusive images), 
avoidance behaviour (e.g., not wanting to think about the traumatic event), emotional 
numbing (e.g., a lack of interest in significant activities), and hyperarousal (e.g., sleeping 
problems). The diagnosis of PTSD is considered when the symptoms persist for more than 
one month after the traumatic event occurred. 
 Although people have always suffered from traumatic events, the diagnosis of PTSD 
was only included in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders in 1980 (DSM-III; APA, 1980). The inclusion of PTSD came with several political 
strings attached. It was the first disorder to be included as a psychiatric phenomenon that 
could be ascribed to circumstances outside the person. This was taken as recognition of 
psychological problems experienced by Vietnam veterans and survivors of concentration 
camps in WW II (Gersons & Carlier, 1992). Before, post-traumatic stress symptoms were 
mainly ascribed to an intrapsychic or neurotic problem because of a weak character. The 
recognition of a traumatic event as the cause of a patient’s symptoms paved the way for an 
understanding of suffering caused by war, as well as the right to compensation claims.  
 Before the term post-traumatic stress disorder came into place, stress symptoms 
caused by war did not go unnoticed, however. They were known under various names, like 
‘irritable heart syndrome’, ‘combat neuroses’, ‘war neurosis' and ‘shell-shock’ (Gersons & 
Carlier, 1992). The oldest account of what we now refer to as post-traumatic stress has been 
found in the biblical story of Jacob and Joseph in the book Genesis, with father Jacob 
showing signs of post-traumatic symptoms after the disappearance and apparent death of his 
son Joseph (Birnbaum, 2007).  
 Today, the lifetime prevalence of exposure to any traumatic event is estimated to be 
89.6% in an American sample (Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat, Schultz, Davis, & Andreski, 1996), 
to 64.6% (for men) and 49.5% (for women) in an Australian sample (Creamer, Burgess, & 
McFarlane, 2001), and 28% in Switzerland (Hepp et al., 2006). However, not everyone 
develops full-blown PTSD after a traumatic event. In the American sample mentioned above, 
the conditional risk for PTSD was 9.2%-13.0% for women and 6.2% for men (Breslau et al., 
1996), whereas the 12-month prevalence of PTSD reported in the Australian sample was 
1.33% (Creamer et al., 2001), and 1.30% in the Swiss sample (Hepp et al., 2006). So, 
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although it is likely that people encounter a traumatic event at one point in their life, the 
probability that they will develop PTSD seems to depend on other factors. 
 Meta-analyses of studies about the onset and maintenance of PTSD have shown that 
peri-traumatic factors (e.g., emotional responses, perceived life threat, dissociation) are 
among the best predictors. It is therefore not surprising that cognitive theories of PTSD have 
focused on peri-traumatic processes in order to explain PTSD and one of its major features: 
intrusive re-experiencing. Theoretically it is proposed that the encoding of traumatic 
information in memory lies at the heart of re-experiencing symptoms. The goal of the studies 
that comprise this dissertation was to experimentally test the suggested role of information 
processing in the development of re-experiencing symptoms, intrusive images specifically. 
Below, information processing models of PTSD are briefly described. For a more detailed 
account, the reader is referred to Chapter 2 and Chapter 10.  
  
Information processing models of PTSD: Theoretical context 
The dual representation theory 
 The dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 
2001) states that trauma information is stored in two separate memory systems. The Verbally 
Accessible Memory (VAM) consists of memory representations that can be deliberately 
retrieved and overlaps with the more common concept of autobiographical memory (e.g., 
Conway, 1996). The VAMs consist of trauma information that is embedded within a 
meaningful context that integrates the information within autobiographical memory. 
Information that is consciously attended to at the time of the trauma is stored in the VAM 
system. The information stored in the Situationally Accessible Memory (SAM) was processed 
automatically in a raw fashion. Thus, SAMs mainly consists of perceptual information, but 
also of uncorrected cognitions about the traumatic event at the time (e.g., “I am going to die”). 
SAMs are automatically activated on encounter with a matching stimulus and are experienced 
as an intrusive memory. Accordingly, the information from the SAM system needs to be 
consciously processed and integrated within the VAM system or newly formed SAMs (e.g., “I 
did not die) need to be created that inhibit the automatic retrieval of the original SAM 
(Brewin, 2001) in order to reduce intrusive images.  
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The cognitive model of PTSD 
 The cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) states that a shift in balance 
towards more data-driven processing (i.e., processing of mostly perceptual information), in 
contrast to conceptual processing (i.e., more meaningful evaluations of the trauma) during the 
traumatic event results in intrusive images. The model does not suggest separate memory 
systems, but rather an episodic memory of the trauma consisting of mostly perceptual 
information (e.g., Conway, 1995). Episodic memory contains highly detailed information of 
specific events (e.g., watering the flowers in the garden this morning) and is part of 
autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005). The trauma information is automatically activated 
by matching stimuli, resulting in the experience of an intrusive memory. The trauma 
information is not easily integrated within the knowledge structures of autobiographical 
memory because of the large discrepancies between the implications of the trauma (e.g., “the 
world is not safe”) and existing beliefs (e.g., “the world is predictable”). Furthermore, 
negative evaluations of the traumatic event and its consequences can lead to a feeling of 
“current threat”, which, in turn, is thought to maintain PTSD symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000).  
  
Outline of the dissertation 
Although the dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996) and the cognitive model 
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) differ on several aspects, they also converge on important 
theoretical points. Both models suggest that peri-traumatic processing that leads to image-
based trauma representations in memory are the source of intrusive images. Further, the 
models agree that more integration of the trauma information within autobiographical 
memory should reduce intrusions. Importantly, reducing peri-traumatic perceptual processing 
or enhancing conceptual processing should then reduce intrusion frequency, as suggested by 
Holmes & Bourne (2008). An elaborate discussion of these theoretical accounts along with a 
review of associated empirical findings is provided in the theoretical Chapter 2.  
 As noted earlier, the information processing models of PTSD have not been subjected 
to extensive empirical investigations even though they are highly influential theoretically as 
well as clinically. In order to test their hypotheses about intrusion development, the studies 
reported in this dissertation made use of the ‘trauma film paradigm’ (Holmes & Bourne, 
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2008) to provide an analogy of a traumatic experience. Participants are typically shown a film 
of a traumatic situation which allows for experimental manipulation of peri-traumatic 
processes, which is not possible in already traumatized survivors. As noted, information 
processing models suggest that perceptual processing and conceptual processing during 
encoding of traumatic information are highly important in intrusion development. In Chapter 
3, the role of peri-traumatic perceptual (i.e., visuospatial) processing in intrusion development 
is experimentally tested using the trauma film paradigm. In Chapter 4, a similar design was 
used to test the role of peri-traumatic conceptual (i.e., verbal) processing in intrusion 
development. According to the information processing models of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000), an important stage in recovery from trauma is the integration of the 
trauma information in autobiographical memory. Chapter 5 aimed to test the hypothesis that 
enhancing the organization of traumatic information immediately post-trauma reduces 
intrusion development. The studies in Chapters 3 to 5 provide partial support for the 
information processing models of PTSD, but highly important inconsistencies that require 
revision of the models are also brought to light.  
Chapters 3 to 5 aimed to experimentally test specific hypotheses about intrusion 
development derived from the information processing models of PTSD. Chapter 6 and 7 
extended the scope of these models by exploring the development of intrusive visual images 
in the absence of direct visual input. As the models discussed above all assume direct visual 
input, Chapters 6 and 7 provide food for thought on the core nature of intrusions. Chapter 6 
focuses on the role of peri-traumatic processing in the development of visual intrusive images 
from auditory traumatic information. Chapter 7 aimed to further elucidate working 
mechanisms underlying the development of intrusive visual images in the absence of direct 
visual input. Chapter 7 accordingly explored the role of mental imagery in the development of 
intrusive images from a film (i.e., direct visual input) versus a verbal report (i.e., a verbal 
description of the event). The combined results of these studies require a major 
reconceptualisation of the development of intrusive images as described by the information 
processing models.  
Apart from peri-traumatic encoding processes, thought suppression and attentional 
bias have also been suggested to play a role in trauma. In Chapter 8, it is explored to what 
extent intrusive images can be deliberately controlled in comparison to non-intrusive images. 
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Given the straightforward nature of this research question, it is surprising that the large 
majority of previous studies on intrusions and thought suppression have confused several 
definitions of ‘intrusion’. This crucial distinction is addressed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 
explores the role of attentional bias in the automatic activation of analogue trauma 
representations in memory. The results are highly interesting and shed light on the automatic 
effect of trauma reminders in ongoing processing thereby extending information processing 
models of PTSD. In Chapter 10, a theoretical review is provided reflecting on possible 
functions of intrusive re-experiencing. To conclude, Chapter 11 provides an overview of the 
major findings reported in this dissertation and proposes a new psychological model of 
intrusion development that encompasses these results. 
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Chapter 2  
Exploring Involuntary Recall in Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder from an Information Processing Perspective: 
Intrusive Images of Trauma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Woud, M. L., Näring, G., Becker, E. S., & Holmes, E. A. 
(in press). Exploring involuntary recall in post-traumatic stress disorder from an information 
processing perspective: Intrusive images of trauma. J. H. Mace (Ed.), The act of 
remembering: Towards an understanding of how we recall the past. Blackwell Publishing. 
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Introduction 
 The ability to recall our past is a very valuable and characteristically human quality. 
Remembering earlier experiences gives us a sense of who we are, where we are coming from 
and where we are going (Barclay, 1996). It provides us with a personal identity and sense of 
self, and it is through memory that we learn and that we develop ourselves. In memory’s most 
romantic form, we take a trip down memory lane and think back to that summer’s night with 
our love and we fully enjoy the remembrance. Unfortunately, a trip down memory lane can 
also confront us with negative experiences. For instance, our love might have rejected and left 
us. Usually, although painful, we can endure these negative memories. Sometimes, however, 
we have experiences so horrific or frightening that we would rather avoid remembering them 
at all. Ironically, memories of extremely negative or traumatic events seem to be far less 
under our control than the more pleasant or neutral ones and are appropriately termed 
“intrusive memories”.  
 
I was in my car that was parked in my street when a man puts a knife 
to my neck. He comes out of nowhere. I think I’m going to die and am 
afraid that he might hurt my daughter if he realises I live there. I try to 
be calm. The mugger says “give me all your money” and he is 
aggressive. I think I’m going to die. He checks my pockets and 
rummages through my purse. I should be aggressive and scare him, or 
start the car..., but I don’t. He runs off and I look back to my house 
and see my daughter crying and banging at the door. Maybe she saw 
me and she could be traumatised. She’s too young. 
 
 The example above is a reconstruction of a trauma memory that came to be intrusive 
for the victim. We reconstructed the story based on actual reports from this victim collected 
by Holmes, Grey, and Young (2005, p. 9).  The image of the mugger’s knife on the neck and 
the daughter crying and banging at the door frequently haunt the victim, leading to high 
distress during this involuntary recall. In a follow-up study by Grey and Holmes (2008) more 
illustrations of intrusive images can be found. For example, one participant developed post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after a road traffic accident and reported intrusive memories 
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of the moment when a scaffold on the pavement smashed the windscreen of the car. At that 
time, the participant thought that they would be decapitated and the intrusive image of the 
scaffold is accompanied by intense anxiety (Grey & Holmes, 2008).  
 PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This psychological 
disorder can develop after a traumatic event, which is defined in the DSM-IV-TR as a 
situation in which ‘the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or 
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical 
integrity of self and other’ and ‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or 
horror.’ Examples of traumatic events are experiencing or being a witness of military combat, 
violent personal assault and natural or man-made disasters (APA, 2000). The features that 
define PTSD are: re-experiencing the traumatic event in the form of intrusive images, 
thoughts or nightmares; avoidance of reminders of the traumatic event such as conversations 
about the trauma or the scene where the trauma occurred; emotional numbing, featured by a 
lack of interest for significant activities and feeling alienated from others; and symptoms of 
hyperarousal such as sleeping problems, irritability and exaggerated startle (APA, 2000). 
Post-traumatic stress symptoms are common after a traumatic event. Therefore, only in the 
case that the symptoms persist for more than one month the diagnosis of PTSD is considered.  
 There are several striking memory phenomena present in PTSD. For example, 
although a traumatic memory is usually very detailed, PTSD patients may have trouble with 
the deliberate recall of their experience, so-called trauma-related amnesia. Furthermore, 
traumatic memories can be activated by triggers that seem to have ‘generalized’ from the 
initial encoded information (Conway & Holmes, 2005).  What is especially striking about re-
experiencing in PTSD is the disruption of ongoing activities and attentional problems, often 
impairing important life aspects. The present chapter focuses on re-experiencing in the form 
of intrusive images. Intrusive images can be described as uncontrollable and unbidden mental 
pictures that pop into consciousness. An intrusive image is often a memory representation1 of 
                                                            
1   This is in contrast to intrusive images where the content depicts a worry or fear about something that could 
(have) happen(ed) but has not necessarily happened (e.g. the image of people laughing when preparing for a 
presentation in social phobia). However, research indicates that many intrusive images, at least in 
psychological disorders, are related to some earlier experience (Brewin, 1998). 
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the traumatic event, rich in sensory detail, as was illustrated by the mugging example earlier 
in this chapter. Because intrusive images develop in almost all PTSD patients (Speckens, 
Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007), it is a highly salient and important topic in clinical 
practice. A major goal of therapy is often to reduce the frequency of involuntary recall as well 
as the impact that the symptoms of re-experiencing have on the patient. Symptoms of re-
experiencing are intriguing because they are somehow different from our “normal” memories, 
the ones that we can access and control more or less at will. The unbiddenness and 
uncontrollability that characterizes intrusive images indicates that during the processing of 
traumatic information something ‘unusual’ happens. As a result, intrusive images can lead to 
the subjective experience that the event is happening right now, rather than that the 
experience is something from the past. PTSD sufferers can relive the traumatic event and 
experience the negative emotions that were present during the original experience in a full-
blown flashback. Markedly, there is a sense of “current threat” in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000), even though the traumatic event, and so the objective danger, is in the past. This could 
be said to be the differentiating feature of PTSD in relation to other anxiety disorders, where 
intrusions are usually related to a present or future threat. The here-and-now feature of 
traumatic intrusive memories indicates that during the processing of traumatic information, a 
temporal structure is relatively lacking, leading to a memory representation that lacks a 
conceptual context and is not integrated in autobiographical memory (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996).  
 In sum, intrusive images are an intriguing topic of research because of their clinical 
importance and the theoretical enigmas that they confront us with. What follows is a 
discussion and review of the theory and the current state of research on intrusive images in 
PTSD from an information processing perspective. 
 
PTSD Theories 
 Currently, information processing theories of PTSD are very influential in inspiring 
research on involuntary recall in trauma. However, other theoretical explanations have been 
put forward in the past. For example, in a pioneering series of laboratory studies, Horowitz 
(1969) applied a combination of psychoanalytic and psychobiological theory based on ideas 
by Freud and Breuer to explain the occurrence of intrusive images from stressful film material 
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in healthy participants. Horowitz suggested that normally, the individual is in an emotional 
homeostasis where psychological processes are functioning in an integrated fashion. 
However, the overwhelming experience of a traumatic event can interfere with the 
psychological processes and disrupt homeostasis. As a consequence, a “repetition 
compulsion” occurs, in which the individual attempts to repress the traumatic memory but is 
unsuccessful because of weakened psychological defences, which results in intrusive images. 
At other times, the trauma memory is successfully repressed to protect the individual from 
being overwhelmed with emotions, resulting in amnesia. Successful repression and 
compulsive repetition in the form of intrusive memories are alternated in order to resolve the 
conflict induced by the traumatic event and to reinstate homeostasis. In a later paper, 
Horowitz (1975) introduced the concept of “cognitive processing”, a term relevant to current 
information processing theories of PTSD. Although the theory may seem outdated to us, 
Horowitz’ experimental paradigm is still highly relevant, as we shall see later on in this 
chapter. Brewin and Holmes (2003) noted that Horowitz was a pioneer in modern day 
experimental research of trauma. In their review (Brewin & Holmes, 2003), the authors 
evaluated the most influential theories of PTSD from past to present. They conclude that 
current information processing models of PTSD have the advantage that they allow for the 
generation of specific hypotheses as well as providing a theoretical explanation for the entire 
spectrum of PTSD symptoms. 
 Current information processing models of PTSD are largely based on theories of 
autobiographical memory that describe “normal” memory processes. For example, Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose a model of autobiographical memory in which 
information is stored in different levels of specificity. Very detailed memory representations 
that mainly consist of perceptual information are part of the Event Specific Knowledge (ESK) 
that forms episodic memories. Information in the ESK is usually abstracted into General 
Events that can include one or more events with a common theme. At the top of this hierarchy 
are Lifetime Periods that describe more general knowledge about a certain life-time period. 
Specific patterns of activation across these levels define an autobiographical memory. Goals 
of the self direct the formation of knowledge structures and hence regulate the organisation 
and retrieval of autobiographical memories. Theories of PTSD aim to specify what processes 
in memory formation depart from “normal” processing in order to explain PTSD symptoms. 
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Figure 1. Model reprinted from Ehlers and Clark (2000). 
 
The cognitive model of PTSD 
 One information processing theory that is very influential in experimental research on 
intrusive images is the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The model 
acknowledges that post-traumatic stress symptoms are a normal phenomenon in the direct 
aftermath of a traumatic event. A main difference between ‘normal’ and pathological 
reactions, according to this model, is the experience of ‘current threat’ in PTSD, which, as 
mentioned earlier, also delineates an important difference between PTSD and other anxiety 
disorders. According to the cognitive model of PTSD, current threat is caused by extremely 
negative appraisals of the traumatic event and its consequences and by characteristics of the 
trauma memory itself. Although the main focus of the model is on the persisting power of the 
negative appraisals, the quality of the trauma memory plays a crucial part as well. The 
cognitive model of PTSD suggests that conceptual processing leads to ‘normal’ 
autobiographical memory representations that can be retrieved deliberately. In contrast, more 
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data-driven processing (e.g., being absorbed by sensory information) leads to memory 
representations that relatively lack a conceptual context and are therefore easily activated by 
internal or external cues. Data-driven processing leads to an enhanced perceptual priming 
effect for traumatic material. This entails that traumatic information in memory is especially 
sensitive for perceptually similar stimuli that automatically trigger the trauma memory 
representation. Ehlers and Clark (2000) offer extensive suggestions of treatment interventions 
based on their model. One of their suggestions is to reduce current threat by learning to 
discriminate between the past (the time of the traumatic event) and the present by looking at 
differences between objectively neutral stimuli that signalled danger then but not now. This 
way, the traumatic event is thought to become more integrated in autobiographical memory 
and unhelpful appraisals that maintain symptomatology are corrected. 
 
The dual representation theory 
 Another influential information processing model of PTSD is the dual representation 
theory (DRT; Brewin, 1989; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 2001). DRT states 
that information from a traumatic event is represented in two separate memory systems. This 
idea is based on the distinction between conscious processing, which is a slow and serial 
process wherein reflective meaning is conveyed to the information that is encoded, and a 
more automatic processing of raw (often sensory) information. The latter process operates in a 
parallel fashion, thereby having more or less unlimited processing capacity. Memory 
representations that stem from this automatic processing contain mostly sensory information 
from the event, but also the meaning that was assigned at the time (e.g., this is a life-
threatening situation). Memory representations stemming from more conscious processing 
can also involve perceptual features but are foremostly integrated in a conceptual context 
bound by the temporal and causal structure of the event. These representations can be 
retrieved deliberately from autobiographical memory, and are apt to change due to conscious 
reprocessing. These memory representations are called Verbally Accessible Memories 
(VAMs). DRT states that during a traumatic event, the conscious processing of information is 
interfered through hormonal changes that are associated with extreme stress reactions. In 
contrast, the more automatic processing is not much affected by extreme stress, and may even 
be enhanced. The memory representations that stem from automatic processing have not been 
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subjected to conscious elaboration and assignment of meaning, so they cannot be retrieved 
deliberately. However, because they contain detailed sensory information, these memory 
representations are automatically activated by stimuli that bare similar sensory qualities 
(visual, olfactory, bodily sensations, emotions, etcetera) with the information that is encoded. 
Therefore, in the DRT (Brewin, 1989; Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 2001), the latter memory 
representations have been termed Situationally Accessible Memories (SAMs). In effect, the 
SAMs constitute the involuntarily recalled experiences - or intrusive images - after a 
traumatic event. Depending on several factors (e.g., duration and severity of trauma, tolerance 
for involuntary recall experiences, amount and quality of social support, avoidance 
behaviour), emotional processing can be successful and stress symptoms decrease. In other 
cases, emotional processing is inhibited or becomes chronic (Brewin, 1989; Brewin et al., 
1996; Brewin, 2001).  
 
Figure 2. Model reprinted from Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph (1996). 
  
It is noted here that the DRT (Brewin, 1989; Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 2001) and 
the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) differ in some respects. Whereas DRT 
provides a detailed account of peri-traumatic processing, the focus of the cognitive model of 
PTSD lies in the concept of “current threat” and negative appraisals in relation to the 
traumatic event and its consequences. DRT (Brewin, 1989; Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 
2001) describes different outcomes of peri-traumatic information processing and discusses 
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possible neurological correlates, whereas the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) focuses more on clinical implications for the treatment of PTSD. However, there is a 
convergence in that both models are based on theories that describe “normal” memory 
processes (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Furthermore, the concepts of VAMs and 
SAMs in DRT are closely related to the idea of data-driven processing and conceptual 
processing in the cognitive model of PTSD, respectively. What is most important for the 
purpose of the current chapter, as argued by Holmes & Bourne (2008), is the idea that 
intrusive images stem from a sensory form of processing with a relative lack of conceptual 
processing. 
 
An empirical view on information processing theories of PTSD 
 In a recent review of experimental investigations of intrusion development, Holmes 
and Bourne (2008) proposed an empirical model based on information processing theories of 
PTSD. The model simplifies and explicates the overlap between the DRT (Brewin et al., 
1996; Brewin, 1989, 2001) and the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) to aid 
the generation of specific and testable hypotheses in the study of intrusion development in 
trauma.  
Figure 3. Model reprinted from Holmes & Bourne (2008). 
 
 The empirical model by Holmes and Bourne (2008) proposes that memory 
representations become intrusive when the balance between peri-traumatic visuospatial and 
verbal information processing is shifted towards the first. Importantly, both types of 
information processing are present during encoding, and it is the relative balance that 
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accounts for the subsequent intrusive experiences. Thus, during a traumatic event, information 
processing is in a highly perceptual form, relatively lacking conceptual processing, leading to 
involuntary recall in the form of intrusive images. According to this assumption, an increase 
in intrusive images occurs by either enhancing perceptual processing or by interfering with 
verbal processing. A decrease in intrusive images occurs by either interfering with perceptual 
processing or by enhancing verbal processing. With regard to perceptual processing, it is 
noted that information of all sensory modalities (smell, vision, hearing, touch and taste) is 
important. However, since traumatic intrusions are mainly visual in nature (e.g., Speckens et 
al., 2007), the empirical model by Holmes and Bourne (2008) as well as laboratory studies of 
intrusion development have mainly focused on visual perceptual processing.  
 In sum, theoretical models of PTSD (i.e., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996; 
Brewin, 1989, 2001) are useful for a complex understanding of PTSD symptoms that go 
beyond the re-experiencing criterion. With regard to empirical research, a simpler model as 
proposed by Holmes and Bourne (2008) is useful for formulating clear and testable 
hypotheses on circumstances under which memory representations become intrusive.  
 
Empirical Investigations of Intrusive Trauma Memories 
Trauma film paradigm 
 One obvious challenge in studying the cognitive mechanisms of intrusive images is 
that in the case of PTSD, the traumatic event already happened. That is, it is difficult to 
systematically study encoding processes or even psychological responses in the early 
aftermath of a traumatic event. Obviously, there are ethical reasons why a traumatic event 
cannot be simulated. Therefore, experimental studies have used analogue traumatic situations 
like aversive film clips to study intrusion development.  
 In the 'trauma film paradigm' (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), participants view a ‘trauma 
film’ as an analogue traumatic event under controlled circumstances. A trauma film usually 
depicts events that can be defined as traumatic according to the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000): 
involving actual or threatened death, serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity of the 
self or others (Criterion A; APA, 2000). For example, one often used trauma film (Steil, 
1996) shows real-life footage of the aftermath of road traffic accidents (RTAs) in which 
victims are severely injured or dead. Participants are typically healthy university students. 
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Before film viewing, measures of individual differences can be collected. Before and after 
film viewing, measures of state variables (e.g., mood) are administered to check the impact of 
the film. Participants are then instructed to report any intrusive images of the film in a diary 
for a period of time, usually one week, and then return for follow-up. In the follow-up session 
the diary entries can be discussed and measures relating to the film (e.g., memory 
questionnaires) can be collected (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). To manipulate information 
processing during the film, participants can, for example, be instructed to view the film from a 
certain perspective, or perform a concurrent task that taps into differential cognitive resources.  
 Regardless of the clear differences between a trauma film and real trauma, there are 
clues indicating that the quality of the underlying mechanisms of intrusion development is 
comparable. Support for this notion was reviewed by Holmes (2004), suggesting that forms of 
involuntary recall can be placed on a continuum. On one side of the continuum, there is the 
involuntary recall as it is experienced in PTSD, such as the full-blown “flashbacks”. On the 
other side of the continuum, one can place involuntary recall from viewing a trauma film. The 
studies reviewed by Holmes (2004) suggest that the main features of intrusive experiences, 
i.e., mainly visual images of details or scenes of the trauma, are shared across the continuum. 
For example, it was found that London school children experienced post-traumatic stress 
symptoms after viewing 9-11 events on television (Holmes, Creswell, & O’Connor, 2007).  
 
Early uses of the trauma film paradigm 
 Even before the acknowledgement of PTSD in the DSM-III in 1980, the trauma film 
paradigm was used to explore physiological stress reactions under controlled circumstances. 
In several experiments, Lazarus and colleagues (e.g., Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus & 
Opton, 1964) studied the effect of threat from a stressful film on skin conductance and heart 
rate. To illustrate, in one study (Folkins, Lawson, Opton, & Lazarus, 1968), participants 
received three sessions of training (relaxation, simulated desensitization, or cognitive 
rehearsal training) or no training. After the third session, participants viewed a stressful film 
showing work-related accidents and applied their trained skills. The results showed 
differential effects for the different training conditions on skin conductance and heart rate 
measures. The first studies to use the trauma film paradigm to explore more psychological 
constructs, like involuntary recall, were done by Horowitz (1969). In these studies, it was 
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shown for the first time that intrusive images can occur in healthy participants after a mild 
stressor such as an aversive film. Where Lazarus and colleagues used terms like “short-
circuiting of threat” (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & Rankin, 1965) that 
are reminiscent of an early information processing view, Horowitz introduced the term 
“cognitive processing” in 1975 to describe how intrusive images after viewing a stressful film 
occurred. In one study (Horowitz, 1969) participants viewed a neutral and a stressful film and 
reported their subjective experiences during a distraction task after the film. The participants’ 
reports showed significantly more intrusive experiences from the stressful film than from the 
neutral film in the 24 hours following film viewing. 
 
Recent findings exploring peri-traumatic processing 
 Based on the distinction between data-driven processing and conceptual processing as 
formulated in the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), Halligan, Clark, and 
Ehlers (2002) manipulated information processing style during film viewing. Participants 
were instructed to focus on, and become absorbed by, the perceptual information (data-driven 
processing condition), or with the instruction to concentrate on the order and causes of the 
events in the film (conceptual processing condition). Intrusive experiences were measured 
with a questionnaire at one-week follow-up. The results showed no differences between the 
two conditions with regard to intrusion frequency. The authors argued that individual 
preferences for processing style might have overruled the experimental instructions. In other 
words, some people may naturally engage in more data-driven or conceptual processing than 
others. In the second experiment, Halligan et al. (2002; Experiment 2) tested natural groups 
based on a cognitive processing style screening (Ehlers, 1998). Both groups viewed a stressful 
film and, in line with the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), participants with a 
more data-driven processing style reported more intrusive experiences compared to 
participants with a more conceptual processing style. The findings suggest that a preferred 
cognitive processing style is important in intrusion development but not easily manipulated by 
explicit instructions.  
 Brewin and Saunders (2001) initially set out to test the idea that peri-traumatic 
dissociation is related to intrusion development. The term 'dissociation' describes experiences 
that indicate that cognitive processes normally functioning in an integrated way can become 
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disrupted by high stress levels. This disruption can result in a change in consciousness and 
perception (Holmes, 2005). Examples are feeling like being in a dream or being a character in 
a film, rather than having a first person experience (derealisation), or feeling disconnected 
from your body (depersonalization). In one condition, participants viewed a trauma film 
without an extra task. In the experimental condition, participants viewed the film while 
performing a concurrent task (tapping a complex key pattern). Participants then reported their 
intrusive images from the film in a diary for two weeks. It was hypothesized that the 
concurrent task would divide attention and thus create a situation analogous of dissociation, 
leading to more intrusive images. Contrary to predictions, the participants in the concurrent 
task condition reported fewer intrusive images than participants in the no task control 
condition. Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy (2004) proposed that the concurrent tapping task had 
placed a demand on visuospatial processing resources that are required for the processing of 
visual (and spatial) information. A visuospatial task in this respect is defined as a task that 
requires resources of working memory for the processing of visual and spatial information 
(i.e., the visuospatial sketchpad; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). By this, the visuospatial 
processing of the film material was reduced by a competing demand from the tapping task, 
leading to a decrease in intrusive images. 
 This “concurrent task” hypothesis led to a series of experiments further exploring a 
dual processing account of PTSD. In the first experiment, Holmes et al. (2004) showed 
participants a trauma film under one of three conditions: no extra task, with a visuospatial 
tapping task, or after a dot-staring task used to induce dissociation. Although the participants 
in the dot-staring condition reported a higher increase in state dissociation from pre- to post-
film compared to the other conditions, their number of intrusive images was not significantly 
different from participants in the no task control condition. Participants in the visuospatial 
tapping condition, however, reported fewer intrusive images after one week compared to both 
participants in the no task control condition and the dot-staring condition. This finding 
replicates the effect by Brewin and Saunders (2001), in line with predictions formulated by 
Holmes et al. (2004). 
 In the second experiment, Holmes et al. (2004) varied the amount of cognitive load of 
the visuospatial task by having participants tap a single key, an overpractised visuospatial 
pattern or a complex visuospatial pattern while viewing the trauma film. In the overpractised 
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pattern condition, participants performed the pattern tapping until they were able to perform 
the task effortlessly. In the complex pattern condition, participants performed the same 
tapping task without practice. In line with predictions, the number of intrusive images from 
the trauma film reported after one week was lowest in the complex visuospatial tapping 
condition, followed by the overpractised tapping condition. The single key tapping was not 
significantly different from no task. 
 Further evidence for the role of peri-traumatic visuospatial processing in intrusion 
development stems from a study by Stuart, Holmes, and Brewin (2006). Instead of performing 
the tapping task, participants performed an alternative visuospatial task - modelling cubes and 
pyramids alternately from clay. A similar task is sometimes used in clinical practice to help 
PTSD patients remain grounded during imaginal exposure interventions, when the trauma 
memory is vividly brought back to mind. Participants performed the clay task during one part 
of the trauma film. During the other part of the task they did not perform any concurrent task. 
By specifying the scene of the intrusive images in the intrusion diary, the intrusive images 
could be linked to a specific film part. In line with predictions, participants reported fewer 
intrusive images from the film part during which they were modelling clay than during which 
they had not performed an extra task. 
 The role peri-traumatic conceptual processing has also been studied. The third 
experiment in Holmes et al. (2004) was designed to investigate verbal processing in relation 
to intrusion development. Participants viewed a trauma film under one of three conditions: 
without an extra task, while counting backwards out loud in 3’s, or while verbalizing the 
unfolding scenes out loud (verbal enhancement). It was hypothesized that counting backwards 
in 3’s would increase intrusion frequency by interfering with the verbal processing of the 
film. Indeed, after one week, participants in the counting backwards condition reported more 
intrusive images from the film compared to both the no task control condition and the verbal 
enhancement condition. The prediction that the verbal enhancement task would decrease 
intrusive images was not supported. The authors note that, on closer inspection, participants in 
the verbal enhancement condition seemed to verbalize mainly physical aspects of the film, so 
the lack of a decrease could be due to low task compliance. The effect of the verbal 
interference task has been replicated and extended in two experiments (Bourne, Frasquilho, 
Roth, & Holmes, 2008); by using the instruction of counting backwards in 7’s instead of 3’s. 
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In a study by Nixon, Nehmy, and Seymour (2007), participants viewed an aversive film under 
one of three conditions: while having a cognitive load (having to remember a 9-digit number), 
while hyperventilating, or without a concurrent task. The cognitive load task was used to 
prevent verbal processing of the film. For the purpose of the current chapter we only report 
the results on the cognitive load task and the no task control condition. Intrusive images were 
measured immediately post-film with a free thinking task. Intrusive experiences after one 
week were measured with a questionnaire (Impact of Event Scale; Weiss & Marmer, 1997). 
In line with predictions, the participants in the cognitive load task reported more frequent 
intrusive images immediately post-film compared to the no task control group. However, after 
one week, there was no significant difference between the cognitive load group and the no 
task control group. Pearson, Sawyer, and Holmes (2008) tested the effect of a visuospatial 
task and a cognitive load task. Instead of a trauma film, participants viewed negatively and 
positively valenced pictures. During picture viewing, participants performed a visuospatial 
tapping task, a random number generation (RNG) task, or no concurrent task. RNG requires 
participants to say aloud numbers from 1 to 10 in a random fashion. This induces a cognitive 
load since the production of non-random series needs to be monitored continuously. 
Surprisingly, the results showed that participants in both the visuospatial tapping condition 
and the RNG condition showed a decrease in intrusive images for both negatively and 
positively valenced pictures after one week compared to the no task control condition. The 
finding that the visuospatial tapping task reduced intrusive images is in line with the 
information processing models of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 2001, 2003; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). However, the finding that the RNG condition also reduced intrusive images was 
surprising. In a further examination, Pearson et al. (2008) modulated the cognitive load of 
both the visuospatial task and the RNG task. The results showed that increasing cognitive 
load decreased intrusion frequency for both tasks. 
 Table 1 reviews the studies described above. Although the findings from studies 
manipulating visuospatial processing are rather robust, attempts to manipulate intrusion 
frequency through the manipulation of verbal processing have come up with conflicting 
results.
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Recent findings exploring post-traumatic processing 
 The large majority of research on information processing models of PTSD has focused 
on peri-traumatic processing. To date, only a few studies have looked at post-traumatic 
processes, although this is important for several reasons. First, there is a theoretical 
importance. Is the distinction between visuospatial and verbal processing as relevant post-
traumatically as it is thought to be peri-traumatically? And can consolidation of information 
in memory still be manipulated? Second, if post-traumatic processing can be manipulated this 
has implications for possible treatment or prevention interventions. The latter reason is 
especially important, since studies on the effectiveness of intervention immediately post-
trauma are rather mixed, with some studies showing an improvement in PTSD symptoms 
(Sijbrandij et al., 2007), but some showing a disturbing worsening of stress symptoms (e.g., 
Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, & Bannister, 1997; Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000). Importantly, 
clinical guidelines of the treatment of PTSD (National Institute of Clinical Excellence, 2003) 
do not recommend interventions immediately post-trauma for aforementioned reasons. 
Research on information processing post-trauma could be helpful in shedding light on these 
discrepancies and possibly aid in the development of effective prevention interventions.  
 The few studies that have used the trauma film paradigm to look at post-film effects 
differ in the extent to which they directly assess an information processing account as outlined 
in this chapter. As noted, information processing models of PTSD like the DRT (Brewin et 
al., 1996; Brewin, 1989, 2001) and the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) 
come down to the idea that the initial encoding of traumatic information is a major factor in 
the development of intrusive traumatic images. The event-specific knowledge, often raw 
sensory details, of the traumatic event is not further integrated in the autobiographical 
knowledge base (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and is therefore prone to automatic 
activation through internal or external stimuli that are similar in sensory qualities. The 
implication is that if the trauma memory becomes more integrated within autobiographical 
memory, intrusive images should decrease.   
 Butler, Wells, and Dewick (1995) explored the effect of worry and imagery on 
intrusive images after film viewing. Participants were instructed to either worry about the film 
in verbal form (worry group), imagine the film in mental pictures (imagery group), or take 
some time to settle down (control group) after the film. Participants reported intrusive images 
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of the film in a diary. After three days, participants in the worry group reported significantly 
more intrusive images from the film compared to both the imagery group and the control 
group. Although this study does not explicitly test an information processing account of 
PTSD, their results do have implications for post-trauma processing. Although worrying is a 
verbal activity, it is very preoccupied with questions about what could have happened and 
possible (negative) implications. Worry, then, is importantly distinct from verbal conceptual 
processing as it may not reflect contextualizing a stressful event in a helpful way. With regard 
to post-film perceptual processing, one recent study by Holmes, James, Deeprose, and Coode-
Bate (2009), showed that performing a visuospatial task (playing Tetris) after a trauma film 
also successfully reduces intrusive images from the film compared to no task. The final study 
that is discussed here is unique in that it is one of the first studies to use the trauma film 
paradigm to explore a possible application for clinical practice. Cognitions about a traumatic 
event and its consequences are important in the maintenance of intrusive images (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). A frequently used measure of post-traumatic cognitions is the PTCI (Post 
Traumatic Cognitions Inventory; Foa et al., 1999). Based on this questionnaire, Mackintosh, 
Woud, Postma, Dalgleish, and Holmes (submitted) created a trauma specific Cognitive Bias 
Modification (CBM) training (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) used for the indirect training of 
participants for a positive or negative interpretation of analogue post-traumatic stress 
symptoms. Participants were presented with incomplete, ambiguous scenarios based on items 
of the PTCI Self-scale. The scenarios contained typical post-trauma cognitions, e.g., how well 
a person thinks he/she can cope with the trauma or whether he/she beliefs to have acted 
adequately during the traumatic event. Participants were instructed to complete these 
scenarios in either a positive or negative way. It was hypothesised that this training would 
induce an interpretation bias towards analogue trauma symptoms compatible to the valence of 
the participants’ training condition. After the training (Experiment 1), participants viewed a 
trauma film and then recorded their intrusive images of the film in a one-week diary. The 
results showed that although there were no differences in the frequency of intrusive images, 
the distress that accompanied the intrusive images was significantly lower in the positive 
training condition compared to the negative training. In a second experiment, the same trauma 
CBM procedure was applied after film viewing. This time, participants in the positive 
condition reported a lower intrusion frequency, but not intrusion distress, compared to the 
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negative condition. However, when intrusive thoughts and images were included that could 
not be traced back directly to the film, like in Experiment 1, differences in distress emerged in 
the same pattern as in Experiment 1. Overall, these findings indicate that the trauma film 
paradigm could prove to be useful for testing clinical applications. Further, the study 
illustrates that negative cognitions about ones reactions to a traumatic event relate to both a 
higher frequency of intrusive images as well as higher distress associated with the intrusive 
thoughts and images. These results are obviously in line with the role of appraisals in the 
onset and maintenance of PTSD, as described in the cognitive model of PTSD by Ehlers and 
Clark (2000).  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
 The goal of this chapter was to provide and review an information processing 
perspective on involuntary recall after psychological trauma. Historically, the 
acknowledgement of PTSD as a psychiatric disorder has not been straightforward, partly due 
to political and social factors. However, even before this, PTSD theory and experimental 
research has been innovative, especially when we consider that this chapter has only 
addressed the very specific topic of intrusive image-based trauma memories.  
 As noted, an influential perspective on involuntary recall in PTSD comes from an 
information processing tradition. Two important information processing theories were 
discussed, namely the dual representation theory by Brewin and colleagues (1996, 1989, 
2001) and the cognitive model of PTSD by Ehlers and Clark (2000). Although they differ on 
several aspects, both theories converge on the idea that the initial encoding of traumatic 
information in memory lies at the heart of involuntary recall in PTSD. With this in mind, 
Holmes and Bourne (2008) developed a pragmatic model of PTSD to guide the design and 
interpretation of experimental studies of intrusive images. In light of the successful results on 
visuospatial processing and mixed findings with regard to verbal processing, the model needs 
further study. 
 In relation to providing support for the information processing view of involuntary 
recall in PTSD, the trauma film paradigm has proven to be a useful tool to study causal 
influences of underlying mechanisms that are not accessible by studying actual PTSD 
patients. 
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 With regard to peri-traumatic information processing, research findings continue to 
provide support for the idea that intrusive images rely on an image-based memory system that 
stems from initial encoding of trauma information that is not integrated within 
autobiographical memory. Studies showing that specific interference of peri-traumatic 
visuospatial processing (e.g., Halligan et al., 2002; Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 
Experiment 1 and 2, 2004; Stuart et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2008) reduces the frequency of 
intrusive images from a trauma film provide support for this. Findings related to peri-
traumatic verbal processing have yielded mixed results, with some studies showing that 
interfering with verbal processing reduces intrusive images (e.g., Holmes et al., Experiment 3, 
2004; Nixon et al., 2007; Bourne et al., 2008), and one showing the opposite effect (e.g., 
Pearson et al., 2008).  
 One exciting field of research that has started to emerge is the study of post-traumatic 
processing. So far, findings are encouraging in that a visuospatial task after film viewing 
induced a reduction in subsequent intrusive images (Holmes et al., 2008). Because the 
aftermath of trauma defines the moment when PTSD symptoms are presented, studies like the 
CBM training by Mackintosh et al. (submitted) are promising for possible application in 
clinical practice.  
 We started this chapter by emphasizing the importance of autobiographical memory, 
how it gives us a personal identity and a life story to tell. It is not difficult to see how 
memory-related problems in trauma, such as intrusive re-experiencing, can have a profound 
impact on the life of an individual. Therefore, the study of post-traumatic stress symptoms 
such as intrusive images remains highly important.
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Motion effects on intrusion development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., Holmes E. A., & Becker, E. S. (2010). Motion 
effects on intrusion development. Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 11, 73-82. 
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Abstract 
 Analogue studies on intrusion development have found that visuospatial tasks 
performed during the encoding of aversive information reduce subsequent intrusion 
development. However, these studies cannot rule out a physical explanation in terms of 
simple movement. In the current study we addressed this issue. Healthy participants viewed 
an aversive film while performing a visuospatial movement task, a configurational movement 
task, or no task. Intrusive images from the film were reported in a diary during the week 
following film viewing. In line with an information-processing account of posttraumatic stress 
disorder, intrusion frequency was significantly reduced by the visuospatial movement task but 
not the configurational movement task compared to no task. This finding supports the specific 
role of visuospatial processing in intrusion development. 
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Introduction  
 Intrusive images can be defined as images of a traumatic event that come into mind 
uncontrollably. Intrusive images in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are mainly of a 
visual nature (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007), and visuospatial 
processing is thought to play a critical role in intrusion development. During extreme stress, 
information processing is thought to shift toward more visuospatial processing, resulting in 
image-based trauma representations that are prone to automatic intrusive activation (Holmes 
& Bourne, 2008). 
 Experimental studies have shown that performing a visuospatial task (e.g., complex 
pattern tapping) during the encoding of an aversive film reduces subsequent intrusion 
frequency (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Stuart, Holmes, & 
Brewin, 2006). However, movement per se is confounded with the visuospatial aspect in these 
studies. Hagenaars, Van Minnen, Holmes, Brewin, and Hoogduin (2008) found that 
participants who were instructed not to move during an aversive film reported more intrusive 
images after 1 week compared to participants who could move freely. This gives rise to the 
idea that movement per se could have the reverse effect. A critical test is needed of the effects 
of visuospatial versus non-visuospatial movement on intrusion development. 
 Configurational movements by definition rely on propriospatial information and not 
on visuospatial processing. Smyth, Pearson, and Pendleton (1988) found that performing a 
visuospatial tapping task interfered with visuospatial recall but not with movement recall. 
Conversely, configurational movement tasks (continuously tapping body parts with the hands, 
hand squeezing) interfered with configurational but not visuospatial recall (Smyth et al., 1988; 
Smyth & Pendleton, 1989). 
 In terms of suitability for the current study, the body-tapping task in Smyth et al. 
(1988) could interfere with film viewing, and the squeezing task used by Smyth and 
Pendleton (1989) might affect heart rate, which has been shown to relate to intrusion 
development (Holmes et al., 2004). Therefore, we chose a complex gum-chewing task. This 
involved chewing the gum from the left jaw to the front teeth, the right jaw, the left jaw, and 
back again continuously. This task does not interfere with film viewing, is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on heart rate, and involves propriospatial but not visuospatial imagery. 
Research on infant imitation behaviour supports the idea that tongue movements rely on a 
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proprioceptive system and not on visuospatial processing (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983a, 1983b, 
1989). 
 We also included measures of dissociation and cognitive avoidance in this study. 
Dissociation is described as “a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, 
memory, identity, or perception” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 519). 
Retrospective studies (e.g., Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003) and prospective studies 
(Engelhard, Van Den Hout, Kindt, Arntz, & Schouten, 2003; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 
2002) have shown a relation between dissociation  and intrusion development, and earlier 
studies have shown that dissociation can be induced by an aversive film (Brewin & Saunders, 
2001; Holmes et al., 2004). 
 The main goals of the present study were (a) to replicate the finding of lower intrusion 
frequency from a concurrent visuospatial task (complex pattern tapping) during the encoding 
of an aversive film and (b) to distinguish between the effects of visuospatial versus non-
visuospatial movement on intrusion development using a configurational task. Based on an 
empirical account of information-processing in PTSD (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), we expected 
that the visuospatial task would result in lower intrusion frequency than both no task and the 
configurational task, which in turn was expected not to affect intrusion frequency compared to 
no task. If both movement tasks reduce intrusion frequency compared to no task, this would 
count against the specific role of visuospatial processing in intrusion development (Holmes et 
al., 2004). 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants, all psychology students, were recruited on a university campus using 
flyers and posters. As required by the ethical committee (Commissie Mensgebonden 
Onderzoek [CMO], Approval No. 2005/063), flyers and posters contained information about 
the violent nature of the film. Participants received 24 Euros for participating. Exclusion 
criteria were panic attacks, panic disorder, PTSD, major depressive episode (current or 
lifetime), blood phobia, history of fainting, and history of road traffic accidents. No 
participants dropped out. Data were collected from 54 participants (34 women, 20 men). 
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Participants’ mean age was 21 years, 9 months (SD = 3 years, 10 months). Age and gender 
were comparable across conditions. 
 The visuospatial tapping task, mood questionnaire, attention rating, cued recall and 
recognition memory tests, diary compliance rating, and intrusion diary were the same as in 
Holmes et al. (2004). All questionnaires were presented on a personal computer using 
Perseus® software (Version 6). 
 
Materials 
 Aversive film. The film contained four scenes of the aftermath of real life road traffic 
accidents showing car wrecks, bloody wounds, and dead bodies being moved (Hagenaars et 
al., 2008; Steil, 1996). The film was projected onto a smooth white wall, and sound was 
presented through headphones. 
 Experimental tasks. A 5 × 5 matrix keyboard with letters running from A to Y (“Moar 
box”) was used for the visuospatial tapping task. Participants continuously tapped the 
complex pattern JYPVA as fast and as accurately as possible during the film while the tapping 
hand was out of sight. For the configurational task, participants chewed sugar-free gum 
(peppermint flavour). Participants in the visuospatial and the configurational movement 
conditions practiced the task for 1 min before the film was started. All participants were 
instructed to view the film as if they were witnesses, not to look away, and to pay full 
attention to the film. To enhance task compliance we told participants that they were being 
videotaped (a recording was not actually made). 
 
Measures 
 Emotional impact of the film. A mood questionnaire was used to rate current 
happiness, fear, horror, depression, and anger on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = not at all, 10 = 
extremely). The Dutch version of the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Van der Ploeg, 
1980) was used to assess state anxiety. It contains 20 items about the individual’s current 
level of anxiety, with ratings from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The STAI has 
satisfactory reliability and validity (Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
 Dissociation. Trait dissociation was measured with the Dutch version of the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale–Revised (DES-II; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). The DES-II 
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consists of 28 items and rates the frequency of dissociative phenomena on an 11-point scale 
with a 10% interval from 0% (never) to 100% (always). It has satisfactory reliability and 
validity (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). State dissociation 
was measured with the Dutch version of the self-report Dissociative States Scale (DSS; 
Bremner et al., 1998). It contains 19 items rating current dissociative phenomena on a 5-point 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Reliability and validity are sufficient (Bremner et 
al., 1998). 
 Attention and memory for the film. Attention was rated on an 11-point scale (0 = not at 
all focused on the film, 10 = attention completely focused on the film) as an indirect measure 
of task difficulty. The cued recall memory test contained two to four open-ended questions 
per scene (e.g., “What body parts were wounded and bleeding when the woman was freed 
from the minivan and was lying down on the stretcher?”). The recognition memory test 
contained three to five statements per scene (e.g., “The paramedics covered the students’ head 
with bandage” yes/no). 
 Compliance and demand. Diary compliance was rated on a scale from 0 (never forgot 
to write down the intrusion) to 10 (always forgot to write down the intrusion). Participants 
were asked about the perceived goal of the study with an open-ended question. 
 Cognitive avoidance. A single-item question (“During the last week, how strongly 
have you tried to push away or suppress thoughts and images of the film?”) was rated on a 7-
point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). The item correlates highly (r = .62, p < .001; 
Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009b) with the avoidance subscale of the Impact of Event 
Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979), and similar single-item avoidance measures have 
been used in previous research (e.g., Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001). 
 Intrusive images. Intrusive images were recorded in a one-week diary. Participants 
indicated whether the intrusion was an image, a verbal thought, or both and provided a 
content description. Participants were required to check their entries at a fixed time every day. 
 
Procedure 
 After signing informed consent, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire 
(age, gender, and education), the DES-II, the DSS, the STAI-S, and the mood questionnaire. 
Then participants received instructions according to their condition and practiced their task 
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for 1 min. Participants were told that they could quit the experiment at any time. Participants 
viewed the film and then filled out the DSS, the mood questionnaire, the STAI-S, and the 
attention rating. During the week between the first session and follow-up, participants 
reported their intrusions of the film in the diary. At follow-up they filled out the cued recall 
and the recognition memory tests, the diary compliance rating, and an open-ended question 
about the goal of the study. The participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Method of Analysis 
 For variables that showed a violation of homogeneity of variance according to 
Levene’s statistic, the corrected t value is reported. A priori hypotheses were examined using 
directional tests. The number of intrusive images did not have a normal distribution, so 
Spearman correlations were used. For all analyses, an alpha of .05 was the level of 
significance. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Results 
Outliers and Task Compliance 
 The diary data were checked for outliers (more than 3 SD from the mean) using 
boxplots. One multivariate outlier (in the visuospatial tapping condition) was removed from 
the data set. One univariate outlier was changed into one unit smaller than the next extreme 
score in that condition (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
 The mean number of tapped keys and correct sequences were compared to those 
reported in Holmes et al. (2004; Experiment 1) with two one-sample t tests. These showed 
comparable performance (both ps > .05). 
 
Control Measures 
 Emotional impact. A 2 Time (pre-film, post-film) x 3 Condition (control, visuospatial 
tapping, configurational gum chewing) mixed ANOVA was done with condition as the 
between-subjects factor and the mood questionnaire and STAI-S as the dependent variables. 
The overall within-subject effect was significant, F(6, 46) = 13.53, p < .001, f = 1.33, and the 
univariate within-subject effects were significant (all ps < .05), indicating a significant 
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emotional impact of the film. There was no significant effect of condition or an interaction 
effect (both ps > .05). 
 Dissociation. A 2 Time (pre-film, post-film) × 3 Condition (control, visuospatial 
tapping, configurational gum chewing) mixed ANOVA with state dissociation as the 
dependent variable showed a significant increase from baseline to post-film, F(1, 51) = 4.06, 
MSE = 6.31, p = .05, f = 0.27. There was no significant effect of condition (p < .05) and no 
significant interaction effect (p < .05). Trait dissociation and state dissociation (pre-film, post-
film, and change) were not significantly correlated with intrusion frequency (all ps > .05). 
Attention and memory. A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between 
the conditions with regard to the attention rating for the film, F(2, 51) = 1.48, MSE = 1.51, p = 
.24, indicating that the tasks were comparable on required attention and task difficulty. 
 A one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference between the conditions on the 
cued recall memory test, F(2, 51) = 4.40, MSE = 3.25, p = .02, f = 0.42. Post hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction showed a significantly better cued recall performance in the no-task 
control condition than the visuospatial tapping condition, SE = .61, p = .01. There was no 
significant difference between the configurational gum chewing condition and the other 
conditions, both ps > .05. Across conditions, cued recall performance was positively related to 
intrusion frequency, rs = .35, p = .01. A one-way ANOVA showed that recognition memory 
performance was comparable across conditions, p > .05. 
 Cognitive avoidance. A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between 
the conditions with regard to cognitive avoidance at follow-up, p < .05. There was no 
significant correlation with intrusion frequency, although there was a trend in the predicted 
direction, rs = .24, p = .08, with more avoidance related to more intrusions. 
Demand characteristics. None of the participants mentioned modulation of intrusion 
frequency by the two movement tasks when asked about the goal of the study. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for each experimental condition 
  No task Visuospatial tapping Configurational gum chewing 
Measure  M SD M SD M SD 
Total key presses  - - 807.19 404.99 - - 
Correct sequences  - - 148.31 62.67 - - 
Intrusion frequency  4.28  4.79 1.64 1.86 2.63 1.61 
Happiness pre-film 7.47 1.31 8.13 0.72 7.95 0.85 
 post-film 5.47 1.87 6.38 1.75 5.89 2.21 
Anxiety pre-film 1.89 1.41 2.13 1.41 1.89 1.41 
 post-film 2.11 1.60 3.38 2.36 2.58 2.01 
Horror pre-film 1.16 0.50 1.63 0.89 1.05 0.23 
 post-film 2.89 2.18 4.63 2.78 4.00 2.94 
Depressed mood pre-film 1.58 0.61 1.88 1.03 2.00 1.53 
 post-film 2.89 2.05 4.00 1.93 3.26 2.51 
Anger pre-film 1.16 0.38 1.69 1.01 1.21 0.54 
 post-film 1.32 0.95 2.63 2.25 2.37 2.31 
State anxiety 
(STAI-S) 
pre-film 31.68 5.97 30.31 5.88 31.53 7.31 
 post-film 36.63 6.92 37.50 8.85 36.11 9.67 
State dissociation 
(DSS) 
pre-film 21.00 1.83 21.44 3.24 21.95 3.01 
 post-film 21.74 3.46 23.00 7.27 22.58 2.97 
Trait dissociation  
(DES-II) 
 4.72 3.07 5.02 4.04 6.62 3.98 
Attention  8.68 1.06 8.13 1.20 8.05 1.39 
Cued-recall  7.00 1.56 5.19 2.34 6.21 1.47 
Cued-recognition  11.47 1.90 10.81 1.60 11.00 1.86 
Note: dashes stand for 'not applicable' 
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Intrusion Modulation 
 As predicted, participants in the visuospatial tapping condition reported significantly 
fewer intrusive images of the film compared to participants in the no-task control condition, 
corrected t(24.09) = 2.21, p = .02 (one-tailed), d = 0.78; and the configurational gum-chewing 
condition, t(33) = 1.70, p = .05 (one-tailed), d = 0.57. The difference between the 
configurational gum-chewing condition and the no-task control condition was not significant, 
corrected t(21.99) = 1.42, p = 0.17 (two-tailed). 
 We performed a hierarchical regression analysis to determine whether cued recall 
contributed to the prediction of intrusive images independent of experimental condition. The 
first block contained two dummy variables representing experimental condition. The second 
block contained the cued recall memory test. The first block reached significance, Fchange(2, 
51) = 3.13, p = .05, R2 change = 0.11. The second block did not increase the prediction 
significantly (p < .05). Thus, cued recall memory performance did not predict intrusive 
images after experimental condition was controlled for. 
 
Discussion 
 We aimed to replicate the finding that a visuospatial task performed during encoding 
protects against intrusion development after viewing an aversive film. We investigated 
whether visuospatial movement specifically or movement in general reduces intrusion 
development. Our results show that the visuospatial tapping task significantly reduced 
intrusion frequency compared to both the no-task control condition and the configurational 
gum-chewing condition, whereas the latter did not reduce intrusion frequency compared to no 
task. Attention or task difficulty did not seem to explain this difference. Our findings support 
an information-processing account of PTSD (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Although it has been 
found that non-movement is related to an increase in intrusion frequency (Hagenaars et al., 
2008), our results do not support an opposite effect. It is interesting that performance on the 
cued recall memory test after one week was positively related to the number of intrusive 
images. This fits an explanation in which the visuospatial tapping condition reduces 
visuospatial encoding, affecting both intrusion frequency and deliberate recall.  
 With regard to dissociation, our results replicate the finding by Holmes et al. (2004) 
that an aversive film can induce spontaneous dissociation. However, our effect was modest at 
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best. Neither state nor trait dissociation was related to the number of intrusive images in our 
study. Perhaps only higher levels of dissociation lead to intrusion development, and this was 
not induced in this analogue experiment. 
 The use of concurrent tasks in order to reduce intrusive images has also been endorsed 
by eye movement desensitization and reprocessing research. In a comprehensive series of 
experiments, Gunter and Bodner (2008) showed that vividness and emotionality of memory 
decreased according to the cognitive load of the task regardless of modality (visuospatial or 
verbal). This seems to contradict our present argument of a modality-specific effect of 
visuospatial processing. However, an important difference is that our study focused on 
encoding processes, whereas eye movement desensitization and reprocessing focuses on 
recoding of traumatic memories. A systematic study of modality (a)specific effects on 
intrusive memories directly comparing encoding and recall processes has not yet been done 
and would be an interesting future research direction. 
 The present study has some specific limitations. The gum-chewing task was created on 
the basis of the literature of configurational and proprioceptive movement, but we did not 
specifically test the assumption that it is not a visuospatial task. This leaves open the 
possibility that it may involve a visuospatial component after all, although our findings and 
previous research do not support this. Furthermore, we did not control for several measures 
that are thought to be related to intrusion development, such as repressive coping, 
neuroticism, and schizotypy. Avoidance was measured with a single item instead of a 
validated measure, for example the Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979). 
 In sum, our results suggest that it is not movement per se but visuospatial movement 
specifically that reduces intrusive images after one views an aversive film. This important 
finding confirms a central tenet of information-processing theories of PTSD that suggest that 
visuospatial processing rather than movement per se underlies intrusion development.
  42
 
  43
Chapter 4  
Count out your intrusions: Effects of verbal encoding on 
intrusive memories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., & Becker, E. S. (2009). Count out your 
intrusions: Effects of verbal encoding on intrusive memories. Memory, 17(8), 809-815. 
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Abstract 
 Peri-traumatic information processing is thought to affect the development of intrusive 
trauma memories. This study aimed to replicate and improve the study by Holmes, Brewin, 
and Hennessy (2004, Exp. 3) on the role of peri-traumatic verbal processing in analogue 
traumatic intrusion development. Participants viewed an aversive film under one of three 
conditions: counting backwards in 3s (‘‘verbal interference’’), verbalising emotions and 
thoughts (‘‘verbal enhancement’’), or without an extra task. A dual-process account of PTSD 
would predict that verbal interference would increase intrusion frequency compared to no 
task, whereas verbal enhancement would lead to a decrease. In contrast, mainstream memory 
theory predicts a decrease in intrusion frequency from any concurrent task that diverts 
attention away from the trauma film. The main finding was that the verbal interference task 
led to a decrease in intrusive memories of the film compared to the other two conditions. This 
finding does not support a dual-process account of PTSD, but is in line with general theories 
of memory and attention. 
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Introduction 
 A hallmark feature of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is re-experiencing the 
trauma through distressing intrusive memories (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Distortions in peri-traumatic information processing have been suggested 
as an important factor in intrusion development (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). The present study 
aimed to test the effect of interference versus enhancement of verbal processing during 
encoding of an aversive film on the frequency of subsequent intrusive memories. 
 The dual representation theory of PTSD (DRT; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) 
distinguishes between (a) trauma memory representations from conscious processing that can 
be deliberately retrieved (VAMs), and (b) image-based trauma memories (SAMs) that are 
automatically activated by perceptually similar cues and give rise to intrusive memories. 
According to DRT, conscious processing is impaired during high stress, leading to more 
SAMs than VAMs, which finally leads to intrusive trauma memories. Peri-traumatic verbal 
processing has been suggested to underlie the formation of VAMs (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; 
Holmes et al., 2004). Interfering with peri-traumatic verbal processing, then, should increase 
intrusion frequency, whereas enhancing verbal processing should decrease intrusion 
frequency by modulating VAM information. Additionally, verbal interference should 
decrease deliberate recall whereas verbal enhancement should increase deliberate recall 
compared to a no-task control condition. 
 More general theories of memory and attention (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1994; Cowan, 
1995; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin, 2006; Kirkegaard Thomsen & Berntsen, 
2009) suggest it depends on the retrieval process whether a memory will be intrusive or 
deliberately recalled (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008). For example, 
the self-memory-system (SMS) model (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) suggests that 
(traumatic) information is stored in its raw near-sensory form in the episodic memory system. 
Because of its threatening nature, traumatic information is not readily integrated into the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base and therefore automatic activation of traumatic 
episodic memories (i.e., intrusions) is not inhibited. Traumatic information is not stored in 
separate systems (e.g., VAMs and SAMs) but it lacks the natural integration into the 
autobiographical knowledge base. In terms of encoding, additional cognitive load generally 
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reduces encoding of the film (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Thus, verbal interference during film 
viewing should decrease both intrusion development and deliberate recall of the film. 
 The ‘‘trauma film paradigm’’ (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008, for a review) was 
developed to study peri-traumatic information processing. Typically, healthy participants are 
presented with an aversive film while performing a concurrent task. Participants report 
intrusive memories from the film in a 1-week diary. Studies have supported the role of 
visuospatial-perceptual information processing in intrusion development (e.g., Krans, Näring, 
Holmes, & Becker, 2010) but the role of verbal-conceptual processing is less well studied. 
This is surprising because the study of peri-traumatic verbal processing is critical for the dual-
processing account. Showing that intrusion frequency can increase through interference with 
peri-traumatic verbal processing would argue against a general distraction argument. In an 
important study, Holmes et al. (2004, Exp. 3) presented participants with an aversive film 
under one of three conditions: while counting backwards in 3s (‘‘verbal interference’’ task), 
while verbalising the impact of the film (‘‘verbal enhancement’’), or with no extra task. 
Predictions were based on DRT (Brewin et al., 1996) and, in line with this, participants in the 
counting backwards condition reported significantly more intrusive memories from the film 
compared to the control condition. The verbal enhancement condition showed a non-
significant trend towards more intrusions. However, on closer inspection it appeared that 
participants in the latter condition were verbalising physical features of the film, which is not 
thought to promote verbal-conceptual processing. The Holmes et al. (2004) study is important 
since it suggests that mere distraction is not an explanation for the results obtained in other 
trauma film paradigm studies. However, the results need to be replicated and the dual-
processing account needs to be contrasted with general memory and attention theory. Finally, 
participants did not perform the verbal enhancement task as intended and this task needs to be 
improved.  
 The present study aimed (a) to replicate the study by Holmes et al. (2004; Exp. 3) 
while contrasting dual-processing and mainstream memory views, and (b) to improve the 
verbal enhancement task using more extensive training. Participants viewed an aversive film 
under one of three conditions: counting backwards in 3s (verbal interference), verbalising the 
impact of the film (verbal enhancement), or no task. Participants reported intrusive memories 
of the film in a 1-week diary. Results in line with the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996) would be: (a) 
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a decrease in intrusive memories and an increase in deliberate recall of the film in the verbal 
enhancement condition compared to the no-task control condition and the verbal interference 
condition; and (b) an increase in intrusive memories and a decrease of deliberate recall in the 
verbal interference condition compared to both other conditions. However, more general 
theories of autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) would predict a 
decrease in intrusive memories and deliberate recall in the verbal interference condition 
compared to the no-task-control condition and the verbal enhancement condition. No specific 
difference would be expected between the verbal enhancement and the no-task-control 
condition as attention is film-related in both conditions. 
 
Method 
 This study has been approved by the ethical committee (CMO 2005/063). 
 
Participants 
 Participants, all psychology students, were recruited by flyers and posters that 
contained information about the violent content of the film. They received credit for 
participation. Data from 76 participants (11 men and 65 women) were collected (age M = 
21.84 years, range 18 30). Participants were screened for panic attacks, panic disorder, PTSD, 
major depressive episode, psychotic episode, blood phobia, history of fainting, and a history 
of car accidents. No students had to be excluded. 
 
Materials 
 Aversive film. The film consisted of three clips: (1) a female student in the aftermath of 
a traffic accident being medically attended to while crying out in pain (Steil, 1996; 2 minutes 
6 seconds); (2) a mother in a WWII concentration camp forced to choose which one of her 
two children will be killed (from the film Sophie’s Choice; 2 minutes 32 seconds); and (3) 
several short scenes showing mortally wounded children, faces burned with napalm, 
American soldiers talking about killing Iraqi citizens, and a woman crying out to Allah (from 
the documentary Fahrenheit 911 by Michael Moore; 2 minutes 10 seconds). The film was 
projected onto a smooth white wall with sound presented through headphones. 
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 Experimental tasks. All participants were instructed to pay full attention to the film as 
if being a witness. Participants in the verbal processing conditions received task training. For 
verbal enhancement, participants were instructed to verbalise their emotions, sensations, and 
thoughts during the film. An example was provided with a correct verbalisation (emotion, 
sensory experience, or thought) and an incorrect verbalisation (physical feature). Participants 
practised in the presence of the experimenter, who stopped and corrected the participant in a 
friendly way in the case of an incorrect verbalisation. When participants fell silent they were 
encouraged to continue verbalising out loud. Practice continued until the participant was able 
to perform the task without error for 1 minute. Participants in the verbal interference 
condition were instructed to count backwards in 3s from 958 during the film. To practise, 
participants counted backwards in 3s from 100 in the presence of the experimenter. In the 
case of an error, the experimenter stopped and corrected the participant in a friendly way. 
Participants then restarted counting from 100 until they reached number 1 or 1 minute had 
passed. When participants fell silent they were encouraged to continue counting out loud. 
During the film, an audio recording was made in all conditions with an unobtrusive 
microphone. 
 
Measures 
 Emotion. The mood questionnaire (Holmes et al., 2004) was used to rate current 
happiness, anxiety, horror, depression, and anger on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = 
extremely). The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Van der Ploeg, 1980) was used to 
assess state anxiety with 20 items (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). It has satisfactory 
reliability and validity (Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
 Intrusive memories. Participants reported their intrusive memories in a 1-week diary 
(Holmes et al., 2004). ‘‘Intrusions’’ were defined as spontaneously occurring unwanted 
memories of the film clips. It was emphasised that deliberate thinking about the film did not 
count as an intrusion. Participants were instructed to write down every occurrence 
immediately and check the diary at the same time every day. 
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Control measures 
 Attention and memory. Attention for the film was rated on a single item (0 = not at all, 
10 = completely focused). The recognition test contained nine statements with a true/false 
format. The cued-recall test contained nine open-ended questions (e.g., ‘‘What was the 
student that was medically attended to wearing?’’).  
 Diary compliance and demand characteristics. Diary compliance was rated on a scale 
from 0 (never forgot to write down the intrusion) to 10 (always forgot to write down the 
intrusion). The perceived goal of the study was asked for with an open-ended question. 
 
Procedure 
 After screening, participants signed an informed consent form. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions and were tested individually. The STAI-S 
and mood questionnaire were administered before and after film viewing. Participants in the 
verbalisation conditions received their task training. Then participants viewed the film, after 
which the attention scale was administered. At 1 week follow-up, participants filled in the 
cued-recall memory test, the recognition memory test, and diary compliance rating. 
 
Statistical approach 
 Analyses of variance were used to test between participants effects. A priori 
hypotheses were examined with directional tests. The corrected t-value is reported in case of 
violation of Levene’s statistic. The level of significance was an alpha level of .05. 
 
Results 
 Outliers were checked across and within conditions using boxplots. Four univariate 
outliers were identified on the number of intrusive memories. These were adjusted according 
to the procedure described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Six univariate outliers (all scores 
1 or 2) were identified for pre-film horror on the mood questionnaire. However, correction 
would lead to all scores being 0. To ensure variance it was decided not to adjust these scores. 
No multivariate outliers were detected with Mahalanobis distances (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
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Randomisation and manipulation check 
 A multivariate ANOVA to test for pre-film differences on the mood questionnaire was 
not significant, F(10, 140) = 0.75, p = .68. There was no significant difference between 
conditions in pre-film STAI-S, F(2, 73) = 0.76, p = .47. Pre-film mood was comparable 
across conditions. 
 Audio recordings from 47 participants (88.68%) were suitable for analysis. The verbal 
interference condition showed M = 5.40 (SD = 6.68) errors. In the verbal enhancement 
condition, thoughts and emotions about the film were verbalised during 16.36% of the film, 
physical features during 1.95%, and participants were silent during 81.69% of the film. The 
number of pauses in this condition was similar to that in the verbal interference condition (see 
Table 1), corrected t(41.05) = 1.22, p = .23. The mean duration of the pauses was almost three 
times longer in the verbal enhancement condition than in the verbal interference condition, 
corrected t(15.92) = 6.26, p < .001, d = 1.77. 
 
Control measures 
 Demand characteristics. Participants who recognised intrusion modulation as the 
perceived goal of the study were given a score of 1 on a demand variable, whereas other 
participants were given a score of 0. Within conditions, one-way ANOVAs were performed 
with demand as the independent factor and the number of intrusive memories as the 
dependent variable. There was no difference by demand on intrusion frequency in the no-task-
control and the verbal interference condition (p > .05). Participants in the verbal enhancement 
condition who mentioned intrusion modulation (n = 8) reported significantly fewer intrusive 
memories compared to participants who did not (n = 16), F(1, 22) = 6.56, p = .02, f = 0.55. 
 Diary compliance. The overall diary compliance rating was M = 1.97, SD = 1.38, 
indicating high compliance. There was no significant difference between conditions ( p > .05). 
 Intrusion frequency. The verbal enhancement condition was not significantly different 
from the no-task-control condition with regard to intrusion frequency, corrected t(40.17) = 
1.04, p = .30 (two-tailed). Participants in the verbal interference condition showed a trend 
towards fewer intrusive memories compared to the no-task control condition, t(50) = 1.80, p = 
.08 (two-tailed), d = 0.50. There was no significant difference between the verbal interference 
and verbal enhancement condition, t(51) = 0.85, p = .20 (one-tailed). Because the number of 
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intrusive memories in the verbal enhancement condition could be deflated due to demand 
characteristics, we reran the analyses for this condition with only participants who were 
unaware of the goal of the study. Now the verbal enhancement condition showed significantly 
more intrusive memories compared to the verbal interference condition, t(28) = 2.05, p = .04 
(two-tailed), d = .76, but not compared to the no-task control condition, t(31) = 0.22, p = .82 
(two-tailed). 
Emotional impact. A 2 (mood questionnaire: pre- film, post-film) x 3 (condition: 
control, verbal interference, verbal enhancement) repeated measures MANOVA was done to 
test the emotional impact of the film. The within-participants test was significant, F(5, 69) = 
70.37, p < .001, f = 2.26, indicating significant emotional impact of the film. There was no 
significant main effect of condition, F(2, 73) = 0.64, p = .53. The interaction effect was only 
marginally significant, F(10, 140) = 1.81, p = .06, with a significant larger decrease in 
happiness in the control condition compared to the verbal interference condition (p = .02). 
 A 2 (anxiety: pre-film, post-film) x 3 (condition: control, verbal interference, verbal 
enhancement) repeated measures ANOVA with STAI-S scores as the within-participants 
factor and condition as the between-participants factor showed a significant increase in state 
anxiety, F(1, 73) = 99.75, p < .001, f = 1.17. There was no significant main effect of 
condition, F(2, 73) = 0.40, p = .67, but there was a significant interaction, F(2, 73) = 3.29, p = 
.04, f = 0.30. A one-way ANOVA was performed with the change scores on the STAI-S as 
the dependent variable and condition as the between-participants factor. Post hoc tests 
(Bonferroni correction) showed a significantly smaller increase in anxiety in the verbal 
interference condition compared to the verbal enhancement condition, p = .04, but not 
compared to the no-task control condition, p > .05. The latter two conditions were not 
significantly different, p = .34.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the experimental variables 
  No-task control  Verbal interference Verbal enhancement 
Measure  M SD M SD M SD 
Intrusive images*  3.53 3.26 2.07 2.02 3.75 2.41 
Number of pauses  - - 14.76 13.20 18.64 8.34 
Pause duration (sec.)  - - 6.85 4.74 18.88 9.77 
Happiness pre-film 6.65 0.89 6.24 1.15 6.67 1.31 
 post-film 3.09 1.93 4.17 2.11 3.92 1.96 
Anxiety pre-film 1.57 1.47 1.66 1.52 1.38 1.81 
 post-film 2.48 2.48 2.55 1.99 2.67 1.93 
Horror pre-film 0.30 0.64 0.59 0.98 0.33 0.57 
 post-film 6.09 2.45 5.00 2.25 4.88 2.42 
Depr. mood pre-film 1.65 1.70 1.52 1.50 1.04 1.40 
 post-film 4.57 2.27 3.83 2.51 3.42 2.04 
Anger pre-film 0.39 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.38 0.82 
 post-film 4.43 2.91 3.62 2.71 4.67 2.75 
STAI-S pre-film 30.26 5.75 32.14 7.35 30.25 5.91 
 post-film 39.43 8.94 39.31 12.37 43.42 9.53 
Attention   9.09 0.73 5.97 2.24 8.71 1.20 
Cued-recall  5.48 1.59 2.97 2.15 4.38 1.86 
Recognition  5.78 1.31 5.17 1.34 5.63 1.21 
* Corrected for demand characteristics 
  
 Attention for the film. A one-way ANOVA with attention rating as the dependent 
variable and condition (control, verbal interference, verbal enhancement) as the between-
participants factor was significant, F(2, 73) = 30.55, p < .001, f = 0.92. Post hoc analysis 
(Bonferroni correction) showed that attention rating was significantly lower in the verbal 
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interference condition compared to the no-task control and the verbal enhancement condition, 
both p < .001. There was no significant difference between the latter two conditions, p > .05. 
 Memory for the film. A one-way ANOVA was performed with cued-recall as the 
dependent and condition as the independent variable, F(2, 73) = 11.39, p < .001, f = 0.56. Post 
hoc analyses (Bonferroni correction) showed a significantly lower performance in the verbal 
interference condition compared to the other two conditions, both p < .05. There was no 
significant difference between conditions with regard to recognition test performance, F(2, 
73) = 1.60, p = .21. 
 
Discussion 
 The main goal of this study was to investigate the role of peri-traumatic verbal 
processing in the development of intrusive memories. We aimed to replicate research 
(Holmes et al., 2004, Exp. 3) that grounded predictions in a dual-processing account of PTSD 
(e.g., Brewin et al., 1996). From this view predictions were (a) lower intrusion frequency with 
higher deliberate recall performance in the verbal enhancement condition compared to both 
the verbal interference and the no-task control condition; and (b) an increase in intrusion 
frequency with a decrease in deliberate recall in the verbal interference condition compared to 
the verbal enhancement and the no-task condition. Interestingly, we found lower intrusion 
frequency and deliberate recall (as well as attention rating) in the verbal interference 
condition compared to both other conditions. This pattern is in line with a general disruption 
of encoding of the film as predicted by mainstream models of attention and memory that do 
not assume separate memory systems for traumatic information (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 
1994; Conway et al., 2004; Rubin, 2006). 
 Audio-recordings indicated that we taught participants to verbalise their emotions and 
thoughts instead of physical features of the film, thereby solving the problem that was 
reported in Holmes et al. (2004, Exp. 3). However, participants performed the task during 
only 20% of the film. It has been previously noted in the literature that enhancing processing 
style in participants is difficult. In addition to the problem reported in Holmes et al. (2004, 
Exp. 3), Halligan, Clark, and Ehlers (2002) also failed to have participants successfully apply 
data-driven or conceptual processing of an aversive film when this was not their natural 
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processing style. We cannot rule out ‘‘silent processing’’ in our study but we suggest that low 
task performance is a more plausible interpretation of our results. 
 The finding that the verbal interference task reduced intrusion frequency as well as 
deliberate recall is in conflict with the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996). It is possible that counting 
backwards in 3s is not a purely verbal task as it involves more than verbalising numbers. 
However, the exact same task was used in Holmes et al. (2004, Exp. 3) and was defined as a 
verbal task there. Accepting a general cognitive load interpretation involving central 
executive resources would make their finding (an increase in intrusive memories in the verbal 
interference condition) problematic. A similar finding as ours was presented by Pearson, 
Sawyer, and Holmes (2008), and we echo their argumentation here. Several studies have 
shown that the central executive is involved in forming mental images from perceptual 
information in working memory and in keeping these images active (Pearson, 2001; Pearson, 
Logie, & Green, 1996; Rudkin, Pearson, & Logie, 2007). From this viewpoint, interfering 
with executive processes by a concurrent task disrupts the encoding of perceptual 
information. 
 A possible explanation for the incompatible findings of our study and the study by 
Holmes et al. (2004, Exp. 3) is a difference in the context given with the film material. The 
film clips in Holmes et al. were preceded by a short auditory introduction that informed 
participants about what had happened, the victims, and the outcome. In the present study and 
the studies by Pearson et al. (2008) participants were not given any introduction. It is possible 
that a film context affects verbal processing of the film because it may already activate 
conceptual processing. Also, our film material included different clips from those used in 
Holmes et al. (2004). Finally, participants in our study practised the counting backwards task 
before viewing, which is not reported in Holmes et al. (2004). Generally, the analogue trauma 
and healthy sample of limited size, common in trauma film studies, restrict generalisation to 
clinical populations. In this study we controlled for state and trait anxiety, but perhaps other 
moderators might be important as well (e.g., dissociation or schizotypy). 
 To conclude, our results do not support dual process accounts of PTSD (e.g., Brewin 
et al., 1996) with regard to the development of intrusive memories. Rather, our findings are in 
line with non-PTSD models of memory and attention (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Rubin, 2006) and indicate that analogue traumatic information is not encoded into separate 
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memory systems (i.e., VAMs and SAMs). Our results contradict earlier findings (Holmes et 
al., 2004) and we believe that they should be inspirational for future research. 
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Chapter 5  
Tell me more: Can a memory test reduce analogue traumatic 
intrusions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., Holmes, E. A., & Becker, E. S. (2009). Tell me 
more: Can a memory test reduce analogue traumatic intrusions? Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47, 426-430. 
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Abstract 
 Information processing theories of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) state that 
intrusive images emerge due to a lack of integration of perceptual trauma representations in 
autobiographical memory. To test this hypothesis experimentally, participants were shown an 
aversive film to elicit intrusive images. After viewing, they received a recognition test for just 
one part of the film. The test contained neutrally formulated items to rehearse information 
from the film. Participants reported intrusive images for the film in an intrusion diary during 
one week after viewing. In line with expectations, the number of intrusive images decreased 
only for the part of the film for which the recognition test was given. Furthermore, cued-recall 
memory after one week was selectively enhanced for the film part that was in the recognition 
test a week before. The findings provide new evidence supporting information processing 
models of PTSD and have potential implications for early interventions after trauma. 
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Introduction 
 Although several studies have investigated the role of peri-traumatic processing in 
intrusion development, post-trauma processing has received less attention. However, 
experimentally investigating post-trauma processing is important because it relates to current 
clinical practice where treatment starts after a traumatic event has occurred. The present study 
investigated whether intrusive images from viewing an aversive film can be reduced by 
giving a neutral, verbal recognition memory test immediately post-film aimed to help 
structure verbal memory. 
 Intrusive images can be defined as mental pictures (and other sensations) that come 
into consciousness unwanted and uncontrollably. Intrusive images are a common form of re-
experiencing a traumatic event (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007) and are 
a core feature of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 
fourth edition, text revision, 2000). Recent information processing theories of PTSD (Brewin, 
Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) converge on the idea that intrusive images 
develop due to impaired information processing during the traumatic event (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). Normally, there is a balance between raw automatic encoding of mostly 
perceptual information and more conscious verbal conceptual information processing, leading 
to memory representations that incorporate perceptual features of an event within a 
conceptual framework. However, under extreme stress, the balance is thought to shift towards 
the more automatic and raw data processing (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), leading to memory 
representations with perceptual features but relatively lacking a conceptual framework. This 
prevents the representation from being integrated within autobiographical memory, making 
the image-based memory representation harder to recall deliberately and more prone to 
intrude into consciousness involuntary. Both models (i.e., Brewin et al., 1996 and Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) build on existing theories of “normal” autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway, 
1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) to specify trauma-specific memory processes. 
 Several experimental studies support this information processing account of PTSD. 
For example, it has been found that blocking the visuospatial processing of an aversive film 
decreased subsequent intrusive images of the film (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes, 
Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). Conversely, interfering with 
verbal processing during the encoding of an aversive film increased intrusive images (Holmes 
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et al., 2004; but see Krans, Näring, & Becker, 2009). Furthermore, individuals with a 
preferred data-driven processing style developed more intrusive images from an aversive film 
compared to individuals with a conceptual processing style (Halligan, Clark & Ehlers, 2002). 
For a review, see Holmes and Bourne (2008).  
 Most studies have been on information processing during an aversive event with little 
experimental research investigating intrusion development post-event (Butler, Wells, & 
Dewick, 1995; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). Direct efforts to enhance conceptual post-event 
memory integration in order to reduce intrusive images have not been reported at the time of 
writing. Integrating a trauma representation in autobiographical memory is an important goal 
of effective cognitive-behavioural treatment for PTSD (Degun-Mather, 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Kindt, Buck, Arntz, & Soeter, 2007). The consideration of early interventions following 
a traumatic experience is of clinical relevance as well. Cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT) 
appears to be effective in the aftermath of trauma (Sijbrandij et al., 2007). Currently, clinical 
practice guidelines advise to offer CBT no sooner than 1 month post-trauma and only in cases 
of severe posttraumatic stress symptoms or acute stress disorder (National Institute Clinical 
Excellence, 2003). Up to now, there are no recommended interventions within the first month 
post-trauma. However, information processing theories of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000) suggest that interventions aimed at enhancing memory integration should be 
helpful in preventing intrusion development.  
 In sum, the role of post-event information processing in intrusion development has 
been neglected in experimental studies despite clear theoretical and clinical relevance. The 
present study aimed to experimentally explore the effect of enhancing memory integration on 
the development of intrusive images. To induce intrusive images, participants viewed an 
aversive film with traumatic content. We aimed to enhance memory integration by 
administering a verbal recognition memory test for one part of the film directly after viewing. 
The items on the recognition memory test were in chronological order, thereby allowing 
participants to think through the film in a structured and detailed way. The recognition 
memory test was thus used as an experimental intervention, rather than an actual memory test 
per se. Although the items were statements about emotional events from the film, the wording 
of the statements was neutral. By administering the recognition memory test, information of 
the trauma film is rehearsed in a structured way. This should enhance the formation of 
Chapter 5: Can a memory test reduce analogue traumatic intrusions? 
 61
verbally accessible and organized memories that can be retrieved deliberately and 
theoretically reduce intrusive images. We hypothesized that participants would show fewer 
intrusive images of the film after one week for that part of the film for which they received 
the memory test, in contrast to the part of the film for which they did not receive the memory 
test. In addition, we hypothesized that participants’ performance on the memory test would 
selectively strengthen memory for that part of the film one week later.  
 
Method 
Overview 
 After screening for exclusion criteria (described below), participants viewed the 
aversive film. The film consisted of two parts, which were shown in counterbalanced order. 
After the film, participants completed the recognition memory test for one part of the film 
according to random allocation. Questionnaires were administered at baseline and post-film. 
In the week following film viewing, participants reported their intrusions of the film in a 
diary. After one week, participants returned for a follow-up session.  
 
Participants 
 All participants were psychology students in their first semester. They received course 
credit for participation. As required by the ethical committee (CMO approval number 
2005/063), participants were informed about the graphic content of the film beforehand (as in 
previous studies by Holmes et al., 2004). Exclusion criteria were: panic attacks, panic 
disorder, PTSD, major depressive episode (current and lifetime), social phobia, and psychotic 
episode (current and lifetime), blood phobia, history of fainting and significant experience 
with road traffic accidents (RTA). Two participants terminated film viewing and did not 
complete the experiment. Total data from 57 participants was collected. Gender and age was 
equally distributed across the conditions (all p > .05). Table 1 displays the number of 
participants in every condition. 
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Table 1. Number of participants for each combination of  film version and recognition 
memory test version 
 Memory test 
version A 
Memory test 
version B 
Film version AB 13 13 
Film version BA 15 11 
 
Materials 
 Aversive film. The aversive film from Hagenaars, van Minnen, Holmes, Brewin and 
Hoogduin (2008), originally compiled by Steil (1996), was used. It contains four scenes 
showing the aftermath of real-life RTAs and has previously been shown to induce intrusive 
images (e.g., Holmes et al., 2004). Following the method of Stuart et al. (2006), the film was 
divided into two parts (or ‘blocks’) that were matched for the number of intrusive images they 
were likely to produce based on data from a pilot study with student participants, see Table 2. 
Matching for number of intrusive images instead of time of the film scenes was done to create 
a comparable “baseline” number of intrusions for both film blocks; with “baseline” being the 
number of intrusions had there not be any intervention at all. Accordingly, the film was 
divided in scenes 1 – 3 (Block A; 8 minutes and 53 seconds) and scene 4 (Block B; 2 minutes 
and 45 seconds). The film blocks were presented in counterbalanced order (AB or BA). The 
film was projected onto a smooth white wall and sound was presented through headphones. 
 
Table 2. Number of intrusive images from each scene of the aversive film in the pilot study 
Part A Part B 
 Scene 1 Scene 2 Scene 3 Scene 4 
Intrusive images 34 20 30 85 
 
 Memory integration. The recognition memory test used to enhance memory 
integration was similar to the recognition memory test used in the 1-week follow-up session 
of previous studies (e.g. Holmes et al., 2004). It contained statements (for example, “There 
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were three doctors in white coats present at the scene”) for which participants had to decide 
whether it was true or false. The items were in chronological order and the statements, 
although emotional in content, were neutral in formulation. To match the film blocks, there 
were two versions of the test: Version A (Film block A) and version B (Film block B).  
 
Measures 
 Emotional impact of the film. This was measured with a mood questionnaire (Holmes 
et al., 2004). On a 0-10 point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely), participants rated current 
happiness, fear, horror, depressed mood and anger. In addition, the Dutch version of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Zelfbeoordelingsvragenlijst; Van der Ploeg, 1980) was used to 
assess state anxiety (STAI-S). This questionnaire contains 20 items about the current level of 
anxiety, with ratings from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) and is reported to have a 
good reliability and validity (Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
 Intrusive images. The intrusion diary was similar to the one in Holmes et al. (2004). 
Participants were given thorough instructions as to how to complete the daily diary and 
reported their intrusions of the film during the week after film viewing. The diary contained a 
definition of intrusive images and reminder instructions on how to keep the diary. Participants 
reported the content of each intrusion so it could be assigned to a specific film scene. 
Additionally, participants rated the distress of every intrusion on a scale from 0 (not at all 
distressing) to 100 (extremely distressing). To enhance compliance, participants were required 
to hand in one page of the diary every day.  
 Deliberate recall. At one week follow-up, participants filled in a cued-recall memory 
test (Holmes et al., 2004) about the whole film. This contained two to four questions per 
scene and 12 items in total (for example: “Which body parts were wounded and bleeding 
when the woman was freed from the minivan and was lying down on the stretcher?”).  
 Attention for the film. After the film, participants rated the attention they paid to the 
film on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all focused on the film, 10 = completely focused on the 
film).  
 Diary compliance. At follow-up, participants rated how often they thought they forgot 
to write down their intrusions, on a scale from 0 (never forgot to write down the intrusion) to 
10 (always forgot to write down the intrusion) as in Holmes et al. (2004).  
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 Demand characteristics. At follow-up, participants were asked about the goal of the 
study with an open-ended question. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants filled in a demographic questionnaire, the mood ratings and the STAI-S 
and then viewed the aversive film. Participants were instructed to stay focused on the film, 
not to look away or mentally disengage and to view the film as if they were really there at the 
scene. They were informed that they could terminate the experiment at any time. Film version 
(AB or BA) was randomly assigned, with the restriction that an equal number of participants 
viewed each version. Immediately after the film ended, the recognition test was given. The 
version of the recognition test (A or B) was randomly assigned to participants, with the 
restriction that half of the participants who viewed either film version received test version A 
and the other half test version B (see Table 2). Participants then filled in the mood 
questionnaire, the STAI-S and the attention rating. During the week after film viewing, 
participants reported their intrusions of the film in the diary. At follow-up, they filled in the 
diary compliance rating, the cued-recall memory test and were asked about the perceived goal 
of the study.  
 
Results 
Outliers and compliance 
 Four participants failed to complete the intrusion diary and were deleted from the 
dataset. Data of the number of intrusions was checked for outliers (more than three standard 
deviations from the mean) per condition (with recognition test versus without recognition test) 
using boxplots. One multivariate outlier was deleted from the dataset. Six univariate outliers 
were changed into the next extreme score minus one since the outliers were above the mean 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The final dataset contained 52 participants (37 women and 15 
men), with an average age of 19 years and 10 months (SD = 3 years and 6 months). 
 
Control measures 
 Emotional impact. Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for all emotion 
variables. There was a significant decrease from pre-film to post-film for happiness, F(1, 51) 
Chapter 5: Can a memory test reduce analogue traumatic intrusions? 
 65
= 13.33, MSE = 1.59, p < .01, η2 = .21. There was a significant increase in horror, F(1, 51) = 
34.20, MSE = 1.76, p < .01, η2 = .40; depressed mood, F(1, 51) = 14.15, MSE = 1.57, p < .01, 
η2 = .22; and state anxiety STAI-S, F(1, 51) = 18.07, MSE = 23.47, p < .01, η2 = .26, but not 
in the single item anxiety rating, F < 1, or anger from the mood questionnaire, F(1, 51) = 
2.17, MSE = 0.54, p = .15. 
 Attention for the film. The overall attention rating for the film was M = 8.27, SD = 
1.83. 
 Diary compliance. The average diary compliance rating was M = 1.98, SD = 1.11, 
indicating a high level of compliance. 
 
Experimental measures 
 Intrusion frequency. To test the effect of the memory test on the number of intrusive 
images, we performed a 2 (Task: recognition memory test versus no recognition memory test) 
x 2 (Memory test version: A or B) x 2 (Film version: AB or BA) mixed model ANOVA with 
Test version and Film version as a between-subject factors and Task as a within-subjects 
factor. The results showed a significant effect of Task on the number of intrusive images, F(1, 
48) = 5.67, MSE = 0.52, p = .02, partial η2 = .11. There was no significant effect of Test 
version, F < 1, or Film version, F(1, 48) = 1.97, MSE = 1.14, p = .17 and there were no 
interaction effects. As predicted, participants reported fewer intrusive images from scenes for 
which they had received the recognition memory test, M = 0.46, SD = 0.73, compared to 
scenes for which they had not received the recognition memory test, M = 0.79, SD = 1.06. 
 Intrusion distress. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the summed and 
average distress ratings for the film block for which participants received a memory test and 
for the film block for which they received no test. Only participants who reported intrusions 
(n = 44) are included. Three univariate outliers were adjusted  (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
To investigate whether the memory test affected intrusion distress, we performed two 2 (Task: 
recognition memory test versus no recognition memory test) x 2 (Memory test version: A or 
B) x 2 (Film version: AB or BA) mixed model ANOVAs with Test version and Film version 
as a between-subject factors and Task as a within-subjects factor on both summed and 
average distress scores. The results show no significant main effect or interaction effects for 
the summed distress scores (all p > .05), although there was a trend for a main effect of Task, 
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F(1, 40) = 3.09, MSE = 3758.60, p = .087, partial η2 = .07.  There were no significant main 
effects or interactions for the average intrusion distress ratings (all p > .05). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the summed and average intrusion distress ratings for the 
tested and non-tested film block 
 Film block 
without memory test 
Film block 
with memory test 
Measure  M (SD) 
Range 
M (SD) 
Range 
Summed distress  74.58 (103.91) 
0 - 350 
51.53 (75.50) 
0 - 270 
Average distress 19.29 (21.89) 
0 - 70 
15.69 (19.14) 
0 - 60 
 
 Deliberate recall. The mean score on the cued-recall test at follow-up was M = 6.85,  
SD = 1.68. To check if the reduction was likely to be because of a more integrated memory 
for the film, we performed a one-way ANOVA with Test version (A, B) as the independent 
variable and cued-recall memory test performance at follow-up for scenes 1-3 (Film block A) 
as the dependent variable. This revealed significantly higher performance for participants who 
received the recognition memory test for scenes 1-3, M = 5.68 and SD = 1.19, than those who 
had received the test for scene 4, M = 3.58 and SD = 0.97, F(1, 50) = 47.32, MSE = 1.20, p < 
.01, η2 = .49. An independent sample t-test indicated that participants who received the 
memory test for scene 4 (Film block B) performed significantly better on the cued-recall 
memory test for that scene at follow-up, M = 2.54, SD = 0.72, than participants who received 
the memory test for scenes 1-3, M = 1.79, SD = 1.10, corrected t(46.98) = - 2.97, p = .01, d = 
.82.  
 Demand characteristics. None of the participants mentioned modulation of intrusive 
images when asked for the goal of the study.   
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Discussion 
 The critical finding was that the recognition memory test administered immediately 
post-film selectively decreased the number of intrusive images, in line with our hypothesis. In 
addition, intrusive images from the film block for which participants received the memory test 
tended to have lower distress ratings than for the film block for which participants did not 
receive a memory test, although this finding did not reach significance. Furthermore, the 
recognition memory test selectively increased performance on the cued-recall memory test at 
one week follow-up. We propose that by performing this recognition memory test 
immediately after an aversive film, the film’s representations in memory become more 
integrated (i.e. not fragmented and isolated) with autobiographical memory, as measured by 
improved deliberate recall performance. The findings are in line with information processing 
accounts of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggesting that a trauma-
memory representation becomes intrusive because it is fragmented and isolated from 
autobiographical memory. As to what the exact processes are that underlie the reduction in 
intrusive images and the enhanced deliberate recall performance, it seems likely that a 
reduction of avoidance facilitated by the recognition memory test played a role. 
 The present study showed that a rather simple intervention – a structured, verbal 
recognition memory test – was effective in reducing one aspect of post-traumatic stress 
symptoms: intrusive images. The memory test contained factual information about the film, 
not specifically about the emotional parts, and provided a rehearsal opportunity. We suggest 
that this may have strengthened the conceptual memory for the film, reducing intrusions. 
Future research should explore the exact cognitive mechanisms underlying memory 
integration. For example, it is possible that by presenting the memory test avoidance reduces, 
resulting in fewer intrusions. Another interesting question is whether active engagement is 
necessary or if passively reading information of an aversive event is sufficient for a reduction 
in intrusive images.  
 There are some general limitations to our study. First, generalization of our findings to 
actual trauma survivors is not warranted, since our study reported on a non-clinical sample 
exposed to an analogue traumatic situation (an aversive film). Further, the number of intrusive 
images was measured during only one week after film viewing. The general tendency was 
that participants did not experience any more intrusive images after this week. This may not 
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reflect the actual time curve for non-analogue traumatic intrusions and more research is 
needed with prolonged follow-up measures. 
 To conclude, the finding that a recognition memory test reduces intrusive images from 
an aversive film is relevant for both theory and practice. The results of our study are 
encouraging for research moving beyond the debate related to the lack of successful early 
trauma interventions, such as critical incidence stress debriefing (e.g. Bisson et al., 1997; 
Mayou et al., 2000: Sijbrandij et al., 2007). That is, it may point to new target possibilities for 
developing evidence-based early crisis interventions for traumatic events. Our findings are 
supportive of the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and the dual 
representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, 2001). Both models suggest that intrusive 
images develop as a result of impaired peri-traumatic information processing, leading to 
isolated image-based representations that relatively lack a verbal conceptual embedding. 
Promoting verbal processing with a recognition memory test both reduced the frequency of 
intrusion images and enhanced deliberate recall, as would be predicted by these models. The 
findings from the current study encourage future research exploring the nature and role of 
memory integration immediately post-trauma in intrusion development. Our findings have 
potential clinical relevance since they indicate it may be possible that interventions aimed at 
structuring and enhancing memory integration for an aversive event could be used to reduce 
intrusion-development.
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Chapter 6  
“I see what you're saying”: Intrusive images from listening to 
a traumatic verbal report   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., Holmes, E. A., & Becker, E. S. (2009). “I see 
what you're saying”: Intrusive images from listening to a traumatic verbal report. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 24, 134-140. 
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Abstract 
 We tested the hypothesis that intrusive visual images could develop from listening to a 
traumatic verbal report. Eighty-six participants listened to a traumatic verbal report under one 
of three conditions: while shaping plasticine (visuospatial condition), while performing 
articulatory suppression (verbal condition), or with no extra task (control condition). Results 
showed that intrusive visual images developed from listening to the traumatic report. In line 
with the idea that central executive processes guide encoding of information, intrusion 
frequency was reduced in both the visuospatial and the verbal condition compared to the no 
task control condition. Overall, this pattern is similar to intrusive images from a traumatic 
film as found in earlier studies. This study provides a valuable addition to models of post-
traumatic stress disorder and autobiographical memory. Additionally, the results have 
potential implications for therapists working with traumatized individuals.  
Chapter 6: Intrusive images from listening to a traumatic verbal report 
 71
Introduction  
 The experience of a traumatic event can lead to development of intrusive memories: 
uncontrollable and distressing images of the traumatic event that repeatedly come into 
consciousness unbidden, such as the sights and sounds of a terrifying car crash (Grey & 
Holmes, 2008). Intrusive memories in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are mostly visual 
in nature, although images from other senses and verbal intrusions are also reported 
(Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). The content of intrusive images, 
however, is not necessarily restricted to actual memories or even the diagnosis of PTSD 
(Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). Intrusive images can also display fantasies of alternative 
outcomes, future events (flash-forwards; Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007), or 
reflect a story told by another (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995; McCann & Pearlman, 1990; 
Figley, 1995). In the last two decades it has been acknowledged that learning about a 
traumatic event without being personally involved (i.e., secondary traumatisation) can induce 
post-traumatic stress symptoms. In a classic paper, Terr et al. (1999) found that children who 
heard about the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle in 1986 afterwards developed post-
traumatic stress symptoms, such as nightmares, Challenger-specific fears and negative 
expectations of the future. Furthermore, it has been shown that therapists and other helpers are 
at risk of developing intrusive images of their client’s traumatic experience (Pearlman & Mac 
Ian, 1995; McCann & Pearlman, 1990; Figley, 1995). Secondary traumatic stress in people 
dealing with trauma survivors has been distinguished from burnout and seems to be 
specifically related to treating trauma survivors (McCann & Pearlman, 1990; Arvay 2001). 
 Studies have mainly used survey methods to explore broad clusters of secondary stress 
symptoms (Arvay, 2001). Although these studies give important information on secondary 
stress, they lack the benefits of an experimental design and are too broad in focus to assess 
basic processes underlying specific symptoms like intrusive images or how these might arise.
 The goal of our study was to investigate whether intrusive visual images could 
develop from verbal information by evoking mental imagery when listening to traumatic 
material. That is, whether people would develop flashback-like images to a trauma they had 
never seen, but only imagined. Furthermore, we explored whether the frequency of these 
“imagined” intrusions could be modulated by interfering with the encoding of analogue 
traumatic information. 
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 Two influential models that aim to explain intrusion development in PTSD are the 
dual representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) and the cognitive model of 
PTSD by Ehlers and Clark (2000). According to a pragmatic model by Holmes and Bourne 
(2008), these models converge on the idea that the balance between peri-traumatic 
visuospatial and verbal processing predicts intrusion development. During high stress, 
information processing shifts in favour of visuospatial processing with a relative lack of 
verbal conceptual processing. Resulting memory representations are rich in sensory detail but 
are not conceptually integrated within autobiographical memory (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). 
Accordingly, interference of visuospatial processing during encoding should reduce intrusion 
development whereas interference of verbal processing should increase intrusion 
development. 
 Alternatively, the self-memory-system (SMS) model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) is a more general model of autobiographical memory 
that, importantly, also aims to explain intrusive memories. The “working self” consists of 
active goals and serves to allocate attention and motivates behaviour in the broadest sense. 
The working self guides encoding of information through control processes such as the 
central executive in working memory. As with more “ordinary” events, episodic memories 
with highly sensory detail are initially formed of the traumatic event. In contrast to non-
traumatic memories, the episodic trauma memories are not easily integrated within the 
autobiographical knowledge base and thus direct activation of trauma memories by internal or 
external cues can therefore not be inhibited and intrusive images persist (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). One hypothesis that can be derived from the SMS model 
is that interfering with central executive capacity during encoding should reduce intrusion 
development regardless of the modality of the interference (i.e., visuospatial, verbal) because 
less traumatic information is encoded.  
 Generally speaking, there are two views on intrusion development: PTSD-specific 
models propose modality-specific effects of encoding interference in relation to intrusion 
development, whereas more general autobiographical models suggest that modulation of 
intrusive memories is dependent on the encoding capacity guided by the central executive. 
While the PTSD-specific view provides an often used framework for research on intrusion 
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development, more general models of autobiographical memory, like the SMS model, have 
been less associated with the subject of intrusion development.  
 Many studies testing hypotheses from information processing models of PTSD have 
adopted the trauma film paradigm (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Typically, healthy participants 
view an aversive film while performing a concurrent task that relies on visuospatial or verbal 
resources. During the week after film viewing, participants report their intrusive images in a 
diary. A general finding is that performing a visuospatial task  during encoding of an aversive 
film reduces intrusion development compared to a no task control condition or other 
movement condition (e.g., Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 2004; Stuart, Holmes, & 
Brewin, 2006; Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010). This finding has been extended to a 
visuospatial task given in the post-film period (Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 
2009). Verbal processing has been studied to a lesser extent, and results are more mixed. 
Some studies (e.g., Holmes et al., 2004; Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, submitted) 
have found an increase in intrusion frequency from verbal interference, as would be predicted 
from dual process models (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). In contrast, others have found a 
decrease in intrusion frequency as a result of verbal interference (e.g., Krans, Näring, & 
Becker, 2009; Pearson, Sawyer, & Holmes, 2008), which is in line with the SMS model 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004).  
 Clinical models of PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003) focus on intrusive memories from 
direct sensory experience. However, stressful intrusive images can also develop from 
listening to an aversive story, as studies of secondary traumatic stress have shown (Pearlman 
& Mac Ian, 1995; McCann & Pearlman, 1990; Figley, 1995). Because listening to trauma 
narratives is an important part of a therapist’s job in effective cognitive behavioural treatment 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005), more knowledge about how to 
modulate this kind of intrusion may aid in preventing intrusion development in clinicians, and 
thus also to therapist “burn out”.  
 The main goal of our study was to investigate the development of intrusive visual 
images as a result of verbal input. As a variation to the trauma film paradigm, we presented 
participants with an aversive verbal report of a traumatic situation and asked them to imagine 
the story. Our main research questions were: (a) to ascertain whether intrusive images would 
develop from a verbal report and (b), if so, could their frequency be modulated by interfering 
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with encoding of the provoking verbal stimulus? We predicted (1) that intrusive images 
would develop, and (2) that visuospatial interference during encoding would reduce intrusion 
development compared to no extra task. Verbal interference was added as a concurrent-task 
control condition. An increase in intrusive images in this verbal condition compared to no-
task would be in line with dual-process models of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) as suggested by Holmes and Bourne (2008), whereas a reduction would be in line with 
a hierarchical model of autobiographical memory such as the SMS model (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). To control for individual differences that could be related to intrusion 
development, we assessed spontaneous use of imagery, trait dissociation, and trait anxiety. 
 
Method 
 Questionnaires and instructions were presented on a PC using Perseus® Software 
(Version 6). 
 
Participants 
 Participants were invited by e-mail to participate in exchange for course credit. As 
required by the ethical committee (CMO approval number 2005/063), the invitation contained 
information about the graphic nature of the film/report. In total, 90 participants completed the 
study. Exclusion criteria were: panic attacks, panic disorder (current and lifetime), PTSD 
(current and lifetime), major depressive episode (current and lifetime), psychotic episode 
(current and lifetime), blood phobia, history of fainting, and history of road traffic accidents. 
Four participants failed to complete the intrusion diary and were excluded from the dataset. 
The final dataset contained 60 women and 26 men with an age of M = 22.01 years (SD = 
3.14). Seventy participants were students, and 16 participants were either working or seeking 
employment. The non-student participants were comparable on age, F(2, 83) = 0.42, p = .66, 
and trait imagery, F(2, 83) = 0.08, p = .92, but showed higher levels of trait dissociation, 
F(2,82) = 4.07, f = 0.33, p = .02; and trait anxiety, F(2, 82) = 4.71, f = 0.34, p = .01, compared 
to the student participants. Running the analyses in the student sample only yielded the same 
result pattern; since level of education was equally distributed between the three conditions, 
χ2(4) = 4.17, p = .38, the non-student participants were included in the analyses reported 
below. 
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Materials 
 Verbal report. The verbal report (11 min 42 sec) was based on an often used ‘trauma 
film’ depicting the aftermath of real-life road traffic accidents (Steil, 1996) for studying the 
development of traumatic intrusions (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). The cover story was that a 
traffic journalist was describing the events into a voice-key for later use. The background 
noise of the original film was audible in the recording. Each scene was preceded with a short 
auditory introduction about the people involved in the accident and the outcome. Participants 
listened to the report through headphones. 
 Experimental task. All participants were instructed to focus on the report while 
imagining everything that the journalist described using field perspective, that is, as if looking 
through one’s own eyes (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008). In the visuospatial 
interference condition, participants shaped plasticine into small cubes and pyramids 
alternately as fast and accurate as possible (Stuart et al., 2006). Hands were covered with a 
wooden inverse U-shaped box. In the practice trial, participants were shown an example of 
each plasticine figure and were asked to copy this. In the verbal interference condition, 
participants counted from 1 to 6 continuously at a speed of three digits per second (Larsen & 
Baddeley, 2003). They were instructed to whisper so that utterances could be recorded but did 
not interfere with listening to the traumatic report. In the practice trial, participants performed 
the task paced by a metronome for one minute. Imagery of the report (vividness and distress) 
was rated on a 4 – point scale (1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree). 
 
Control measures 
 Individual differences. Trait imagery was measured with the Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale (SUIS). The SUIS has high internal consistency with α = .98 and has a 
significant relationship with other imagery measures (i.e., VVIQ; Marks, 1973) supporting its 
validity (Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). The scale contains 12 items that are rated on a 
1-5 point scale (1 = never appropriate, 5 = completely appropriate). Trait dissociation was 
measured with the Dissociative Experiences Scale, revised (DES-II; Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986). The DES-II contains 28 items and answers are rated on an 11-point scale from 0 % 
(never) to 100 % (always). The DES-II has a test-retest reliability of .84 and a median 
coefficient for construct validity of .64 (Bernstein & Putnam). Trait anxiety was measured 
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with the Dutch version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
The STAI-T contains 20 items about general anxiety level, with ratings from 1 (almost never) 
to 4 (almost always). The STAI-T showed a test-retest reliability of .75 and an internal 
consistency of α = .85 (Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
 Impact of the report. A mood questionnaire (Holmes et al., 2004) measured current 
happiness, fear, horror, depressed mood, and anger on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = 
extremely). The state version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was used to assess state 
anxiety (STAI-S; Van der Ploeg, 1980). This questionnaire contains 20 items about current 
anxiety level, with ratings from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Test-retest reliability 
has been reported at .25 and up, and the internal consistency at α = .88. State dissociation was 
measured with the self-report version of the Dissociative States Scale (DSS; Bremner et al., 
1998). The questionnaire contains 19 items and answers are rated on a 5-point scale from 0 
(not at all) to 4 (very much). Reliability has been shown at α = .94. The DSS discriminates 
between PTSD patients and non-patients, supporting its validity (Bremner et al., 1998).  
 
Experimental measures 
 Intrusion frequency. Intrusive images were reported in an event-related diary (Holmes 
et al., 2004). For every entry, participants reported intrusion frequency, nature (sensory or 
verbal), and content. An intrusion provocation task (Lang, Holmes, & Moulds, 2009) was 
included as an alternative measure of intrusion frequency. Participants were presented with 
ten 4-second neutral fragments from the report and then were required to think freely for two 
minutes while pressing a key whenever an intrusion occurred.  
 The Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; Dutch version 
by TZP Psychotrauma, 2006) contains an Intrusion subscale (8 items), an Avoidance subscale 
(8 items) and a Hyperarousal subscale (6 items). Answers are rated on a 5-point scale from 0 
(not at all) to 4 (very much). Internal consistency has been reported at 0.97 for the Total score, 
0.86 for the Intrusion subscale, 0.82 for Avoidance, and 0.85 for Hyperarousal. Test-retest 
reliability has been reported at 0.87 for the Total score, 0.89 for the Intrusion scale, 0.79 for 
Avoidance, and 0.82 for Hyperarousal (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002).  
 Other PTSD symptoms. Avoidance was measured with the avoidance subscale of the 
IES (Horowitz et al., 1979) and with a single-item on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = 
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very strongly). Participants rated the fragmentation of their memory of the report on an 11-
point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = very strongly).  
 Post-traumatic cognitions in relation to the report were measured with the Post-
traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; Dutch 
version by van Minnen, 2001). The PTCI consists of three subscales: Negative cognitions 
about self (21 items), Negative cognitions about the world (7 items) and Self-blame (5 items). 
Statements are rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Internal 
consistency has been reported at α = .97 for the Self scale, .88 for World, and .86 for Self 
blame. Test-retest reliability has been reported at .75 and higher (Foa et al., 1999). 
 Attention and memory. Attention for the report was rated on an 11-point scale from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (completely). Cued-recall memory was assessed with 12 open ended 
questions about the journalist report. Recognition memory was assessed with 12 statements of 
the report with a yes/no response. 
 Compliance and demand. Participants rated the appropriateness of the statement “I 
have often been unable (or have forgotten) to report my intrusions in the diary” on an 11-point 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), as in Holmes et al. (2004). Participants were asked 
about the perceived goal of the study with an open-ended question. In the visuospatial and 
verbal interference conditions participants indicated if they thought their task had increased, 
decreased or had no effect on intrusion frequency.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants signed an informed consent and filled in the SUIS, STAI-T, DES-II, 
STAI-S, DSS, and the mood questionnaire. All participants received short imagery training in 
field perspective (Holmes et al., 2008). Participants were instructed according to experimental 
condition and the recording of the journalist report was started. After the report, participants 
filled in the imagery compliance check, the mood questionnaire, STAI-S, DSS, the attention 
rating, and received the diary. After one week, participants returned for follow-up. The 
intrusion provocation task was performed and participants filled in the diary compliance 
rating, cognitive avoidance item, cued-recall and recognition memory test, the IES, PTCI, and 
ratings about the perceived goal of the study. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their involvement.  
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Statistical approach 
 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the main statistical method used. In cases where 
Levene’s statistic was significant (indicating a violation of the homogeneity of variance) 
corrected t-tests or non-parametric tests are reported. A priori hypotheses were tested 
directionally. Spearman correlations were calculated for intrusion frequency because of non-
normal distribution. An α of 0.05 was regarded as the level of significance. Effect sizes 
reported are Cohen’s d for t-tests and Cohen’s f for ANOVAs. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1 and 2. 
 
Results 
Compliance, demand, and outliers 
 The mean diary compliance rating was M = 1.56 (SD = 1.50), indicating high 
compliance. Participants in the verbal interference condition repeated the “123456” string M 
= 291.80 times (SD = 46.13), with M = 9.30 errors (SD = 7.15) and M = 2.70 pauses (SD = 
2.47). In the visuospatial interference condition, participants produced M = 20.33 plasticine 
objects (SD = 5.22). Eighteen participants mentioned intrusion modulation as the goal of the 
experiment but there was no difference in intrusion frequency compared to those who did not 
(p > .05). 
All variables were checked on multivariate and univariate outliers across and within 
conditions as advised by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). One multivariate outlier was 
identified and removed from the dataset. Nine univariate outliers were detected and were 
adjusted appropriately. Unfortunately, the IES-hyperarousal scale yielded many univariate 
outliers and it was decided to exclude this scale from analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
 
Control measures 
 Randomization check. One-way ANOVAs with condition (control, visuospatial 
interference, verbal interference) as the between-subject factor indicated no significant 
difference between conditions in trait imagery, F(2, 83) = 1.08, p = .35, or trait anxiety 
(STAI-T), F(2, 83) = 0.21, p = .81. A Kruskal-Wallis test with condition (control, visuospatial 
interference, verbal interference) as the between-subject factor and indicated no significant 
difference in trait dissociation (DES-II) between the three conditions, χ2(2) = 5.11, p = .08.  
Chapter 6: Intrusive images from listening to a traumatic verbal report 
 79
 Manipulation check. The ratings on the mood questionnaire were summed into a 
single score (happiness reversed; Mackintosh et al., submitted). A 3 condition (control, 
visuospatial interference, verbal interference) x 2 mood (pre-report, post-report) mixed model 
ANOVA with condition as the between-subject factor and mood ratings as the within-subject 
factor showed a significant increase in negative mood from pre- to post-report, F(1, 83) = 
30.56, f = 0.61, p < .001. There was no significant main effect of condition or a significant 
interaction (both p > .05). The same pattern emerged for state anxiety (STAI-S), with a 
significant increase pre- to post report, F(1, 83) = 40.59, f = 0.70, p < .001. 
A 3 condition (control, visuospatial interference, verbal interference) x 2 DSS (pre-
report, post-report) mixed model ANOVA was performed with condition as the between-
subject factor and state dissociation (DSS) as the within-subject factor. There was no 
significant main effect (both p > .05) but a significant condition x DSS interaction emerged, 
F(2, 83) = 3.09, f = 0.27, p = .05. Repeated measures ANOVAs within conditions with state 
dissociation (DSS) as the within-subject factor indicated that there was a significant decrease 
in state dissociation in the visuospatial interference condition, F(1, 26) = 6.03, f = 0.48, p = 
.02, but no significant change in the control or the verbal interference condition (both p > .05). 
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of control measures within and across conditions 
  Control condition Visuospatial  
interference 
Verbal interference Total  
Measure  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
SUIS  40.11 6.23 38.26 7.31 37.81 5.32 38.70 6.30 
STAI-T  36.32 8.13 36.81 8.26 35.42 8.69 36.15 8.30 
DES-II  9.99 7.09 14.06 9.67 8.49 6.06 10.73 7.95 
Mood Q Pre 7.43 3.67 7.89 5.92 8.16 5.68 7.84 5.15 
 Post 11.39 5.55 11.26 7.43 11.71 7.49 11.47 6.82 
STAI-S Pre 32.50 7.10 33.59 8.28 33.45 8.56 33.19 7.94 
 Post 37.07 8.64 37.11 8.20 40.19 6.40 38.21 7.81 
DSS Pre 1.86 2.81 2.33 2.04 2.19 2.52 2.13 2.46 
 Post 2.32 3.17 1.63 1.69 3.00 2.91 2.35 2.72 
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Experimental measures 
 Intrusion frequency. The à priori hypotheses were tested with directional tests. As 
predicted, the number of intrusive images reported in the diary was lower in the visuospatial 
condition than in the no task control condition, t(53) = 2.53, d = 0.71, p < .001 (one-tailed). 
Intrusion frequency was also lower in the verbal interference condition compared to no task, 
t(57) = 2.51, d = 0.66, p = .02 (two-tailed). There was no significant difference between the 
visuospatial and the verbal interference condition, t(56) = 0.06, p = .96 (two-tailed).  
 The same pattern emerged for intrusions in the provocation task. Intrusion frequency 
was significantly lower in the visuospatial interference condition compared to the no-task 
control condition, corrected t(39.74) = 2.83, d = 0.80, p < .01 (one-tailed), but not 
significantly different from the verbal interference condition, t(56) = 1.44, p = .15 (two-
tailed). Intrusion frequency was not significantly different in the verbal interference condition 
compared to the no-task control condition, corrected t(45.05) = 1.72, p = .09 (two-tailed), 
although the direction was similar to the diary measure. 
 Both the intrusion diary and the provocation task were significantly correlated with the 
IES-intrusion scale, and with each other, as reported in Table 3.  
Other PTSD symptoms. One-way ANOVAs with condition (control, visuospatial 
interference, verbal interference) as the between subject factor showed no significant 
differences between conditions on the avoidance single-item, IES-avoidance subscale, 
fragmentation rating, or the PTCI subscales, all p > .05. Correlation coefficients are reported 
in Table 3.  
Intrusion frequency in the diary was significantly related to the IES-intrusion scale, 
single-item measure of avoidance, the IES-avoidance scale, and the PTCI-self blame scale. 
The diary measure was not significantly related to the other PTCI scales or the fragmentation 
rating, all p > .05. Intrusion frequency in the provocation task was significantly related to the 
IES-intrusion scale, the single-item measure of avoidance and the fragmentation rating, but 
not with the IES-avoidance scale or the PTCI scales, all p > .05. Furthermore, there was a 
significant correlation between the single-item measure of avoidance and the IES-avoidance 
scale.  
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of experimental measures within and across 
conditions 
 Control condition Visuospatial  
interference 
Verbal interference Total  
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Number of intrusive 
images in diary 
4.57 3.69 2.48 2.23 2.52 2.55 3.17 3.01 
Number of intrusive 
images in provocation task 
3.54 2.94 1.78 1.45 2.42 1.88 2.58 2.27 
IES – intrusion 5.11 2.53 3.70 3.58 4.16 3.23 4.33 3.16 
IES – avoidance  4.07 2.18 2.81 2.88 3.65 3.28 3.52 2.85 
Single-item avoidance 1.57 2.04 0.78 0.97 1.52 2.05 1.30 1.80 
Fragmentation 6.11 2.77 6.30 2.96 5.77 2.62 6.05 2.75 
PTCI – negative cognitions 
about self 
1.64 0.51 1.62 0.64 1.54 0.55 1.60 0.56 
PTCI – negative cognitions 
about the world 
2.94 1.09 2.68 1.20 2.62 1.33 2.74 1.21 
PTCI – self blame 1.98 0.76 1.86 0.74 1.87 0.87 1.90 0.79 
Attention  7.46 0.96 6.44 1.45 6.23 1.80 6.70 1.54 
Cued-recall 5.86 2.10 5.56 2.29 5.61 2.23 5.67 2.19 
Recognition  8.00 1.63 7.07 1.77 7.56 1.43 7.55 1.64 
 
Attention and memory. A one-way ANOVA with condition (control, visuospatial 
interference, verbal interference) as the between subject factor and the attention rating as the 
dependent variable was significant, F(2, 83) = 5.88, f = 0.38, p < .01. Post hoc tests with 
Bonferroni correction showed a significantly higher attention rating in the control condition 
compared to both interference conditions, both p < .05. The interference conditions did not 
differ significantly from each other, p > .05.  The three conditions were comparable on cued-
recall and recognition memory performance, F(2, 83) = 0.15, p = .86, respectively, F(2, 83) = 
2.60, p = .11. The attention rating was significantly correlated with recognition memory, rs = 
.32, p < .02, but not cued-recall memory. 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s Rho) between the frequency of intrusive images 
in and other PTSD symptoms 
 Intrusive visual images in 
diary 
Intrusive visual images in provocation task 
Intrusive images in provocation 
task 
.36** - 
IES intrusion .60** .24* 
IES avoidance .36** .10 
Single-item avoidance .33** .21* 
Memory fragmentation .14 .22* 
PTCI negative cognitions about 
self 
.14 .03 
PTCI negative cognitions about 
the world 
.03 -.0.3 
PTCI self blame .25* .10 
* Significant at the .05 level, ** Significant at the .01 level 
 
Discussion 
 The main goal of this study was to explore whether intrusive visual images could 
develop from aversive verbal information when participants imagined the described 
scenarios. Our results clearly showed that participants developed intrusive visual images from 
imagining the traumatic journalist report. Furthermore, the participants reported a significant 
emotional impact from listening to the report. Thus, our findings suggest that intrusive visual 
images can indeed develop not only from direct visual input, but also from verbal descriptions 
of events. This indicates that, as earlier survey research and anecdotal reports have suggested, 
clinicians working with traumatized individuals may be at risk of developing intrusive images 
of their patients’ trauma narratives. Our study has, for the first time to our knowledge, brought 
the investigation of intrusions of imagery into the laboratory. 
We know that intrusions to directly perceived analogue trauma (i.e., an aversive film) can 
be selectively modulated by competing tasks (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Thus, our second 
goal was to explore whether intrusive visual images from verbal information could be 
modulated by interfering with the encoding of the verbal narrative. Our results showed that 
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intrusion frequency was reduced in both the visuospatial and verbal interference condition, 
compared to the no task control condition. This finding has implications for the field of 
secondary traumatisation and those at risk of developing symptoms. For example, clinicians 
working with traumatized individuals could benefit from performing a dual task when 
listening to the trauma narrative. Speculatively, writing therapy notes while listening to a 
trauma narrative in exposure therapy may help in this regard. From a theoretical point of view 
the results are more complex. Since this is, to our knowledge, the first study experimentally 
examining intrusive visual images from an aversive verbal report, our interpretation of the 
findings is still speculative.  
Mental imagery research has shown that visuospatial competition reduces the vividness 
and emotionality of visual imagery whereas verbal competition does not (Baddeley & 
Andrade, 2000; Van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001). This modality-specific 
effect does not appear in our results: first, there was no significant difference between 
conditions on the vividness and distress ratings of their imagery, indicating that the dual-tasks 
did not affect the imagery itself. Of course, it is possible that our imagery compliance check 
suffered from a lack of power to pick up any group differences. However, power-analyses 
(GPower 3.0.10) indicated that with the current results, a sample size of 495 would be 
required for imagery vividness and 1,854 for distress to show a significant difference between 
conditions. Another explanation is that imagery is especially vulnerable for modality-specific 
interference during encoding from a direct percept, or during memory retrieval, but not so 
much during imagery generated by incoming verbal information. In contrast to earlier 
imagery studies in which participants applied mental imagery during retrieval of for example 
a personal memory (Van den Hout et al., 2001), our participants were given specific 
generation instructions to use the incoming verbal information to generate experiences using 
mental imagery.  
 Interestingly, the competing resources tasks led to a difference in intrusion frequency. 
Participants in both the visuospatial and verbal interference condition reported lower intrusion 
frequency compared to those in the no task control condition. This indicates that the encoding 
of the imagery of the report was interfered by cognitive load, independent of modality. As 
discussed in the introduction, this is in line with predictions made by the SMS model of 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) and does not support modality specific predictions made 
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by the dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996). These models were not developed to 
explain intrusions of imagery and this interpretation is merely speculative. However, a similar 
pattern has been found in studies using a trauma film (Krans, Näring, & Becker, 2009) and 
IAPS pictures (Pearson et al., 2008) and is thus not unique to intrusions of imagery. 
Our study has several limitations. The large majority of our participants were comprised 
of students. Given that they differed from the non-student participants on several measures 
(e.g., trait dissociation and trait anxiety), replication in a community sample is warranted. We 
focused on visual intrusions specifically, and therefore our results cannot be generalized to 
intrusive images from other modalities. Further, all participants were instructed to generate 
mental imagery when listening to the verbal report, but it is difficult to ascertain (as in other 
mental imagery studies; e.g., Baddeley & Andrade, 2000) how well participants were able to 
comply with this task. Methodological innovations such as fMRI may help in future studies. 
Future research should explore the role of mental imagery in more detail. For example, 
exploring variations of modality in input, intrusions, and mental imagery will be a very 
valuable enterprise.  
 In sum, our study showed that intrusive visual images can develop from verbal 
traumatic information and the frequency of these intrusions can be modulated. Our findings 
have practical implications. Clinicians working with PTSD patients may opt for employing a 
dual task during reliving sessions to prevent intrusion development, which may be useful in 
helping to reduce therapist “burnout” or at least the reluctance by some clinicians to conduct 
the exposure component of therapy for PTSD. Theoretically, our current results are more in 
line with a hierarchical model of autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000) and not with dual-processing theories of PTSD (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
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Chapter 7  
Eyewitness or earwitness: The role of mental imagery in 
intrusion development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., Speckens, A. E. M., & Becker, E. S. 
Eyewitness or earwitness: The role of mental imagery in intrusion development. Manuscript 
submitted for publication.  
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Abstract 
 Current cognitive theories of PTSD explain the development of intrusive visual 
images according to the encoding of the perceptual (visual) information of the traumatic 
event. However, recent studies have, under controlled circumstances, shown that visual 
intrusive images can also develop from listening to a verbal trauma report. The present study 
compared posttraumatic stress symptoms resulting from seeing versus listening to a trauma to 
help elucidate possible working mechanisms. Participants were randomly assigned to a film 
group or an imagery group. Participants in the film group were shown a trauma film of traffic 
accidents, whereas participants in the imagery group listened to a verbal report of this film 
and imagined the scenes. The main finding was that a preference for visual processing was 
positively related to intrusion frequency in the imagery condition but not in the film 
condition. In addition, participants in the imagery condition reported more avoidance and 
negative cognitions about the world after one week. Limitations and implications for the 
aetiology and treatment of intrusive traumatic memories are discussed.  
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Introduction 
 After a traumatic experience, people may suffer from recurring and distressing 
intrusive memories. For example, a person who was in a car accident may repetitively 
experience the image of approaching headlights preceding the accident (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). These intrusive images are a key feature of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and have also been acknowledged to play a role in 
other disorders such as depression (Starr & Moulds, 2006). Interestingly, it has also been 
found that listening to a description of such an event can lead to intrusive visual images as 
well (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009b). Cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), however, assume direct visual input of a 
traumatic experience in the development of intrusive visual images. Thus, these models do 
not account for intrusive images that result from listening to a story, or so-called secondary 
traumatic experiences. Therefore, the present study aimed to help elucidate this process by 
examining potential differences in emotional impact, intrusive images, and other stress 
symptoms following an analogue traumatic event (i.e., a distressing film) versus a verbal 
description of that event. 
 The dual representation theory of PTSD (DRT; Brewin et al., 1996) states that 
intrusive images develop when there is a large discrepancy between the amount of 
information that has been consciously attended to during the trauma and information that was 
processed more automatically (Brewin et al., 1996). Accordingly, the information is stored in 
two memory systems. One system contains information that was processed automatically and 
consists of mostly sensory information but also cognitions formed at the time of trauma. This 
information is not integrated within autobiographical memory due to a lack of conscious 
conceptual processing, and is therefore automatically activated by perceptually similar cues, 
which is experienced as an intrusion. In contrast, elaborately processed information is 
integrated in autobiographical memory and recall is deliberately controlled (Brewin et al., 
1996). The cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) states that intrusive images 
develop from an imbalance between peri-traumatic data-driven processing and conceptual 
processing. Whereas data-driven processing results largely in automatic encoding of 
perceptual features, conceptual processing attempts to assign meaning to the event and 
integrate the information within autobiographic memory. According to the PTSD models, the 
Chapter 7: The role of mental imagery in intrusion development 
 88
development of intrusive images is heavily determined by the way in which the direct sensory 
input of the traumatic event is stored and processed in memory.  
Both models have been investigated empirically and have gained support (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). However, it is clear that neither can explain the development of intrusive 
images in the absence of the direct sensory input. Nevertheless, even visual intrusive images 
can develop from listening to the story of a traumatic experience (Krans et al., 2009b).  
 It is proposed here that mental imagery may play an important role in the development 
of intrusive images from a verbal report. A mental image exists “(…) when a representation 
of the type created during the initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not 
actually being perceived.” (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006, p. 4). Mental imagery has 
been shown to have a strong link with emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) and is thought to 
function as a preparation for an action response (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008). 
We suggest here that the trauma information is visually processed through mental imagery 
and that this underlies the development of intrusive images from a trauma narrative. If our 
hypothesis is supported, the occurrence of intrusive images may be more closely related 
mental imagery than cognitive models of PTSD suggest (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin 
et al., 1996). Specifically, the encoding and processing of direct (perceptual) trauma 
information that has been put forward as an important factor in intrusion development may 
actually play a less central role than suggested. 
 In the study by Krans et al. (2009b), participants were instructed to use mental 
imagery while listening to a verbal traumatic report. The main findings were that participants 
reported visual intrusive images of the report, and that intrusion frequency was reduced when 
a concurrent verbal or visuospatial task (compared to no extra task) was performed during the 
report. After this confirmation - that intrusive visual images can develop from listening to a 
traumatic verbal report - the current study aimed to elucidate what working mechanisms 
underlie this ‘secondary’ intrusion development. The data from the no-task control condition 
have been reported previously in Krans et al. (2009b). These data were compared here to data 
from a film group, tested specifically for this purpose. Participants in the film group viewed 
an often used stressful film showing road traffic accidents (RTAs) whereas participants in the 
imagery group listened to a verbal report of these traffic accidents. Mental imagery use and 
preference and the emotional impact of the film/report were assessed. Participants reported 
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their intrusive images of the film/report in a one-week diary and returned for follow-up, when 
further self-report measures of stress symptoms were administered. It was hypothesized that 
mental imagery would be related to intrusion development in the imagery condition, but not 
in the film condition. In the latter group, the sensory (i.e., visual and auditory) information is 
presented to the participants and there is no need for mental imagery.  
 
Method 
 Measures not relevant for the current study are reported in Krans, Näring, Holmes and 
Becker (2009b). 
 
Participants 
 Participants were invited by e-mail to participate in exchange for course credit. As 
required by the ethics committee (CMO approval number 2005/063), participants were 
informed about the graphic content of the film/report (as in previous studies, e.g., Holmes, 
Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) and went through a screening procedure. Exclusion criteria were: 
panic attacks, panic disorder (current and lifetime), PTSD, major depressive episode (current 
and lifetime), psychotic episode (current and lifetime), blood phobia, history of fainting and 
significant experience with road traffic accidents (RTA). The final sample consisted of 59 
participants: 14 men and 45 women with a mean age of 21 years and 10 months (SD = 3.38).  
 
Materials 
 Stressful film and report. The stressful film was originally compiled by Steil (1996). 
The version of Hagenaars, van Minnen, Holmes, Brewin, and Hoogduin (2008) was used, 
which includes the first four scenes of the original film. This version of the film lasts 11 min 
42 sec and depicts graphic scenes of the aftermath of real-life RTAs that were videotaped in 
Germany. Each scene was introduced with a short spoken introduction about the victims and 
the outcome of the accidents. The film showed car wrecks, bloody wounds, dead bodies being 
moved, accompanied by sounds such as the screaming of the victims. The film was projected 
on a smooth white wall. 
 The eyewitness report (also 11 min 42 sec) was based on the RTA film. As a rationale, 
participants were told that they were going to listen to a reporter present at the scene who was 
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making notes for later use using a voice-recorder. The background sounds of the original film 
were included in the recording. The reporter made particular mention of actions and details 
that had led to intrusions in previous experiments (e.g., Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 
2010). The reporter spoke continuously and clearly became emotionally moved. The 
introductory remarks were the same as in the film. Participants used headphones to listen to 
the report and closed their eyes during imagery.  
 
Questionnaires 
 Questionnaires and instructions were presented on a PC using Perseus® Software 
(Version 6).  
 Individual differences. Trait anxiety was measured with the Dutch version of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Van der Ploeg, 1980). The STAI-T contains 20 items rated 
on a 4-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). The STAI-T has a high test-retest 
reliability and internal consistency (Van der Ploeg, 1980). To measure to what extent 
participants spontaneously use imagery in daily life, the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale 
(SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003) was administered. This questionnaire consists of 
12 items, rated on a 5-point scale (1 = never appropriate, 5 = always completely appropriate). 
The SUIS has high internal consistency and convergent validity (Reisberg et al., 2003). 
Preference of cognitive processing style (verbal/visual) was measured with the Verbalizer-
Visualizer Questionnaire (Richardson, 1977). This widely used questionnaire consists of 15 
items (7 for verbal processing, 8 for visual processing) and has acceptable stability and 
reliability. Following recommendations in the literature (Childers, Houston, & Heckler, 
1985), the original response format true/false was changed to a format consisting of a 7-point 
scale (1 = totally agree, 7 = totally disagree). 
 
Control measures 
 Compliance. Participants in the imagery condition received a short imagery training in 
field perspective (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008), and rated the vividness of their 
imagery on a 4-point rating scale (1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree). Attention for the 
film/report was rated on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = completely). To check 
compliance with the intrusion diary, participants rated the statement: “I have often been 
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unable (or have forgotten) to record my intrusive images in the diary” on an 11-point scale (0 
= not at all, 10 = very much; Holmes et al., 2004). 
 Emotional impact of the film/report. Negative mood was measured with a 
questionnaire (MoodQ) consisting of five items rating current happiness, anxiety, horror, 
depressed mood, and anger on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely; Holmes et al., 
2004). The Dutch version of the state version of the STAI (STAI-S; Van der Ploeg, 1980) was 
used to measure state anxiety. The STAI-S consists of 20 items rated on a 4-point scale (1 = 
not at all, 4 = very much). 
 
Experimental measures 
 Intrusive images. Participants reported their intrusive images in a diary during the 
week following the first session. They were required to write down all intrusions the moment 
they occurred and to check the diary at a fixed time everyday. The cover page of the diary 
contained instructions and a definition of intrusions. Each entry in the diary allowed the 
participant to write down the content of the intrusion, the modality (sensory [visual, auditory] 
or verbal), and associated distress (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). At follow-up, intrusive 
experiences were measured with the Intrusion subscale of the revised version of the Impact of 
Event Scale (IES_Intrusion; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979, Dutch version by TZP 
Psychotrauma, 2006). This subscale consists of 8 items rated on a 4-point scale (0 = not at all, 
3 = often) and has adequate reliability and validity (Olde, Kleber, van der Hart, & Pop, 2006). 
 Other PTSD symptoms.  Avoidance (8 items) and hyperarousal (6 items) symptoms 
during the week between the first session and follow-up were measured with the Dutch 
translation of the revised version of the IES (TZP Psychotrauma, 2006). Post-traumatic 
cognitions about the film/report were measured with the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory 
(PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999). The PTCI consists of three subscales 
measuring negative cognitions about the self (21 items), negative cognitions about the world 
(7 items), and self-blame (5 items). Answers are given on a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 
7 = totally agree). 
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Procedure 
 After screening, participants signed an informed consent form stating that they were 
informed about the nature of the study and the exclusion criteria. They also received the 
telephone number and address of a local mental health care centre in case of distress caused 
by participation (no participants contacted the facility). Participants filled in a demographic 
questionnaire (age, gender, and education), the SUIS, STAI-T, STAI-S, and the MoodQ. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (film, imagery). Participants 
in the imagery condition received a short imagery training in field perspective (Holmes et al., 
2008) and rated the vividness of their imagery. All participants received written instructions 
for the appropriate experimental condition. Participants in the film condition were instructed 
to view the film as if they were witnesses to the scene. Participants in the imagery condition 
were instructed to imagine that they were witnesses at the scene. All participants were 
instructed not to look away or mentally disengage from the film/report. The film or mp3 was 
started and the experimenter left the room. Afterwards, participants filled in the MoodQ, 
STAI-S, the attention rating, and were given the intrusion diary. Participants returned for 
follow-up one week later and filled in the diary compliance rating, IES, and PTCI. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their involvement. 
 
Statistical approach 
 The data were checked for univariate and multivariate outliers across and within 
conditions. There were no multivariate outliers according to Mahalanobis distances. There 
were seven univariate outliers (more than three standard deviations from the mean), and these 
were adjusted according to the procedure described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). There 
were two randomly missing values, which were excluded from the analysis.  
 Differences in discrete variables were tested using Chi-square analysis. Differences in 
continuous variables between the imagery and film condition were tested with independent 
samples t-tests. In case of significant differences in variance, corrected t-values are reported. 
Correlations with intrusion frequency were ranked (Spearman) because of non-normal 
distribution. An α = .05 was the level of significance in all tests.  Effect sizes are reported as 
Cohen’s d and f.  
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Results 
Demographic variables 
 The imagery and film condition did not differ with respect to age, t(57) = 0.31, p = 
.76, gender, χ2(1) = 1.68, p = .20, and educational level, χ2(2) = 3.70, p = .16, see Table 1. 
 
Individual differences 
 Participants in the imagery and the film condition were comparable on the trait 
measures (STAI-T, SUIS, VVQ visual, VVQ verbal); all t(57) < 1.38, all p > .17, See Table 1. 
 
Compliance check 
 Participants in the imagery condition rated the vividness of their imagery training as M 
= 2.97, SD = 0.50. Attention rating for the film/report was comparable between conditions, 
t(57) = 1.61, p = .11, and was overall high. Diary compliance was slightly better in the film 
condition, t(57) = 2.03, p = .05, but was overall good. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of control measures across and within conditions 
 
  Imagery condition  Film 
condition 
 Total  
Measure  M* SD M* SD M* SD 
Age  21.69 2.73 21.97 3.95 21.83 3.38 
Gender Men 9 - 5 -   
 Women 20 - 25 -   
Education University 22 - 28 -   
 HBO** 1 - 0 -   
 Other 6 - 2 -   
STAI-T  36.21 8.01 34.40 6.77 35.29 7.40 
SUIS  39.72 6.46 37.67 7.36 38.68 6.95 
VVQ visual  34.76 4.73 35.77 7.01 35.27 5.97 
VVQ verbal  32.79 3.36 34.10 3.92 33.46 3.68 
Imagery vividness  2.97 0.50 - - - - 
Attention for 
film/report 
 8.48 0.95 8.97 1.33 8.73 1.17 
Diary compliance  3.17 1.79 2.27 1.64 2.71 1.76 
* Except for Gender and Education, which are summed scores ** Higher vocational education 
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Emotional impact of the film/report 
 To test the emotional impact of the film/report, a 2 Time (baseline, post-film/report) x 
2 Condition (imagery, film) mixed ANOVA was performed with Time as a within-subjects 
factor, Condition as a between-subjects factor, and negative mood (MoodQ) as the dependent 
variable. There was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 57) = 38.82, p < .01, f = 0.78, 
indicating an increase in negative mood from baseline to post-film/report across conditions, 
see Table 2. The main effect of Condition and the Time x Condition interaction did not reach 
significance, both F(1, 57) < 2.91, both p > .09.  
 A 2 Time (baseline, post-film/report) x 2 Condition (imagery, film) mixed ANOVA 
with state anxiety (STAI-S) as the dependent variable, showed an overall increase in state 
anxiety from baseline to post-film/report, as indicated by a significant main effect of Time, 
F(1, 57) = 38.90, p < .01, f = 0.83. The main effect of Condition and the Time x Condition 
interaction did not reach significance, both F(1, 57) < 1.79, both p > .18.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of experimental measures across and within conditions 
  Imagery 
condition 
 Film 
condition 
 Total  
Measure  M SD M SD M SD 
MoodQ Baseline  10.35 3.63 10.93 3.84 10.64 3.72 
 Post-
film/report 
14.14 5.62 17.30 7.43 15.75 6.74 
STAI-S Baseline 32.45 6.98 32.80 7.34 32.63 7.10 
 Post-
film/report 
36.83 8.59 39.57 9.76 38.22 9.23 
Intrusive visual images  5.59 4.54 6.47 5.20 6.03 4.86 
Intrusive auditory images  0.24 0.58 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.48 
Intrusion distress  2.87 1.88 2.27 1.68 2.56 1.79 
IES_Intrusion  0.70 0.38 0.61 0.43 0.66 0.40 
IES_Avoidance  0.51 0.27 0.26 0.37 0.38 0.34 
IES_Hyperarousal  0.18 0.26 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.22 
PTCI_Negative cognitive about 
self 
 1.64 0.50 1.51 0.37 1.57 0.44 
PTCI_Negative cognitions about 
the world 
 2.95 1.07 2.50 0.82 2.72 0.97 
PTCI_Self blame  1.99 0.75 1.88 0.82 1.94 0.78 
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Experimental measures 
 Intrusive images. In total, 356 visual intrusive images and 12 auditory intrusive images 
were reported. There was no significant difference in the frequency of intrusive images 
between the two conditions per modality (visual or auditory) or in total, all t(57) < 0.70, all p 
> .49. This was confirmed by a similar test on the IES_Intrusion subscale, t(57) = 0.86, p = 
.40. Intrusion distress was also comparable for both conditions, t(54) = 1.25, p = .22. Given 
the low number of auditory intrusive images and theoretical considerations, further analyses 
were done for the visual intrusive images only.  
 Across participants, the frequency of intrusive visual images was significantly and 
negatively correlated with the spontaneous use of imagery (SUIS), rs = -.26, p = .05. Within 
the imagery condition only, frequency of intrusive visual images was significantly and 
positively correlated with visual processing style (VVQ visual), rs = .41, p = .03, but not with 
verbal processing style (VVQ verbal), rs = -.04, p = .83. In the film condition, processing style 
(VVQ visual and verbal) was not related to the frequency of intrusive visual images, both p > 
.10. 
 Other PTSD symptoms. Participants in the imagery condition reported significantly 
more avoidance (IES) than participants in the film condition, t(57) = 2.97, p < .01, d = 0.79, 
and marginally significantly more negative cognitions about the world (PTCI), t(57) = 1.80, p 
= .08, d = 0.30. There were no significant differences between conditions on hyperarousal 
(IES), t(54) = 1.43, p = .16, negative cognitions about self (PTCI), t(54) = 1.16, p = .25, or 
self blame (PTCI), t(54) = 0.55, p = 0.58. 
 
Discussion 
 In line with our expectation, preference for a visual processing style was related to 
intrusion frequency in the imagery condition, but not in the film condition. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that mental imagery plays a role in the development of intrusive 
images in the absence of direct visual input. A preference for verbal processing was unrelated 
to intrusion development, which is in line with the finding that the large majority of intrusions 
in the diary were visual in nature. Interestingly, spontaneous use of imagery (SUIS) was 
negatively correlated with intrusion frequency across the conditions. We do not have a simple 
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explanation for this finding at this point, but it inspires the exciting suggestion that there may 
be different forms of mental imagery that relate to intrusion development in different ways. 
 Surprisingly, the film and the report increased negative mood and state anxiety to a 
comparable extent, and no significant differences in intrusion frequency or intrusion distress 
were found. Direct sensory input (with a mild stressor) does not appear to be a necessary 
factor for the development of intrusive images. Given the analogue design, our findings do 
not rule out the importance of direct input from an actual traumatic event. The lack of a 
significant difference between the imagery and the film condition in respect to emotional 
impact, intrusion frequency and distress may also be due to lack of power. The power for the 
statistical between-group tests for these specific variables varied from 1-ß = 0.10 (for 
intrusion frequency) to 0.44 (for the MoodQ), suggesting a required sample size of 228 to 
1.602, respectively (calculations done with GPower 3.1). If anything, these effects would be 
small.  
 Interestingly, participants in the imagery condition showed higher avoidance and 
negative cognitions about the world compared to the film condition. Self-relevance of the 
information may be an important concept here. Viewing a film of traffic accidents happening 
to other people may be distressing but does not have direct personal relevance or consequence 
for the viewer. In the imagery condition, however, participants will mostly rely on 
information from personal learning experiences and knowledge to imagine the RTAs scenery 
from the verbal report. Self-generated images may be more self-relevant by definition 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Accordingly, more avoidance and negative cognitions 
about the world were found in the imagery condition. This may be a result of the information 
being more self-relevant to them than viewing other people having car accidents on a video. 
This interpretation is indirectly supported by the fact that almost half of the reported 
intrusions were from a scene in which the RTA victim is a student underway to her parents 
(the other scenes were about families or elderly people). Our participants were mostly female 
students, so identification with this victim was perhaps more likely. The results have to be 
interpreted carefully, however, as the IES and PTCI findings necessarily do not reflect change 
scores but follow-up scores. 
 The present study has several limitations. First, we used a stressful film as an analogue 
traumatic stressor. Therefore, we cannot generalize to actual trauma and we do not believe 
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that our results will. Our main theoretical conclusion is that direct sensory input is not a 
necessary factor for intrusion development, which broadens the scope of cognitive models of 
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996). Our findings may also support the notion 
that, although peri-traumatic processing may be important, self-relevance of the information 
is a key feature in intrusion development. This view is in line with the Self-Memory System 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) in which intrusive memories are thought to reflect 
personally relevant active goals that are challenged by the traumatic event. Future research 
should further explore the relative importance of both peri-traumatic processing and self-
relevance of the trauma information in intrusion development. Second, participants in the 
imagery condition received an imagery training whereas participants in the film group did not. 
It is possible that the training and not the nature of the analogue trauma (i.e., visual film 
material or auditory report material) caused the differences between the conditions. However, 
this would still support the role of mental imagery in the development of intrusive images. 
Nevertheless, it would be more elegant to include a no training imagery condition in future 
studies. Our results do not inform about how mental imagery would be used spontaneously 
when listening to a trauma narrative. 
 To summarise, the present study showed that a preference for visual processing is 
associated with higher levels of intrusive visual images from secondary “trauma” information. 
Whereas cognitive models of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996) have stressed 
peri-traumatic information processing as an important factor for intrusion development in 
trauma, it is possible that self-relevance of stressful information is even more important to 
predict intrusion development (as suggested by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). However, 
this hypothesis clearly needs further testing in a study manipulating the extent of self-
relevance of the traumatic material. From a practical viewpoint, professionals with a high 
preference for visual processing may have a higher risk of developing unwanted intrusive 
images when working with traumatized patients than others. Perhaps interventions to reduce 
the vividness of imagery during sessions can be helpful.  
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Chapter 8  
Suppress ability and suppressability of intrusive and non-
intrusive images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., & Becker, E. S. Suppress ability and 
suppressability of intrusive and non-intrusive images. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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Abstract 
 The present study contrasted intrusiveness as a characteristic of negative images with 
intrusiveness as occurrences in awareness due to thought suppression. These definitions of 
‘intrusions’ are often confounded, although they stem from different cognitive processes. 
Suppression success was compared for a negative intrusive image, a negative non-intrusive 
image from the same event, and a non-intrusive negative image from another event. We 
explored how the ability to suppress these targets related to persistent intrusive images. 
Participants viewed a stressful film and reported intrusive images of the film in a one-week 
diary. On their return, they performed a suppression task consisting of a baseline, suppression, 
and post-suppression phase. Occurrences of the to-be-suppressed images during suppression 
were positively correlated with intrusive images in the diary. Occurrences of the intrusive 
image post-suppression were also related to the number of intrusive images in the diary. 
These findings suggest that both individual differences and specific imagery characteristics 
are important in the relationship between thought suppression and persistent intrusive images. 
Our results support the argument that intrusive images of a negative experience should not be 
confused with intrusions due to thought suppression efforts.  
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Introduction 
 Recurring unwanted (i.e., intrusive) images of a traumatic event are a key feature of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2001). As they are 
highly distressing, it is not surprising that trauma survivors make a great effort to suppress 
these images. However, suppression of a cognition can result in an ironic increase in that very 
cognition (Wegner, 1994). Several studies have employed the thought suppression paradigm 
to investigate intrusive trauma memories. However, the difference between persistent 
intrusive memories and intrusive occurrences as an effect of efforts to suppress is more often 
than not ignored. This is highly surprising, because the intrusive character of an image stems 
from a different cognitive process than thought suppression effects per se. Cognitive theories 
of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) state that the intrusive 
nature of an image is determined by the initial encoding of the traumatic information. The 
information is encoded as an image-based representation that is not well integrated in 
autobiographical memory, and is automatically activated by relevant cues resulting in 
intrusive images or ‘flashbacks’. Thus, the intrusive nature is thought to be determined by the 
initial encoding of the trauma information in memory. Subsequently, people may try to 
suppress the distressing images, which in turn can result in an increase of the images in 
awareness (i.e., thought suppression effect). In line with this distinction, Rassin, Merckelbach, 
and Muris (2001) found that a theoretical model in which thought suppression was not 
causally related to the intrusive character provided the best fit for the memories of negative 
events reported by graduate students. There has been a trend in the thought suppression 
literature for “intrusions” to be used as an umbrella term. In contrast, the present study 
distinguished between two definitions of “intrusions”: (i) intrusive images, as persistent 
unwanted and uncontrollable images of a (negative) event, and (ii) occurrences of a to-be-
suppressed target in awareness due to thought suppression effects.  
Effects of thought suppression have been described by Wegner (1994). During 
suppression, an effortful intentional operating system searches for mental content that will 
lead to the desired state; thus, anything but the to-be-suppressed target. A monitoring process 
scans for failures of this process by searching for the to-be-suppressed target in the mental 
contents. However, by searching for the avoided target, occurrences of that target may 
ironically enter awareness. In a typical thought suppression study (as proposed by Wegner, 
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Schneider, Carter III, & White, 1987), participants are instructed to suppress, express, or 
monitor a target in awareness. Increases in occurrence of the target in awareness during 
suppression compared to monitoring are defined as an immediate enhancement effect. 
Increases after suppression compared to the suppression and monitoring phases are defined as 
a rebound effect (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001).  
Research has linked together the intrusive character of traumatic memories and the 
ironic thought suppression processes (Wegner, 1994). For example, thought suppression was 
found to be a major predictor of PTSD (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998), and seems to be a 
coping style specifically endorsed in PTSD (Amir et al., 1997). Several studies have used 
trauma-related targets in a thought suppression paradigm. For example, a rebound effect of 
trauma-related thoughts was found in PTSD patients (Shipherd & Beck, 2005) and acute 
stress disorder patients (Harvey & Bryant, 1998a). A small number of studies using an 
aversive film as an analogue traumatic event have been carried out to study effects of this type 
of thought suppression experimentally. Davies and Clark (1998) presented participants with a 
positive film on polar bears and a negative film about a disaster. Half of the participants were 
instructed to suppress thoughts of the film for two minutes, followed by a post-suppression 
monitor phase of two minutes. The other half of the participants merely monitored their 
thoughts. The results showed an initial decrease of occurrences in awareness of both films 
during suppression, and a rebound effect for the disaster film but not the polar bear film. 
Nixon, Cain, Nehmy, and Seymour (2009) showed participants an aversive film and 
instructed one group of participants to suppress thoughts about the film whereas another 
group merely monitored their thoughts. At one-week follow-up, participants monitored their 
thoughts again. There was no difference in occurrences of targets between these two groups. 
Harvey and Bryant (1998b) showed participants a violent, humorous or neutral film. Half of 
the participants were allocated to a suppression condition. Overall, the distressing film elicited 
more occurrences than the neutral film, and for all film groups a similar rebound effect was 
found. Overall, studies of “intrusions” and thought suppression in the context of (analogue) 
traumatic memories have yielded mixed results.  
The interchangeable use of the term “intrusions” to refer to both a characteristic of a 
cognitive unit and a result of thought suppression is problematic. Further, most studies have 
instructed participants to suppress (analogue or actual) trauma-related thoughts, which is 
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unclear of itself. This instruction does not distinguish, for example, verbal thoughts (e.g., “I 
am going to die”) from visual images (e.g., “the face of the perpetrator”), and it cannot be 
assumed that suppression effects are identical for all types of cognitive units. For these 
reasons we explored suppression effects for emotional images that differ in the extent to 
which they have an intrusive character.  
 Our participants viewed a stressful film and reported intrusive images of the film in a 
diary during the week after film viewing. Participants then performed a suppression task. 
They suppressed the most frequent and distressing intrusive image from the diary, another 
scene from the film, and a negative control image. Cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Brewin et 
al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggest that intrusive images are hard to control deliberately 
due to the nature of the initial encoding. Therefore, we hypothesized that occurrences of the 
intrusive image of the film in awareness would be higher (1) during and (2) after suppression 
compared to the two other targets. Based on the ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994), we 
expected that none of the targets could be suppressed completely. Further, we expected that 
success of suppression of the intrusive image would be a valid indication for the day-to-day 
controllability of the intrusive image. Thus, the frequency of occurrence of the intrusive 
image during and after suppression was expected to be related to the number of intrusive 
images in the diary. We did not expect any differences between the non-intrusive film image 
and the control negative image. We used a within-subjects design to test our hypotheses. Our 
research question does not involve specific initial enhancement or rebound effects and thus 
does not call for a no-suppression control group.  
 
Method 
Participants  
 Data collection was part of a larger project (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009a). 
Participants were students from the Radboud University Nijmegen. Exclusion criteria were: 
panic attacks, panic disorder, PTSD, major depressive episode, psychotic episode, blood 
phobia, history of fainting and history of road traffic accidents (RTAs). The inclusion 
criterion was at least one intrusive image of the film reported in the diary. Twenty-eight 
participants who fulfilled criteria completed the thought suppression task. The mean number 
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of intrusive images in the diary was M = 3.29, SD = 2.54. The mean age was 19 years and 6 
months (SD = 1.37), 20 participants were female and 8 were male. 
 
Materials 
 Trauma film. Four film clips showing RTAs were used (Hagenaars, van Minnen, 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hoogduin, 2008). These clips involved scenes such as dead bodies being 
moved and injured victims screaming. The film clips were divided into blocks and shown in 
counterbalanced order for purposes not relevant for this study (see Krans et al., 2009a, for 
details). The film was 12 min and 38 sec long and all clips were preceded by a short verbal 
introduction providing information about the event, the victims and the outcome. The film 
was projected on a smooth white wall and sound was provided through headphones.  
 
Measures 
 Control measures and manipulation check. Attention for the film was self-rated with a 
single-item measure on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all focused on the film, 10 = completely 
focused on the film). The emotional impact of the film was measured with a Mood 
Questionnaire (MoodQ; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) and the Dutch version of the 
State Trait Anxiety Index-State version (Zelfbeoordelingsvragenlijst; Van der Ploeg, 1980). 
The MoodQ is a self-report questionnaire with five items measuring current happiness, 
anxiety, horror, depressed mood and anger on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = 
extremely). The STAI-S consists of 20 items of state anxiety that are self-rated from 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (very much). 
 Intrusive images of the film. Participants reported their intrusive images of the film in 
a one-week diary (Holmes et al., 2004). A page was provided for every day and participants 
were required to write down a brief description of the content of their intrusive images. Diary 
compliance was measured with a self-report single-item scale from 0 (never forgot to write 
down the intrusion) to 10 (always forgot to write down the intrusion) as in Holmes et al. 
(2004). 
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General procedure 
 The experiment consisted of two sessions, one week apart. Participants were screened 
for exclusion criteria and signed written informed consent. They were given a demographic 
questionnaire, the MoodQ, and the STAI-S on a PC using Perseus® software (Version 6). 
Participants viewed the trauma film with the instruction not to look away or to mentally 
disengage from the film, and to view the film as if they were a witness to the scene. After film 
viewing, the MoodQ, STAI-S and attention rating were completed, and participants were 
given the intrusion diary. During the week after the first session participants reported their 
intrusive images of the film in the diary and then returned for the second session. The diary 
compliance rating was administered and the suppression task was started. Finally, participants 
were thanked and assigned course credit for participating. 
 
Suppression task 
 Suppression effects were compared for three targets: (a) the main intrusive image of 
the film reported in the intrusion diary (Intrusive image), (b) a well-remembered scene from 
the film that was not the main intrusive image (Scene), and (c) a negative control image 
(Control). For the main intrusive image, participants were asked to select the most important 
image intrusion in their diary, defined as the most frequent and stressful image. All 
participants in the current study remembered two scenes from this particular film (‘screaming 
student on stretcher’ and ‘bloody knee wound’). When the participant reported the ‘screaming 
student on stretcher’ as the main intrusive image, the ‘bloody knee wound’ image was chosen 
as well-remembered scene and vice versa. 92.86% of the participants in the current study 
reported either one if these scenes as their main intrusive image, whereas 7.14% reported 
another scene as their main intrusion, although they all had experienced one of the two scenes 
as intrusive. For the negative control image, participants were asked to form an image of 
themselves drowning.  
 To ensure that participants were clear what the specific targets were, participants were 
asked to close their eyes and to imagine the targets as vividly as possible. When the 
participant indicated that the image was experienced most vividly, the next target was 
imagined. The order of the targets was counterbalanced. 
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 In the suppression task, the first phase was a Baseline measurement. Participants were 
instructed to do the following: 
 
“After the experimenter has left the room, please think out loud for two 
minutes. Verbalize everything that comes into your mind. This could be a 
description of an image, memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, 
observations, daydreams, objects that catch your attention, or attempts at 
solving a problem. It could be something else as well.  
Please verbalize continuously during these two minutes. This is important. 
After two minutes the experimenter will enter the room and you can stop.  
The experimenter cannot hear what you are saying, but it will be recorded. 
The information will be treated confidentially and anonymously. Do you 
have any questions?” 
 
 After the Baseline measurement, three Suppression phases followed in 
counterbalanced order. In one of the Suppression phases, participants were required to 
suppress their main intrusive image from the diary. Instructions were as follows: 
 
“After the experimenter has left the room, please think out loud for two 
minutes again. This time, however, try not to think about the intrusive image 
that you discussed with the experimenter. However, if you do, verbalize 
these thoughts out loud as well. Every time you think about the intrusive 
image please also press the allocated button.” 
 
 In another Suppression phase participants were required to suppress the image of the 
film scene that was not the main intrusive image (‘screaming student on stretcher’ or ‘bloody 
knee wound’). The instructions were the same for suppressing the intrusive image except that 
participants were required not to think about “the scene from the film” instead of the intrusive 
image. In a third Suppression phase, participants were required to suppress the Control image. 
In between the three Suppression phases, participants worked on a word finding puzzle as a 
distraction task for two minutes to minimize fatigue and carry-over effects from the 
suppression task. Although not an actual phase in the task, we also scored the number of 
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occurrences of every target during the suppression of the other two targets. This phase is 
indicated as Suppression of other Target in the results section.  
 After the three suppression phases, participants were required to think out loud for two 
minutes again (Post-suppression phase) with the following instructions: 
 
“After the experimenter has left the room, please think out loud for two 
minutes again. This time you can think about anything, including the 
intrusive image, the film scene and the image of drowning. Just verbalize 
everything that comes into your mind. Please continuously verbalize during 
these two minutes. This is important. Additionally, please press the button 
each time you happen to think about the intrusive image, the film scene, or 
the image of drowning.” 
 
 Occurrences of the three targets were measured using an audio-recording with an 
unobtrusive microphone during the Baseline measurement (button presses were not possible 
since there had been no instruction of suppression yet). Occurrences of the to-be-suppressed 
target in the Suppression phases were measured with both audio-recording and button presses. 
Occurrences of the non-suppressed targets in the suppression phases (Suppression of Other 
Target) was scored with the audio-recording (participants were not required to press a button 
for non-suppressed targets). In the Post-suppression phase, occurrences of the three targets 
were measured by audio-recording and button press. Participants were required to press the 
same button for all three targets to avoid cognitive load. 
 
Results 
Outliers and statistical approach 
 The data was scanned for multivariate and univariate outliers according to the 
procedure described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). No multivariate outliers were detected 
using Mahalanobis distances. Two univariate outliers were identified that were three standard 
deviations from the mean. These outliers (occurrences of Scene during Suppression, 
occurrences of Scene during Post-suppression) were adjusted to the first unit that was not an 
outlier (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
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 Suppression effects were tested using repeated measures ANOVA. Within-subject 
effects were further explored using paired-samples t-tests. Relations with the number of 
intrusive images in the diary were calculated using Spearman correlations as the diary 
measure was not normally distributed. An alpha level of .05 was considered as the threshold 
of significance in all tests.   
 
Control measures and manipulation check 
 The mean attention rating was M = 8.75, SD = 1.17, indicating high attention for the 
film. Paired-samples t-tests indicated a significant increase in negative mood (MoodQ), t(27) 
= 3.31, p < .01, d = 0.76, and state anxiety (STAI-S), t(27) = 3.34, p < .01, d = 1.35, from pre- 
to post-film. Control measures and intrusive images in the diary are displayed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for individual differences and control measures 
Measure 
(n = 28) 
 M SD 
Attention  8.75 1.17 
STAI-S pre-film 33.36 5.81 
 post-film 38.04 7.94 
MoodQ pre-film 10.25 4.01 
 post-film 14.04 5.98 
Diary intrusive images  3.29 2.54 
 
To check reliability of the occurrence measures in the suppression task, we correlated 
the audio-recording and the button presses for each to-be-suppressed target in the Suppression 
phases. These correlations were high (all > r = .86). For the Post-suppression phase, the 
number of button presses was equally highly correlated with the summed frequency of the 
three targets in the audio-recording, r = .90. To ensure the highest inclusion rate, the highest 
frequency (audio or button press) was used for every target/phase combination.  
 To check for possible order effects, ANOVAs were performed with the suppression 
task order as the independent factor and occurrences per target/phase combination as the 
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dependent variable. These analyses indicated no order effects for any of the targets in any of 
the phases (all < F(5, 22) = 2.28, all ps > .08).  
 
Experimental measures 
 Suppression effects were tested with a 3 Target (Intrusive image, Scene, Control) x 4 
Phase (Baseline, Suppression, Suppression of other Target, Post-suppression) repeated 
measures ANOVA with Target and Phase as within-subject factors and intrusion frequency as 
the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of Target, F(2, 26) = 8.89, p < .01, 
f = 0.83; a significant main effect of Phase, F(3, 25) = 24.32, p < .001, f = 1.71; and a 
significant Target x Phase interaction, F(5, 23) = 6.11, p < .01, f = 1.15. There were no carry-
over effects, as correlations between the different phases per target did not reach significance 
(largest rs = .19, p = .34). The Target x Phase interaction was followed up with paired-
samples t-tests comparing intrusion frequency between Phases for each Target and between 
Targets for each Phase. Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 1.  
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for the occurrence per Phase for each Target of in 
the suppression task 
 Intrusive memory Target Scene Target Control Target 
Phase M SD M SD M SD 
Baseline 0.36 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Suppression  2.50 2.20 2.07 1.80 2.32 1.96 
Suppression other 
Target 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post-suppression 0.71 0.76 0.21 0.42 0.68 0.72 
 
 Phase effect. For the Intrusive image target, occurrences in the Suppression phase, M = 
2.50, SD = 2.20, were significantly higher than in the three other phases, all t(27) > 4.51, all p 
< .001, all d > 1.21. Occurrences in the Post-suppression phase, M = 0.71, SD = 0.76, were 
significantly higher than the Suppression of other Target and Baseline phases, all t(27) > 2.17, 
all p < .04, all d > 0.56. Finally, occurrences in the Baseline phase, M = 0.36, SD = 0.49, were 
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significantly higher than during the Suppression of other Target (the intrusive memory was 
not mentioned by any of the participants), t(27) = 3.87, p < .01, d = 1.47. 
 For the Scene target, occurrence was significantly higher in the Suppression phase, M 
= 2.07, SD = 1.80, compared to the other three phases, all t(27) > 5.28, all p < .001, and all d 
> 1.68. Occurrence was significantly higher in the Post-suppression phase, M = 0.21, SD = 
0.42, compared to the Baseline and Suppression of other Target phase, both t(27) = 2.71, p = 
.01, d = 1.00. No occurrences of the film Scene were reported during the Baseline phase or 
during Suppression of other Targets.  
 For the Control image, occurrence was significantly higher in the Suppression phase, 
M = 2.32, SD = 1.96, compared to the three other phases, all t(27) > 4.55, all p < .001, and all 
d > 1.22. Occurrence was significantly higher in the Post-suppression phase, M = 0.68, SD = 
0.72, compared to the Baseline and Suppression of other Target phase, both t(27) = 4.97, p < 
.001, both d = 1.89. No occurrences of the Control image were reported during Baseline 
measurement or during suppression of the other two targets. 
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Figure 1. Mean occurrence of the different Targets (Intrusive memory, Scene, Control) in 
every Phase (Baseline, Suppression, Suppression other Target, Post-suppression). 
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 Target effect. Occurrence of the Intrusive image was significantly higher than the 
other two targets in the Baseline phase, both t(27) = 3.87, p < .01, d = 1.47. There were no 
occurrences of the Scene or Control image in this phase. In the Suppression and Suppression 
of other Target phase, there were no significant differences in the occurrence of the targets, all 
p > .05. In the post-suppression phase, occurrence of Scene was significantly lower than that 
for Intrusive memory and the Control image, all t(27) > 3.30, all ps < .01, all d > .082; 
without a significant difference between the latter, p > .05. 
 Intrusive images in the diary. The number of intrusive images of the film that 
participants reported in the diary was highly significantly related to target occurrence during 
Suppression: Intrusive image rs = .94, p < .001, Scene rs = .74, p < .001, and Control rs = .64, 
p < .001; and to occurrence of the Intrusive image during the Post-suppression phase, rs = .57, 
p < .01, but not to any other variables. 
 
Discussion 
 We hypothesized that occurrence (1) during, and (2) post-suppression would be higher 
for the intrusive image than for the scene and control image. The data only partially supported 
the hypothesis. First, during suppression, occurrences were equally high for all three targets. 
This indicates that (negative) images may be hard to suppress, irrespective of intrusive or 
non-intrusive character. Although unexpected, this supports a distinction between 
intrusiveness as a characteristic of an image and intrusiveness as occurrences of a target in 
awareness due to suppression. Our expectation that the three targets could not be suppressed 
completely was confirmed, supporting the ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994).  
Second, occurrence of the intrusive image was significantly higher than the scene 
target at post-suppression. Once activated, the intrusive image remained active longer than the 
scene target. This is in line with information processing theories (e.g., Brewin et al., 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggesting that intrusive images are harder to control deliberately. The 
prolonged activation may indicate that intrusive images are meaningful in a sense that their 
discrepancy with our current goals and beliefs is not resolved and they are thus goal-relevant 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This argument is supported by the finding that occurrence 
of the intrusive image was significantly higher during baseline than the other two targets, that 
did not come into awareness at all during baseline. The lack of a difference between 
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occurrence of the intrusive image and the control image in the post-suppression phase was 
unexpected. Whereas the intrusive image and the scene image refer to a specific image, the 
instruction to generate an image of drowning may not have resulted in an equally specific 
image. Abramowitz et al. (2001) showed that non-discrete targets showed higher rebound 
effects than discrete (i.e., more specific) targets. Although we did not measure a rebound 
effect, it is possible that the control target remained active after suppression because the 
instruction to image oneself drowning might have lead to a less specific image than a film 
scene. Alternatively, it is possible that the self-generated image of drowning lead to similar 
characteristics as the intrusive image. Krans, Näring, Holmes, and Becker (2009b) found that 
self-generated images from an aversive verbal report developed into intrusive images during 
the subsequent week. Thus, it is possible that the drowning imagery led to sensitivity for 
automatic cueing and prolonged activity by processes similar to those associated with the 
intrusive memory.  
Our second hypothesis was that occurrence of the intrusive image during suppression 
would be positively correlated with the number of intrusive images in the diary. This was 
indeed the case, with an extremely high correlation of .94. Occurrence of the intrusive image 
post-suppression was also significantly and positively correlated with the number of intrusive 
images in the diary (.57). This indicates that the extent to which the intrusive image remains 
active after suppression is related to naturally occurring intrusions. Perhaps the 
meaningfulness of the intrusive image is associated with higher accessibility (and thus higher 
activation) and/or lack of deliberate control. Interestingly, occurrence of the scene and control 
images during suppression were also highly correlated with the number of intrusive images in 
the diary (.74 and .64, respectively). This finding suggests that trait ability to suppress may be 
involved. Earlier studies indeed suggest that there are measurable individual differences in 
successful cognitive control strategies related to thought suppression (e.g., Williams, Moulds, 
Grisham, Gay, Lang, Kandris, et al., 2009). Of relevance to this interpretation, Verwoerd and 
colleagues (2008, 2009) showed that attentional control (especially resistance to pro-active 
interference) was negatively related to more intrusive images from a stressful film. At this 
stage, our interpretation is limited to speculation because no measure of trait suppression was 
included in our study. 
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Our study has several limitations. We used a laboratory stressor to induce intrusive 
images and our participants were all university students. This limits the generalization of our 
findings to the general population. Although our to-be-suppressed targets were assumed to be 
negative targets (based on data from our previous studies) we did not assess the valence or 
discreteness of the targets. Thus, we cannot confidently rule out moderation of affective 
properties in our findings. Finally, the image of drowning as a control negative image turned 
out to be an inelegant choice. Although we intended to control for the specific trauma film as 
a confounding factor, the image of drowning differs in more respects than initially foreseen. 
In particular, its self-generated nature limits our findings and future studies should explore 
self-generated versus other-generated effects of thought suppression. 
 In sum, our findings suggest that negative images are equally hard to suppress, 
irrespective of intrusive nature. The ability to suppress in general appears to be related to the 
frequency of persistent intrusive images as measured in our study with a diary. Furthermore, 
the prolonged activation of an intrusive image after its suppression was also related to the 
persistent intrusive images in the diary. This finding suggests that a specific feature of an 
intrusive image (perhaps goal-relevance) is related to persistent intrusive images in addition to 
a suppression ability trait. Despite methodological limitations, the present study is important 
as it the first to disentangle (1) the concept of “intrusion” into a target characteristic and 
occurrences in awareness due to thought suppression; and (2) the suppression of “trauma-
related thoughts” by looking specifically at mental images. This distinction is clinically and 
conceptually relevant for understanding conditions such as PTSD. Future research should aim 
to replicate these findings and extend the design by including control measures of valence, 
discreteness and trait suppression.
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Chapter 9  
Experimental evidence for attentional bias in analogue trauma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Reinecke, A., de Jong, P. J., Näring, G., & Becker, E. S. 
Experimental evidence for attentional bias in analogue trauma. Manuscript submitted for 
publication.  
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Abstract 
 The present study investigated whether exposure to threat-related pictures would 
induce an attentional bias for threat stimuli. Participants were shown threat or neutral pictures 
and completed a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task. They were instructed to 
identify two targets in a stream of neutral pictures that included landscapes and buildings as 
the first target, and threat or neutral pictures as the second target. The results showed that 
previous exposure to threat pictures disrupted the processing of the first target when the 
second target in an RSVP string was a threat picture, and additionally increased identification 
accuracy of the second target when this was a familiar threat picture. These findings suggest 
an attentional bias of increased identification of perceptually similar threat stimuli, and a bias 
of interference of ongoing processing in the presence of conceptually similar (i.e., threat) 
stimuli. These findings support the notion of the cognitive model of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) that trauma representations are automatically activated by 
perceptually similar cues, and suggest that conceptually similar triggering may underlie the 
feeling of “current threat” in PTSD.  
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Introduction 
 Cognitive models of anxiety (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) propose that the 
emotional valence of a stimulus can be appraised automatically. Stimuli that have features 
associated with threat will receive attentional priority, and will inhibit competing stimuli. 
Following these models, emotional cues will be preferentially processed at the cost of other 
cues. In line with this, information processing theories of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggest that trauma 
representations (e.g., a feeling of current threat, or intrusive experiences) are activated 
automatically by threat-related cues, sometimes without awareness of the specific trigger. 
Often, the triggers share perceptual features with the trauma representation (e.g., the face of a 
man in the bar may resemble the face of the rapist) but they may also generalize to other 
threat cues (e.g., the colour red for someone who was in a bloody car accident). It is plausible 
that an attentional bias for trauma-related stimuli underlies the automatic activation of trauma 
representations.  
Preferential processing of environmental stimuli that bear a strong perceptual 
resemblance to a traumatic situation will enhance the probability that a trauma representation 
emerges in conscious awareness and may thus be responsible for the maintenance of intrusive 
re-experiencing symptoms over time (Michael & Ehlers, 2007). From such a perspective, an 
attentional bias for perceptual trauma-reminders might be critically involved in the 
occurrence and persistence of unwanted reminders. In a first attempt to test whether an 
attentional bias (proactive interference specifically) exists for perceptual trauma-related 
stimuli, Verwoerd, Wessel, de Jong and Nieuwenhuis (2009) showed participants an aversive 
film and participants reported their intrusions of the film in a one-week diary. Film viewing 
was immediately followed by a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task. In an RSVP 
task participants are presented with a string of rapidly presented visual items, and are 
instructed to attend to two targets (T1 and T2) that stand out, for example, by a different 
background colour. In Verwoerd et al. (2009), the T1 was a freeze-frame taken from the 
aversive film, or a neutral image. Participants were instructed to identify whether the T2 
(landscape or architecture) was tilted to the right or left. The results showed no difference 
between film images and neutral images in the accuracy of identification of the T2 (or 
proactive interference). The authors describe that this was likely due to a ceiling effect for the 
Chapter 9: Experimental evidence for attentional bias in analogue trauma 
 118
RSVP task. On an individual level, however, proactive interference of film images on 
correctly identifying T2 was positively related to the number of intrusions. This relation was 
moderated by attentional control (the ability to shift / disengage attention, specifically). In a 
second study, a control group that did not view the aversive film was included to control for 
mere familiarity effects. A similar RSVP task was given to participants who viewed the 
aversive film and those who did not (Verwoerd, Wessel, & de Jong, in press). A similar 
interference was observed when T1 was a film target, but only in the group who previously 
viewed the film. This effect did not appear to stem from mere familiarity with the targets, as it 
did not appear for a neutral film.   
 The aforementioned studies support the role of attentional bias (proactive interference) 
in the automatic activation of trauma representations. However, several questions remain 
unanswered. First, it is unknown if such a bias would also generalize to other threat-cues, i.e., 
a generalization of triggers that activate trauma representations beyond perceptual similarity. 
Therefore, the present study included two groups: an analogue trauma group who viewed 
‘trauma’ pictures before the RSVP task, and a neutral control group who viewed perceptually 
similar pictures in which the central threat object (e.g., a baby corpse) was replaced by a non-
threatening object (e.g., a gold bar). Both groups additionally viewed four neutral pictures to 
control for mere familiarity effects. Second, to prevent any differences in a priori mood state 
between these groups, the RSVP task was started only when mood had returned to baseline. 
Third, the present study reversed the contents of the two targets: T1 was always neutral, 
whereas T2 included threat-related items. This way, interference with ongoing processing as 
described by the model of attentional bias in anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) is tested 
as an extension to the proactive interference studies by Verwoerd and colleagues (2009; in 
press). Interference of ongoing processing may be closer to reflect the disruption of ongoing 
activities by an encounter with a trauma or threat reminder, for example, in the startle reflex 
that is as is often reported in PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Fourth, the 
first study by Verwoerd et al. (2009) observed ceiling effects for the RSVP task instruction 
(identifying whether T2 was tilted to the left or right). Therefore, we explicitly intended a 
more difficult AB task by asking participants to report both T1 and T2. This additionally 
ensures that participants indeed process the first target which is hard to control for when not 
asking for a T1 report. Finally, to ensure more control of the salience, valence and arousal of 
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the RSVP items, pre-rated still pictures of the International Affective Picture System (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) were used.  
 Based on the theory of attentional bias in anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), we 
expected the following: (1) T2 trauma pictures will benefit from enhanced identification 
compared to other T2 categories, (2) because highly salient T2 stimuli may interrupt 
processing of T1, presenting new threat pictures or trauma pictures as T2 will result in a 
lowered T1 identification in the trauma group compared to the neutral group. As indicated by 
Mathews & Mackintosh (1998), if during the processing of a neutral T1 a more important T2 
is encountered, attention shifts from T1 to T2, resulting in the loss of T1 in the identification 
process. In the neutral group we expected (3) an enhanced identification of pictures from the 
induction phase compared to the other categories due to familiarity, and (4) we expected that 
correct identification of trauma pictures will be positively related to intrusion frequency in the 
trauma group.  
 
Method 
 The present study was approved by the Ethical Committee of Behaviour Science 
Research of the Radboud University Nijmegen (ECG09032009). 
 
Participants 
 Participants were university students (N = 81) who were randomly assigned to the 
trauma or neutral group. They were screened for panic attacks, panic disorder, PTSD, major 
depressive episode (current and lifetime), psychotic episode (current and lifetime), blood 
phobia and history of fainting, and were excluded from the study if any criterion was present. 
Participants received course credit for participation. The RSVP task was presented with 
Matlab software (Psychophysics Toolbox) other measures were presented with Inquisit 3 
(Millisecond Software).  
 
Materials 
 Anxiety and mood. The Dutch version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Zelfbeoordelingsvragenlijst; Van der Ploeg, 1980) was used to assess trait (STAI-T) and 
state anxiety (STAI-S). Negative mood was measured with the mood questionnaire as in 
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Holmes, Brewin, and Hennessy (2004). This questionnaire contains five single item ratings 
for current happiness, anxiety, horror, depressed mood, and anger. Scores were summed 
(happiness reversed). 
 Attention and attentional control. Attention for the pictures in the induction phase was 
rated on an 11-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). The Dutch version of the 
Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Verwoerd, de Jong, & Wessel, 2006) 
contains 20 items and consists of two subscales: Attentional Focus (9 items) and Attentional 
Shifting (11 items).  
 Induction. Pictures were presented with a light grey frame for 5 seconds on a computer 
screen, with 1 second in between pictures during which the screen was white. Both groups 
viewed the same four neutral pictures. Participants in the trauma group were then presented 
with four negative pictures. Participants in the neutral group viewed four neutral pictures that 
were matched to the trauma pictures except for the trauma content (e.g., the pre-matched 
IAPS nr. 3005.1 and 3005.2). Participants were instructed to view the pictures as if they were 
witnesses to the scene and not to mentally disengage from the pictures.  
 Intrusion provocation task. After the RSVP trials, participants in the trauma group 
were presented with blurred versions of the trauma pictures for 10s using Microsoft 
PowerPoint. Participants were instructed to think freely for two minutes while recording any 
intrusive images by pressing a key (registered with Microsoft Word). Key presses were 
summed to reflect intrusion frequency in the trauma group.  
 RSVP task. Forty neutral pictures (not presented in the induction phase) were used as 
distracter items. As T1 targets, 32 neutral pictures were selected. Half of these pictures 
depicted landscapes, the other half architectural scenes (Verwoerd et al., 2009). T2 items were 
the 4 trauma pictures (viewed by the trauma group), the 4 matched pictures (viewed by the 
neutral group), the 4 familiar-neutral pictures (viewed by both groups), 4 new-negative 
pictures, and 4 new-neutral pictures. To prevent salience effects (uncontrolled for by the IAPS 
ratings) and to promote conceptual threat categorization, all stimuli in the RSVP task were 
presented in sepia colour. Targets were presented with a bright grey frame, whereas 
distracters had a dark grey frame. Pictures were presented in a 19 cm x 19 cm size (Verwoerd 
et al., 2009).  
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 Each trial started with the presentation of a centred black fixation cross for 500ms. 
Then, 15 pictures were presented in a row with a stimulus duration of 80 ms, without 
interstimulus interval. Participants were instructed to attend to the stream of pictures and to 
identify the two target pictures marked by a bright grey frame. A blank grey screen appeared 
for 1000 ms to prevent memory masking. Then, two response menus were presented for 5000 
ms maximum. The first asked for T2 identification whereas the second asked for T1 
identification (Reinecke, Rinck, & Becker, 2008). The central feature of every T2 picture was 
identified beforehand by three raters on the basis of consensus. The response menu for T2 
consisted of a comparison of the central feature of two pictures. For example, “Was it a baby 
or a fire?” One response option was the central feature of the presented T2, whereas the other 
option was a central feature of any other T2 picture. T2 depicted each of the five possible 
picture categories (trauma, matched, new-negative, new-neutral, familiar-neutral) equally 
often. For T1, participants had to indicate whether it depicted a landscape or architecture 
(Verwoerd et al., 2009). Landscape vs. architecture items were each displayed 50% of the 
time. Guessing was explicitly discouraged and a forced-choice format was used. Participants 
started a new trial through button press and could therefore pace their breaks. Trial by trial, 
the position of T1 within the picture series was randomly determined, occurring in equal 
frequency at the string positions 3 to 9. T2 appeared with a lag of 1, 2 or 6 after T1. For 
example, lag 2 indicates that T2 is presented as the second item appearing after T1. The 
remaining 13 positions within the picture string were randomly filled with distracter items. 
Subjects worked on 6 practice trials and 360 experimental trials, consisting of 2 (repetitions) x 
2 (T1 categories) x 5 (T2 categories) x 3 (lag) x 6 (T1 string positions). The mean accuracy in 
correctly identifying T2/T1 provided that the T1/T2 response was accurate was calculated per 
T2 category/lag combination. 
 
Procedure 
 After screening and signing an informed consent form, participants filled in the STAI-
T, STAI-S and the mood questionnaire. Next, participants viewed the pictures according to 
experimental condition, followed by the STAI-S and the mood questionnaire. To ensure mood 
would return to baseline levels, participants then worked on a word finding puzzle for ten 
minutes. Afterwards, the STAI-S and mood questionnaire were administered and checked to 
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reflect baseline emotional state. If a participant showed elevated scores, the distraction task 
was extended by five minutes and STAI-S and the mood questionnaire were administered 
again. Next, participants worked on the RSVP task and participants in the trauma group 
performed the intrusion provocation task (Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009).   
 
Results 
Statistical approach 
 All variables were checked on outliers across and within groups. There were no 
multivariate outliers as indicated by Mahalanobis distances. There were four univariate 
outliers which were adjusted according to the procedure described by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996). Two participants indicated low attention (score 2 and 5) for the pictures in the 
induction phase and were therefore excluded from analysis. Differences between groups and 
target categories were tested with repeated-measures ANOVAs and follow-up independent- or 
paired-samples t-tests. Reported results for experimental effects are corrected for pre-
experimental differences between the groups (trait anxiety, baseline mood, and attention) by 
including these variables as covariates in ANOVA analysis.  All tests were done with an alpha 
of .05. Self-report data are reported in Table 1, experimental data in Table 2. 
 
Control measures 
 Groups were comparable on age, t(77) = 1.29, p = .20, with M = 20.29, SD = 1.86; 
educational level, χ2(2) = 2.00, p = .37, with 89.9% university, 7.6% college, and 2.5% lower 
education; overall attentional control (ACS), t(77) = 0.19, p = .85, Attentional Focusing, t(77) 
= 1.12, p = .27, and Attentional Shifting, t(77) = 0.64, p = .52; and state anxiety (STAI-S) at 
baseline, t(77) = 1.39; p = .17. 
 The neutral group showed a trend towards more negative mood at baseline compared 
to the trauma group, t(77) = 1.86, p = .07. Trait anxiety (STAI-T) was significantly higher in 
the neutral group than in the trauma group, corrected t(67.80) = 2.08, p = .04. Participants in 
the trauma group reported more attention for pictures in the induction phase than participants 
in the neutral group, t(77) = 2.28, p = .03. 
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Manipulation check 
 Emotional impact of induction. A 2 Group (neutral, trauma) x 2 Time (baseline, post-
induction) repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with negative mood as the dependent 
variable. There was a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 77) = 52.71, p < .001, f = 0.83; and 
Group, F(1, 77) = 13.48, p < .001, f = .42, and a significant Group x Time interaction effect, 
F(1, 77) = 56.50, p < .001, f = 0.85. In the neutral group, there was no significant change in 
negative mood from baseline to post-induction, t(39) = 0.40, p = .69. Negative mood 
increased significantly from baseline to post-induction in the trauma group, t(38) = 7.71, p < 
.001, d = 0.83, and post-induction scores were significantly higher than in the neutral group, 
corrected t(50.83) = 5.79, p < .001, d = 1.41. 
 The impact on state anxiety was tested with a 2 Group (neutral, trauma) x 2 Time 
(baseline, post-induction) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of 
Time, F(1, 77) = 22.83, p < .001, f = 0.55; but not of Group, F(1, 77) = 0.34, p = .56, and a 
significant Group x Time interaction effect, F(1, 77) = 15.20, p < .001, f = 0.44. In the neutral 
group, there was no significant change in state anxiety from baseline to post-induction, t(39) = 
0.63, p = .53.  There was a significant increase in state anxiety from baseline to post-induction 
in the trauma group, t(38) = 6.08, p < .001, d = 0.91. Post-induction state anxiety was 
marginally significantly higher in the trauma group than in the neutral group, t(77) = 1.89, p = 
.06, d = 0.43.  
 Return to baseline. To test whether mood returned to baseline levels after the distracter 
task, a 2 Group (neutral, trauma) x 2 Time (baseline, post-distracter) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed, with negative mood as the dependent variable. There was no 
significant main effect of Group, F(1, 77) = 0.73, p = .40, but a significant main effect of 
Time, F(1, 77) = 11.36, p < .01, f = 0.38, and a Group x Time interaction effect, F(1, 77) = 
8.79, p < .01, f = 0.34. The neutral group indicated significantly higher negative mood at 
baseline than post-distracter, t(39) = 5.19, p < .001, d = 0.30. Negative mood at baseline was 
comparable to post-distracter mood in the trauma group, t(38) = 0.26, p = .80. Post-distracter, 
there was no significant difference in negative mood between the groups, t(77) = 0.60, p = 
.55. 
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Table 1. Self-report data within and across conditions 
  Neutral group Trauma group Total  
Measure  M SD M SD M SD 
ACS  54.38 7.69 54.05 7.37 54.22 7.49 
STAI-T  36.93 7.31 34.03 4.83 35.49 6.34 
Mood baseline 6.88 3.74 5.38 3.35 6.14 3.61 
 post 
induction 
6.70 3.68 15.46 8.73 11.03 7.96 
 post 
distracter 
4.88 2.85 5.26 2.80 5.06 2.81 
STAI-S baseline 32.08 5.77 30.49 4.29 31.29 5.12 
 post 
induction 
32.60 7.39 65.67 7.05 34.11 7.34 
 post 
distracter 
30.15 5.89 31.10 4.74 30.62 5.34 
Attention   8.25 0.98 8.82 1.23 8.53 1.14 
Intrusions   - - 12.13 11.56 - - 
 
A 2 Group (neutral, trauma) x 2 Time (baseline, post-distracter) repeated measures ANOVA 
with state anxiety (STAI-S) as the dependent variable showed the same pattern for state 
anxiety: main effects of Group, p = .77; Time, p = .12; Group x Time interaction, F(1, 77) = 
9.12, p < .01, f = 0.34. In the neutral group, there was a significant decrease in state anxiety 
from baseline to post-distracter, t(39) = 3.10, p < .01, d = 0.33. In the trauma group, there was 
no significant difference between baseline and post-distracter state anxiety, t(38) = 1.09, p = 
.28. Groups were comparable on state anxiety after the distracter task, t(77) = 0.79, p = .43.  
 
Experimental effects 
 T2 accuracy for correct T1 trials. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was run, 
including the between-subjects factors Group (neutral, trauma), the within-subjects factors 
Picture (trauma [Trauma], matched [Matched], familiar-neutral [FN], new-negative [NNeg], 
new-neutral [NNeut]), and Lag (1, 2, 6). The dependent variable was the accuracy rate in 
reporting T2 in correctly identified T1 trials. There was no significant main effect of lag, F(2, 
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148) = 1.16, p = .32, nor did any of the interactions including this factor reach statistical 
significance, all F(2, 148/8, 592) < 2.63, all ps > .08. Therefore, data were collapsed over lags 
for further analysis. There was a significant main effect of Picture, F(4, 296) = 3.07, p = .02, f 
= 0.20, and a significant Picture x Group interaction, F(4, 296) = 2.47, p = .05, f = 0.18. In 
both groups, report accuracy was higher for NNeut pictures compared to all other picture 
types: trauma group all t(38) > 4.88, all p < .001, all d > .91; neutral group all t(39) > 5.72, all 
p < .001, all d > 1.08. This suggests that, despite pilot testing and using sepia colour, NNeut 
pictures appeared to be more salient. Participants in the trauma group identified Trauma 
pictures significantly more accurately than pictures from the remaining three types (NNeg, 
Matched, FN), all relevant t(38) > 2.26, all p < .03, all d > .46, but did not show any further 
differences, all relevant t(38) < 0.78, all p > .44. Participants in the neutral group reported FN 
pictures more accurately than NNeg pictures, t(39) = 2.06, p < .05, d = .38, and showed a non-
significant trend in reporting these FN pictures more accurately than Trauma pictures, t(39) = 
2.01, p = .051, d = .31, all other t(39) < 1.39, all p > .17. The two groups differed only with 
regard to Trauma pictures, with higher accuracy in the trauma group, F(1, 74) = 5.66, p = .02, 
f = 0.27. 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for the RSVP effects. Upper panel: T2 report 
accuracy in T1-correct trials. Lower panel: T1 report accuracy in T2-correct trials (lower 
panel) 
 Trauma group Neutral group 
Picture Category lag 1 lag 2 lag 6 lag 1 lag 2 lag 6 
T2                   Trauma .70 
(.15) 
.73 
(.17) 
.71 
(.17) 
.62 
(.21) 
.61 
(.19) 
.61 
(.18) 
Matched .64 
(.17) 
.65 
(.15) 
.70 
(.14) 
.63 
(.14) 
.64 
(.17) 
.64 
(.17) 
New-Negative (NNeg) .65 
(.18) 
.64 
(.16) 
.66 
(.18) 
.63 
(.17) 
.60 
(.17) 
.61 
(.18) 
New-Neutral (NNeut) .83 
(.10) 
.81 
(.14) 
.80 
(.14) 
.79 
(.12) 
.79 
(.13) 
.75 
(.14) 
Familiar-Neutral (FN) .65 
(.16) 
.65 
(.18) 
.65 
(.17) 
.70 
(.13) 
.67 
(.14) 
.63 
(.16) 
T1                    Trauma .50 
(.13) 
.52 
(.11) 
.55 
(.13) 
.56 
(.14) 
.53 
(.15) 
.51 
(.16) 
Matched .53 
(.15) 
.49 
(.12) 
.57 
(.14) 
.49 
(.14) 
.52 
(.11) 
.53 
(.14) 
New-Negative (NNeg) .50 
(.14) 
.54 
(.14) 
.55 
(.13) 
.56 
(.14) 
.49 
(.13) 
.54 
(.13) 
New-Neutral (NNeut) .56 
(.11) 
.55 
(.13) 
.55 
(.13) 
.49 
(.09) 
.56 
(.12) 
.52 
(.13) 
Familiar-Neutral (FN) .54 
(.14) 
.55 
(.14) 
.55 
(.14) 
.51 
(.13) 
.55 
(.14) 
.53 
(.12) 
 
 T1 accuracy for correct T2 trials. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors 
Group (neutral, trauma), Picture (Trauma, Matched, FN, NNeg, NNeut), and Lag (1, 2, 6) 
was run. The dependent measure was the accuracy in identifying T1 in correct T2 trials. None 
of the main effects nor two-way interactions reached statistical significance, all F(1, 74/2, 
148/4, 296/8, 592) < 1.60, all ps > .18. The three-way interaction was significant, F(8, 592) = 
3.04, p < .01,  f = 0.20, and additional Lag x Group two-way ANOVAs were run for each 
picture type. The two factors significantly interacted for Trauma pictures, F(2, 148) = 3.23, p 
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= .04, f = 0.20; and NNeg pictures, F(2, 148) = 4.15, p = .02, f = 0.23. One-way ANOVAs 
showed a significantly reduced accuracy for T1 pictures in a Trauma trial in the trauma group 
compared to the neutral group at Lag 1, F(1, 74) = 9.47, p < .01, f = .35; but not at Lag 2 (p = 
.67) or Lag 6 (p = .63). Accuracy for T1 pictures in a NNeg trial was similarly reduced in the 
trauma group compared to the neutral group at Lag 1, F(1, 74) = 4.88, p = .03, f = .25; but not 
at Lag 2 (p = .13) or Lag 6 (p = .83). 
 Correlations of RSVP parameters.  In the trauma group, higher accuracy for Trauma 
T2 (collapsed across lags) was significantly related to higher overall attentional control 
(ACS), r = .35, p = .03, which appeared to be driven by the Attentional Shifting subscale, r = 
.44, p < .01. The Attentional Focus subscale was not significantly correlated with Trauma 
accuracy, r = .18, p = .28. There was a non-significant trend between accuracy for NNeg T2 
and Attentional Shifting, r = .29, p = .07. Matched, NNeut, and FN T2 were not related to any 
of the self-report measures, all r < |.20|, all ps > .21. In the neutral group, none of the 
correlations reached statistical significance, all r < |.18|, all ps > .28.  
 Intrusive images. There were no significant correlations with any parameters for 
intrusion frequency measured in the trauma group with the intrusion provocation task, all rs < 
.23, all ps > .16.  
 
Discussion 
 The present study aimed to experimentally test whether analogue trauma would give 
rise to priority processing of trauma reminders. The major results can be summarized as 
follows: (i) exposure to negative pictures increased identification of these pictures in an 
RSVP task; (ii) this preferential processing was at the expense of correctly identifying a 
neutral previous target (i.e., T1); (iii) exposure to negative pictures resulted in a hampered 
identification of the T1 when the T2 was a new negative picture, indicating a generalization of 
threat triggers without enhanced identification of the trigger; and (iv) these effects were not 
due to mere familiarity.  
 
Enhanced identification of trauma reminders 
 The first hypothesis was confirmed by the data. Participants in the trauma group 
showed a higher accuracy for the Trauma pictures from the induction phase compared to the 
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neutral group. This finding supports an attentional bias of enhanced identification for 
perceptually similar stimuli induced by analogue trauma. There was no enhanced 
identification of the New Negative pictures. Thus, the bias did not generalize to threat stimuli 
that were not perceptually similar. This is in line with the cognitive model PTSD (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) stating that trauma representations are automatically activated on encounter with 
perceptually similar cues in the environment. This particular bias may function as a ‘warning 
signal’ for a potentially dangerous situation (e.g., Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, Clohessy, 
Wenninger, & Winter, 2002; Krans, Näring, Becker, & Holmes, 2009).  
 Interestingly, attentional shifting (ACS) was positively correlated with identification 
of Trauma and New Negative pictures in the trauma group. This suggests that the ability to 
shift attention may enhance an attentional bias for threat stimuli in the form of interference of 
ongoing processing. Whereas relevant trauma-related stimuli may already receive preferential 
processing, this enhancement may be exaggerated by a trait factor of shifting attention easily 
to other relevant stimuli.  
 
Trauma induced interference of neutral T1 identification 
 In line with the hypothesis, higher accuracy of the Trauma pictures in the trauma 
group was associated with a disruption of ongoing processing as suggested by a decreased 
accuracy for T1 targets in Trauma trials. This finding is in line with earlier studies (Verwoerd 
et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., in press) that showed a trauma-related interference. The results 
support the model of attentional bias in anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) as a threat-
related stimulus was preferentially processed over a neutral stimulus. Whereas participants in 
the trauma group did not show an increased accuracy for New Negative pictures, the 
appearance of a New Negative target did disrupt processing of the neutral T1 target. This 
finding indicates an attentional bias that disrupts ongoing processing in the presence of a 
conceptually relevant stimulus (i.e., a threat picture that is not perceptually similar to the 
Trauma pictures). As this disruption did not lead to enhanced identification of the threat 
stimulus (as was the case for perceptually similar threat cues) the person may not be able to 
tell the cause of the disruption. This post hoc explanation is in line with the observation that 
trauma representations can be activated automatically without conscious awareness of the 
trigger (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996). The (analogue) trauma-related 
Chapter 9: Experimental evidence for attentional bias in analogue trauma 
 129
information from the induction phase was indeed activated as suggested by the disruption of 
T1 processing in New Negative trials in the trauma group, but did not lead to enhanced 
identification of the T2. The findings cannot be ascribed to mere familiarity effects, as the 
Familiar Neutral pictures did not lead to higher identification in the trauma group. This 
suggests that the (analogue) trauma representation was activated without identification of the 
target in some trials. This finding fits with the understudied concept of “current threat” in 
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Because the threat stimulus does not share perceptual features 
with the trauma memory in this case, perhaps only the shared feature (i.e., threat!) of the 
trauma representation is activated. The activation of a feeling of threat without the 
identification of the trigger is then experienced as a feeling of current threat. It would be 
interesting for future research to explore what information of a trauma representation is 
activated depending on the features that are shared with the trauma stimulus in the 
environment (i.e., visual, olfactory, emotional, etc.).  
 In line with our hypothesis, the neutral group showed a familiarity effect (although not 
for the matched pictures) as suggested by a higher accuracy for the Neutral Familiar pictures 
compared to the Trauma pictures and the New Negative pictures. This finding underlines the 
importance of previous exposure to threat stimuli in the attentional bias in our study. 
 
Intrusion frequency and attentional bias 
  In contrast to our hypothesis, we did not find any correlations with intrusion 
frequency. This is likely to be an effect of our design: intrusive images were measured 
directly after the RSVP task, whereas previous studies used a one-week diary. Thus, we 
measured intrusions during the consolidation phase (supported by the high number of 
intrusions during this task) whereas effects are usually found after consolidation. It would 
therefore be interesting in future research to explore the time frame in which the relation 
between attentional bias and intrusion frequency is established.  
 
Limitations 
 Our study has several limitations. First, we used a laboratory stressor in a student 
population as an “analogue trauma” exposure to negative stimuli. It therefore remains to be 
tested whether similar processes are involved in actual trauma. Future research may benefit 
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from replication of this study in PTSD patients. Second, we did not find a lag effect for T2 
accuracy, which is usually found in so-called “attentional blink” studies. In these studies, 
identification of neutral T2 is typically hampered when T2 follows T1 within 100-500 msec, 
due to the unfinished processing of T1 (Chun & Potter, 1995). Possibly, the familiarity with 
40% of the T2 targets and the emotionality in 40% of the targets may have washed out an 
attentional blink effect. Another limitation may be the order of RSVP response menus (T2 
then T1).  The sequence could have interfered with the continued activation of the T1 identity 
in working memory, resulting in artificially attenuated identification of T1. However, this 
procedure cannot explain T2 specific effects between and within groups and therefore does 
not seem to qualify the main outcomes of this study.  
 
Conclusions 
 The present study suggests that exposure to analogue trauma gives rise to two types of 
attentional bias. First, there appears to be an increased identification of perceptually similar 
trauma stimuli, supported by enhanced identification of Trauma pictures but not New 
Negative pictures in the trauma group. Second, there is an interference of ongoing processing 
in the presence of conceptually similar (i.e., threat) stimuli, supported by a hampered T1 
identification in both Trauma and New Negative trials in the trauma group. Individual 
differences in the ability to shift attention to relevant cues play a role in this relationship. The 
enhanced identification of Trauma in pictures combined with lower identification of the T1 
supports the attentional bias model of anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). The finding 
that ongoing processing can be disrupted in the absence of enhanced identification of the 
“disruptor” extends the model. The findings support the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) in that trauma representations in memory are automatically activated by relevant 
(threat) cues, and trauma representations can be activated without enhanced identification of 
the trigger. Future research has to point out whether this mechanism underlies the important 
central feature of current threat in trauma-exposed individuals. 
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Chapter 10  
Intrusive trauma memory: A review and functional analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Krans, J., Näring, G., Becker, E. S., & Holmes, E. A. (2009). 
Intrusive trauma memory: A review and functional analysis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
23(8), 1076-1088. 
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Abstract 
The present chapter focuses on a functional analysis of the phenomenon of intrusive 
trauma memory. While intrusive trauma memories undoubtedly cause impairment, we argue 
that they may exist for a potentially functional reason. Theory and experimental research on 
intrusion development are reviewed and possible functions of intrusive trauma memory are 
explored. These functions include facilitating emotional processing, preventing future harm, 
and protecting the coherence of the self. The issue of intrusive images in other disorders than 
post-traumatic stress disorder is addressed. This review suggests that the study of function is 
important for a nuanced view on the modulation of intrusive trauma memory in both 
experimental psychopathology and clinical treatment. 
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What is intrusive trauma memory? 
 Our lives are full of experiences and events that have a lasting impact on us. Many of 
these are expected or planned for like going to college, getting married, starting a family, and 
the passing away of our parents. Such momentous events (Pillemer, 1988) can be negative, 
positive, or both, but we are usually able to cope with them. Some events, however, have such 
an impact that our adaptive skills may fail and we become ‘traumatized’. One consequence of 
traumatic events (like other momentous events, at least initially) is the subsequent unwanted 
re-experiencing in the form of intrusive memories. Although it is undoubtedly crucial to 
investigate ways to reduce these unwanted memories, the main question raised in this paper 
is: “Why would we have intrusive trauma memories at all?” This question is inspired by 
Baddeley (1988), who argued not only to look at underlying basic mechanisms of cognitive 
phenomena, but also to try and understand what functions they may serve. Especially in 
literature on psychopathology, the main interest has been to reduce intrusive trauma 
memories. But why would we have intrusive trauma memories at all? What is their function? 
And what do we lose when we succeed in reducing intrusive trauma memories without taking 
into account possible adaptive functions? As Baddeley (1988) suggested, whenever we find a 
really replicable memory phenomenon, we should ask ourselves what its function may be. 
The current paper presents a review of the theory and experimental findings followed by an 
exploration of potential functions of intrusive trauma memory.  
 
Intrusive trauma memory 
 Intrusive trauma memories are rich multi-modal mental images of highly detailed 
sensory impressions of the traumatic event including sights, sounds, feelings and bodily 
sensations. Examples of intrusive trauma memories are seeing the driver’s face before a car 
crash (Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell, & Holmes, in press), an image of “brother with 
head [cut] open, wobbling” (Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005), or the sound of a child 
screaming (Holmes et al., 2005). In contrast to when a trauma survivor thinks back to the 
event deliberately, intrusive trauma memories come into consciousness unbidden. Often, 
people feel powerless against them. In order to understand intrusive trauma memories, models 
have been developed that specifically focus on full-blown post-traumatic stress disorder, i.e., 
PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin & Holmes, 2003). 
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However, it has long been argued (Horowitz, 1969) that the underlying mechanisms that are 
involved in the development of intrusive trauma memories are similar for both psychiatric 
levels and sub-threshold levels of post-traumatic stress. For example, Holmes (2004) 
illustrated that the features of intrusive images may be similar for experiencing actual trauma, 
witnessing trauma and seeing a TV news report about a traumatic event such as September 
11th 2001 (Holmes, Creswell, & O'Connor, 2007). Mace (2007) has proposed that intrusive 
memories are found in everyday mental life and as part of psychological disorders as well. 
Accordingly, intrusive trauma memories may vary from mildly distressing images to full-
blown flashbacks where the trauma survivor is completely absorbed in the memory and 
temporarily loses touch with the here-and-now. In terms of functionality, intrusive trauma 
memories may have features that are not necessarily shared with non-traumatic involuntary 
recall. For example, the content of intrusive trauma memories does not seem to change very 
much and can persist to intrude over a long period of time. These memories are cue-activated 
automatically which can make intrusion relatively frequent. 
 
Trauma and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 Examples of events meeting the clinical criteria for “trauma” are natural disasters, 
interpersonal violence and torture, and road traffic accidents. These events are considered 
‘traumatic’ if the person experiences or witnesses actual or threatened death, serious injury or 
threat to one’s or others’ integrity (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The person also 
needs to experience an intense negative emotional reaction at the time of trauma. For 
example, a soldier may witness a death but not experience intense fear, or horror, or 
helplessness. Then, the event would not count as traumatic. In reaction to trauma, several 
typical symptoms can emerge that are important in the diagnosis of PTSD (APA, 2000). 
These include re-experiencing of the traumatic event (e.g., in the form of intrusive trauma 
memories, nightmares and distress in reaction to trauma reminders), avoidance behaviour 
related to the index trauma (e.g., avoiding conversations, places and objects, and a general 
emotional numbing response) and symptoms of hyperarousal (e.g., startle response, sleeping 
problems, hypervigilance). The diagnosis of PTSD is considered when these symptoms 
persist for more than one month and cause significant impairment in various life domains 
(APA, 2000).  
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Post-traumatic stress is an important area of research because of the high lifetime risk 
of experiencing a traumatic event. Some studies have found lifetime risks as high as 89.6 % 
(Breslau et al., 1998). However, only a small proportion of trauma survivors subsequently 
develop full blown PTSD. Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, and Nelson (1995) estimated 
the lifetime prevalence of PTSD at 7.8% in an American sample, while Creamer, Burgess and 
McFarlane (2001) found a 12-month prevalence of 1.3% in an Australian sample. Some types 
of trauma are more likely to elicit PTSD than others. Generally, rape and physical abuse pose 
a high risk for PTSD, while people seem less at risk after traffic accidents or natural disasters. 
Kessler et al. (1995) found PTSD rates for rape victims of 65% for men and 46% for women, 
and 22% for men and 49% for women in cases of physical abuse. Creamer et al. (2001) 
reported a similar pattern. In contrast, PTSD prevalence rates after traffic accidents of 6.3% 
for men and 8.8% for women, and of 3.7% for men and 5.4% for women after natural 
disasters have been reported (Kessler et al., 1995). In sum, intentional harm seems to be more 
likely to produce post-traumatic stress symptoms. This finding may provide a clue as to the 
function of intrusive trauma memories. For example, events involving human violence may 
be perceived as more under our control (and thus that we have lost control) than, for example, 
an earthquake. Intrusive trauma memories of human violence may provide information that 
can prevent from future harm (see our discussion on warning signals later on).   
 While a traumatic event is necessarily the starting point of PTSD symptoms, it is 
obviously not a sufficient explanation. Interestingly, the risk factors with the greatest 
predictive power for PTSD appear to be psychological. More recent meta-analyses indicate 
that information processing during and after the traumatic event is critical (Brewin, 2003; 
Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). We now review three theoretical models that explain 
intrusive trauma memories from an information processing perspective. The first model is not 
specific for PTSD but provides an account of intrusive trauma memories based on a model of 
autobiographical memory in general, in line with our continuum view. The second and third 
models aim to explain the full range of PTSD symptoms, including intrusive memories, from 
a clinical perspective. They have proven very fruitful in the development of successful PTSD 
treatment and have sparked a bulk of experimental research that is also very important from a 
continuum perspective. 
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Cognitive models of PTSD 
 The Self-Memory-System (SMS) model of autobiographical memory (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) suggests that intrusive trauma 
memories are encoded in the episodic memory system as episodic memories. These memories 
are detailed “experience-near” records that are high in sensory-perceptual detail. What is 
encoded (in general and during a traumatic event) is determined by the “working self”. The 
“working self” is a complex goal hierarchy that organizes information in line with currently 
active goals, comparable to the central executive function in working memory (Conway et al., 
2004; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Episodic memories remain in their characteristic form while 
the goal they reflect is still active or relevant. They are activated by cues that bare perceptual 
similarities with the memory. If not lost, episodic memories are slowly integrated with more 
abstract levels of autobiographical knowledge, which prohibits cued-activation (i.e., unwanted 
intrusion) of the specific episodic memory. The more abstract levels of autobiographical 
knowledge form the “long-term self” that encompasses an autobiographical knowledge base 
and a “conceptual self”. The first is an organization of autobiographical information in 
different levels of abstraction into themes or time-periods (i.e., general events, life-time 
periods, and life story schema). The conceptual self contains schemas, scripts, beliefs, and 
values about the self, others, the world, and the relations between them. Thus, the integration 
of episodic memories into more abstract goal structures consists of changes in these 
structures. As a basic rule, the goal structures in the SMS are resistant to extreme goal change 
and only allow for gradual change in order to protect self-coherence (Conway et al., 2004). A 
traumatic event, by definition, poses a direct and extreme threat to the goal structure of the 
SMS. As a consequence, the traumatic event remains an intrusive episodic memory that is 
high in sensory detail. In contrast to clinical models of PTSD, described below, the SMS 
model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004) does not assume qualitatively 
different mechanisms for traumatic memories, but rather states that traumatic information 
may have more “difficulties” along the way to become a “normal” autobiographical memory.  
The dual representation theory (DRT) by Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996) 
suggests that traumatic information is encoded in two different memory systems: Situationally 
Accessible Memory (SAM) and Verbally Accessible Memory (VAM). SAMs are perceptual 
memories that are automatically triggered by internal or external cues that match sensory 
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perceptual features (i.e., intrusive trauma memories). In contrast, VAMs are the result of 
conscious processing of the traumatic event and they can be retrieved deliberately and 
consciously. Ideally, SAMs are integrated with VAMs to form a coherent and elaborate 
trauma narrative. Under extreme stress, however, the conscious processing that leads to 
VAMs is impaired (Brewin et al., 1996). As a result, there is relatively more trauma 
information encoded in the SAM system and very little in the VAM system. Intrusive trauma 
memories occur now because the cued-activation of SAMs is not inhibited by VAMs. 
The cognitive model of PTSD by Ehlers and Clark (2000) provides the basis of their 
highly successful cognitive therapy treatment for PTSD (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, 
& Fennell, 2005). In this model, ‘data-driven’ processing predominates during a traumatic 
event while ‘conceptual’ processing is impaired. Data-driven processing involves sensory 
information like sight, smell, touch, sounds and bodily sensations.  In contrast, conceptual 
processing of the traumatic event places the traumatic information in a more abstract form by 
creating a coherent trauma narrative that is chronological and meaningful. A central concept 
in the cognitive model of PTSD is a ‘sense of current threat’ that people experience when 
having an intrusive trauma memory. The sense of current threat exists due to a lack of 
chronological context in trauma memory so that the threat in the past is not distinguished 
from the present situation.  
 Discussion about the differences between PTSD specific theories (e.g., Brewin et al., 
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and more general models of autobiographical memory (e.g., 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) has long historical roots (Horowitz, 1969; Rubin, Boals, & 
Berntsen, 2008). The SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004) 
aims to provide a holistic view on autobiographical memory and many of its phenomena and 
“touches on” intrusive trauma memory as well. Just as all goal-relevant information, traumatic 
information is encoded into an episodic memory system. However, the trauma information is 
not easily integrated in the autobiographical knowledge base because this would require 
extreme changes in the goal structures. Therefore, traumatic information remains at this 
highly perceptual level prone to automatic cued-activation, i.e., intrusive memories. In 
contrast, the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996) suggests differential encoding of trauma information 
into SAMs and VAMs. The cognitive model of PTSD by Ehlers and Clark (2000) contains 
some parallels to the SMS model and suggests that (trauma) information is encoded as 
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episodic memories. Additionally, the model suggests a role for peri-traumatic processing 
(data-driven versus conceptual) that is not described in the SMS model. What becomes clear 
from all three models is that information processing and encoding are thought to play an 
important role in intrusion development. Many experimental studies of intrusive trauma 
memory have been carried out, which permits and calls for a functional analysis of this 
phenomenon (Baddeley, 1988).  
 
Studying trauma in the laboratory 
 Support for the role of peri-traumatic processing in intrusion development comes from 
experimental studies that have made use of the ‘trauma film paradigm’ (Holmes & Bourne, 
2008). A ‘trauma film’ refers to a film that depicts an event that is considered as traumatic 
according to the DSM-IV-TR (Criterion A1; APA, 2000). Typically, healthy participants view 
a trauma film under one of several controlled conditions. Before and after film viewing, 
questionnaires are administered to measure variables of interest. During the week after film 
viewing, participants record their intrusive images of the film in a diary and return for a 
follow-up session. In support of the utility of this paradigm, it has been found that intrusive 
memories elicited in a laboratory environment are in many respects similar to naturalistic 
intrusive memories (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
In order to manipulate information processing during encoding, participants can 
perform a concurrent task during film viewing. Using this dual-task approach, manipulations 
can be tailored to compete for specific resources, for example, for perceptual or verbal 
processing of the film (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). In a study by Stuart, Holmes and Brewin 
(2006), participants viewed a trauma film while modelling plasticine shapes as a dual task 
during one part of the film. During the rest of the film, participants performed no extra task 
apart from film viewing. The modelling clay task is thought to rely on limited resources of 
visual and spatial information processing which would interfere with visuospatial encoding of 
the film and thus reduce intrusion frequency. As predicted, participants reported fewer 
intrusive images after one week for the film part during which they were performing the 
visuospatial task compared to the film part during which they performed no extra task. This 
effect has also been shown for other visuospatial tasks, like complex pattern tapping (e.g., 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) and was upheld when contrasted with a non-visuospatial 
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task with a comparable cognitive load (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010). The 
findings support a facilitating role of peri-traumatic perceptual processing in intrusion 
development. 
Findings pertaining to the role of peri-traumatic verbal conceptual processing are more 
mixed. Holmes et al. (2004; Experiment 3) found that participants who were counting 
backwards in 3’s while viewing a trauma film reported more intrusive images of the film 
compared to participants who performed no extra task. This supports the DRT (Brewin et al., 
1996) and the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) in that interfering with verbal 
conceptual processing is thought to increase intrusion frequency. Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & 
Holmes (submitted) recently replicated this finding with a variation on the counting 
backwards task. However, Krans, Näring and Becker (2009) found the opposite effect: 
Participants who were counting backwards in 3’s reported fewer intrusive images compared to 
participants in a no task control condition. Pearson, Sawyer and Holmes (2008) found a 
similar pattern of results. In two experiments, they varied the cognitive load of concurrent 
verbal or visuospatial tasks and found that intrusion frequency varied according to the 
cognitive load of the task (with higher cognitive load tasks reducing intrusion frequency) 
irrespective of task modality. However, Pearson et al. (2008) used static IAPS pictures instead 
of a trauma film, which makes comparison with earlier findings difficult. Studies that fail to 
show a modality-specific effect are in line with single-representation models of 
autobiographical memory like the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In this 
model, cognitive load would reduce the capacity of the working self to guide and direct the 
encoding of the trauma film. Initial support for the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000) comes from a study by Sutherland and Bryant (2008). As traumatic events pose a threat 
to the self, a discrepancy between an ideal and actual self emerges. This discrepancy creates 
goals that are represented in the working self in order to reduce the threat posed by the trauma 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). As the working self modulates 
retrieval it was expected that threat-related memories are more easily recalled in case of 
trauma. Indeed, Sutherland and Bryant (2008) found that trauma survivors who reported more 
discrepancy between an ideal and actual self on a questionnaire also reported more trauma-
related memories in response to positive cue words.  
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Krans, Näring, Holmes and Becker (2009a) used the trauma film paradigm to study 
analogue post-trauma processing. Immediately after film viewing participants received a 
memory test for only one part of the film. As predicted, one week later, participants reported 
fewer intrusive images for the film part for which they did the memory test compared to the 
part for which they had not done a test. Additionally, deliberate cued-recall after one week 
was better for the film part that was tested the week before. These results indicate that the 
rehearsal of analogue trauma information decreases intrusions and increases deliberate cued-
recall (see also Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009). 
 In sum, several studies have shown that visuospatial processing of trauma information 
is an ingredient in the formation of intrusive trauma memories (e.g., Holmes et al., 2004). 
Further, the conceptual integration of trauma information may prohibit this development 
(Krans et al., 2009). In turn, the idea that sensory information may be more important in 
aiding survival during a traumatic event than elaborate conceptual processing is intuitive. 
Thus, the ‘heightened’ sensory information processing that is thought to later result in 
distressing intrusive trauma memories may be viewed as adaptive at the time. Thus, we know 
a little about how intrusive trauma memories come into existence but we really do not know 
why.  
 
But what the hell is it for? 
 The question posed in the header has historical roots starting in the late ’70s and ’80s 
(e.g., Neisser, 1978; Bruce, 1989; Baddeley, 1988). More recently, several researchers have 
further encouraged students of memory to think about function in addition to mechanism 
(e.g., Bluck, 2003). The main question of this paper: “But what the hell is it for?” may seem 
somewhat counter-intuitive in relation to intrusive trauma memories. Naturally, we do not 
want trauma survivors to suffer from distressing and impairing intrusive memories of their 
experience. However, we would like to argue that, at least initially, intrusive trauma memory 
may serve important functions related to survival of the physical and psychological self. Two 
of the broad categories of autobiographical memory (AM) functions proposed by Bluck 
(2003) are especially important in the discussion of intrusive trauma memories: the self 
function and the directive function. The first includes continuity of the self as the same person 
throughout time and a sense of identity (Barclay, 1996). This continuity relies on knowledge 
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of the self in the past and as projected in the future. Directive functions of AM guide our 
behaviour through problem solving, predicting future events and interpreting the past (Bluck, 
2003).  
 
Trauma memories as originating events 
 Before we turn to intrusive trauma memories specifically, we first discuss a potential 
function of trauma memory in general. Intrusive trauma memory may be best viewed as a part 
of a rich array of post-traumatic reactions that together can have great impact on people’s 
lives. Often, trauma survivors report feeling like a different person after the traumatic event. 
This personal change relates to what Pillemer (1988) called ‘originating events’ in his 
categorization of the types of ways that memories can serve directive functions. The 
originating event is (often retrospectively) perceived as a cause for life changes and has a 
motivational (i.e., directive) function (Pillemer, 1988). Bluck, Dirk, Mackay, and Hux (2008) 
reported that death-related events (although not necessarily traumatic) are often seen as 
originating events. While negative effects of trauma are obvious, trauma victims have also 
reported positive outcomes. ‘Post-traumatic growth’ describes positive outcomes from the 
struggle with trauma that surpass the pre-trauma level (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). Trauma 
victims may report feeling mentally stronger, having a higher appreciation for life, more 
intimate relationships and new life priorities and values (Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998). 
For example, in a study of burn victims it was found that some participants experienced a 
renewed self-esteem by overcoming the trauma and having to focus on inner qualities instead 
of appearance (Andreasen & Norris, 1972). Trauma memory may serve as a reminder of an 
originating event when new values, life priorities, or personal growth are established.  
Unfortunately, a traumatic event can also function as an originating event in a  
negative way. For example, a woman who was raped by an acquaintance decided not to 
pursue a career in clinical psychology because she thought that the incident was proof that her 
judgement of character was too poor (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Trauma survivors with PTSD 
may report the feeling of having changed for the worse, feeling alienated from others (Ehlers, 
Maercker, & Boos, 2000) and experience a sense of foreshortened future (APA, 2000). In line 
with this, Rubin et al. (2008) found a positive correlation between PTSD symptoms and a 
measure of the impact of an event on life values and identity. 
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 By discussing the functional value that traumatic events may have we have set the 
scene to further explore potential functions of intrusive trauma memory as a part of a rich 
array of post-traumatic reactions, experiences and behaviours. 
 
Emotional processing 
 Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996) have suggested that intrusive trauma memories 
may serve a self- and directive function by supplying the trauma survivors with detailed 
sensory and physiological information about the event. Intrusive trauma memories that are 
activated can become the focus of conscious attention, during which the meaning of the event 
can be contemplated and cause and effect relations may be defined (directive function). This 
is central to emotional processing of the traumatic event that is targeted at restoring core 
beliefs about safety and control in relation to the self, others and the world (self function). 
From a neuropsychological perspective, Brewin (2001) has suggested that consciously 
processed trauma memory (i.e., VAM system) is based on hippocampal activity whereas 
intrusive trauma memories are related to amygdale processing. The function of intrusive 
trauma memory may be to transfer detailed sensory trauma information to the 
‘hippocampally-based VAM system’ (Brewin, 2001; p.381), for without flashbacks this 
information would remain dormant in memory. In sum, intrusive trauma memories provide a 
source of trauma-related information that is needed for the emotional processing of the 
traumatic event.  
 
Warning signal hypothesis 
 One step further, intrusive trauma memory may serve another directive function 
(Bluck, 2003) by helping to prevent future harm. This ‘warning signal hypothesis’ (Ehlers, 
Hackmann, Steil, Clohessy, Wenninger, & Winter, 2002) was formulated based on 
observations that intrusive trauma memories are often of moments just before the traumatic 
event. For example, a car accident survivor reported a recurrent intrusive memory of 
headlights coming towards her, just before the collision (Ehlers et al., 2002). Sometimes 
intrusive memories are of moments when the meaning of the traumatic event becomes clear. 
Another road traffic accident survivor reported an intrusive memory of her mother’s worried 
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face in the hospital that made her realize that she could have been killed in the crash (Ehlers et 
al., 2002). Intrusive trauma memories thus provide information of impending danger or threat.  
The examples of intrusive trauma memories described above reflect moments of the 
highest emotional impact that are known as “hotspots” (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Grey & 
Holmes, 2008; Grey, Holmes, & Brewin, 2001; Holmes et al., 2005). Interestingly, not all 
moments of a traumatic event become intrusive. For example, an assault could last an hour, 
but just two moments may intrude as flashbacks. These hotspots (i.e., moments of the highest 
emotional impact) give us a clue as to which parts of the trauma become intrusive and which 
do not, while an analysis of their content helps indicate why. In a study by Holmes et al. 
(2005), PTSD patients were asked to report the hotspot moments and their intrusive memories 
of the traumatic event. The hotspot moments were matched with the intrusive trauma 
memories for every participant. The results showed that 77.6% of the intrusive trauma 
memories matched the reported hotspots. In a recent replication this match was 83% (Grey & 
Holmes, 2008). In line with the warning signal hypothesis (Ehlers et al., 2002), the cognitive 
themes of hotspots reflect physical threat and psychological threat to the self (Holmes et al., 
2005; Grey & Holmes, 2008). In other words, intrusive trauma memories often reflect the 
moments at which one’s survival or psychological integrity is questioned. 
 Although the warning signal function of intrusive trauma memory can clearly be 
adaptive, in actual PTSD warning signals may generalize to cues that are actually safe. For 
example, a functional warning cue would be the sight of blood, which indicates a potential 
threat. But consider a trauma survivor whose warning cues generalize to any red object. The 
sight of red clothing might then elicit unwanted intrusive memories and a feeling of current 
threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The feeling of current threat from ‘false’ (i.e., overgeneralized) 
warning signals along with an interpretation of that feeling as actual danger enhances the 
generalization of threat cues and activation of intrusive trauma memories in a vicious cycle 
(Ehlers et al., 2002). 
 
Protection of self-coherence 
 Conway, Meares and Standart (2004) have suggested that intrusive trauma memories 
may play a role in the protection of self-coherence. This argumentation is based on the SMS 
model of autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, et al., 
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2004). This model states that traumatic information directly threatens self-related goals and 
the coherence of the self. Therefore, this information will not be easily integrated within the 
autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual self. The traumatic information remains 
an experience-near sensory-detailed record in the episodic memory system and is activated 
automatically by cues that share sensory features with the memory record. The integration of 
trauma information into the long-term self (i.e., autobiographical knowledge base and 
conceptual self) requires dramatic changes in goal structures. Because these changes come at 
high cognitive and emotional costs integration is avoided in order to protect the current self-
coherence (Conway, Singer, et al., 2004; Greenwald, 1980). Intrusive trauma memories 
reflect the goal structure that the self is trying to protect and thus aid in “holding on” to 
current beliefs. An example provided by Conway, Meares, et al. (2004) is of the intrusive 
trauma memory experienced by a professional driver after a car accident in which he was a 
passenger. The intrusive trauma memory was associated with the victim’s belief that he had 
the time to react and prevent the crash. However, factually, there had been no opportunity for 
him to do anything. During treatment, the intrusive trauma memory appeared to function as a 
protection of the belief that he was in control of events. Accepting that he had actually been 
powerless defied his need for control and would require a drastic change in his goal structure 
and self (especially as a professional driver). From this viewpoint, the intrusive trauma image 
reflected the need to preserve a sense of personal control, which is adaptive.  
 Conway, Meares, et al. (2004) report other examples in which the meaning of the 
intrusive trauma memory was in line with the current goal system. On a critical note, the 
authors state that distortions are not always present in intrusive trauma memories. In general, 
intrusive trauma memories may help to delay the radical change in the long-term self that is 
needed in order to integrate the traumatic information. They may serve a signal-function that 
indicates that something is wrong in the interaction between experience and goal structure. 
However, research is needed to support this suggestion of function.  
 
Intrusive images and memories across psychological disorders 
 Recent research and practice in clinical psychology highlights that intrusive images 
also present a significant phenomenon in several other psychological disorders other than 
PTSD (see Hackmann and Holmes, 2004, for an overview). For example, highly emotional 
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involuntary images linked to trauma can occur across the anxiety disorders such as social 
phobia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Strikingly, it appears 
that patients with bipolar disorder may have as frequent trauma flashbacks as patients with 
PTSD (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008; Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007). In the area 
of psychosis, the impact of trauma memories (e.g., to prior hospitalizations) has also been 
highlighted (Morrison, 2004). Conway et al. (2004) argue that intrusive mental imagery in 
general is strongly related to personal goals in the working self. Thus, intrusive images and 
memories in different psychological disorders may share similar functions. Mental imagery 
may bring autobiographical knowledge to life to facilitate or prepare for an action response 
(Holmes et al., 2008). We therefore suggest that our argumentation so far has wider 
applicability beyond PTSD to other clinical areas where it is now realized that sudden 
intrusive sensory memories pose a problem. It is important, both theoretically and practically, 
to continue the study of intrusive imagery as a phenomenon both regardless and with special 
regard to different psychological disorders. The functional approach provides a useful lens for 
doing so. 
 
Summary and implications 
 Following a long tradition in clinical psychology, we have adopted a continuum view 
of intrusive trauma memory in which intrusions can occur from mildly distressing everyday 
images to full-blown flashbacks in PTSD. This is strongly related to the continuum 
perspective proposed by Holmes (2004) in which intrusive images are found in experimental 
settings, in response to media broadcasting, witnessing a traumatic event as well as in trauma 
survivors. While intrusive trauma memories are very distressing and knowledge about how to 
reduce their impact are highly valuable, it should also be considered what functions might be 
lost when we succeed in reducing them. In relation to the phenomenon of intrusive trauma 
memory we therefore explored the central question “But what the hell is it for?”. While in 
full-blown PTSD intrusive trauma memories reflect a maladaptive response contributing to 
the disorder, the basic underlying mechanisms (e.g., high sensory imagery, automatic retrieval 
in response to cues) may reflect the way in which our memories are adaptively set up to help 
us learn from and navigate through our intense emotional experiences. 
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Intrusive trauma memory is one part of a rich array of possible post traumatic 
reactions. A traumatic event as a whole may function as an originating event (Pillemer, 1988). 
Whereas positive changes may arise in post-traumatic growth (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006), 
on the pathological side of the continuum trauma survivors can also feel they have changed 
for the worse, or have a sense of foreshortened future (Ehlers et al., 2000). Within this larger 
mechanism, intrusive trauma memory has its own specific functions.  
The first function of intrusive trauma memory that we identified was aimed at the 
emotional processing of a traumatic event. Intrusive trauma memories may provide an 
opportunity to highlight important trauma information (specifically sensory and physiological 
details) that would not have been available through deliberate recall. By directing conscious 
attention towards an active intrusive trauma memory, a rich record of the trauma can be 
constructed. 
The second function that we discussed is a warning signal function. Intrusive trauma 
memories may provide information about impending danger and may prepare the person for 
action by an associated feeling of current threat (Ehlers et al., 2002). Basically, this is 
potentially a helpful and adaptive function. But when danger cues generalize to cues that are 
actually safe, intrusion frequency is elevated and can become impairing. In order to recover, 
the person needs to re-evaluate the ‘true’ informational value of each cue. One component of 
treatment is to distinguish between danger signs in the past and safety signs in the present 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
The third possible function of intrusive trauma memory was suggested by Conway, 
Singer, et al. (2004). Intrusive trauma memories and their distortions may function to protect 
the status quo of the self’s goal structure and thus self-coherence. Intrusive trauma memories 
reflect the self’s active goals at time of the trauma that in turn reflect firmly held beliefs about 
the self that are challenged by the traumatic event. Changes in the self’s goal structure may be 
avoided to maintain self-coherence by intrusive trauma images (Conway, Singer, et al., 2004). 
Although intrusive trauma memories are often distressing they may be more pleasant than 
giving up self-coherence, and in that sense can be seen as adaptive. As does the warning 
signal hypothesis, the function of self-coherence suggests that there may be valuable 
information in research of the content of intrusive trauma memories as, for example, the 
reported hotspot studies (e.g., Grey & Holmes, 2008). 
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 While some theoretical models have suggested a functionality of intrusions (e.g., 
Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), it needs to be 
highlighted that little research has tested these ideas directly. At the time of Baddeley’s 
question “But what the hell is it for?” (1988) there was a growing interest in applying specific 
experimental paradigms to the study of different memory phenomena. However, the everyday 
relevance of such research was not always taken into account. Baddeley (1988) argued for 
contemplation on possible functions in order to identify research topics that really matter to 
the lives of human beings.  While the link between experimental study of memory 
phenomena and its social relevance is not always clear, where clinical disorders are concerned 
there is a clear imperative to better understand the underlying processes. As noted, intrusive 
trauma memories can be highly distressing and impairing. Therefore, research on the 
aetiology and function of intrusive trauma memories is clearly important for the development 
of more effective treatments. The studies on intrusion development that we reviewed in the 
introduction are clearly socially relevant, and even suggest new experimentally-driven ways 
of working with intrusive memories that appear very unlike traditional psychological 
therapies (Holmes et al., 2009; Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009; Lilley et al., in press; 
Mackintosh, Woud, Postma, Dalgleish, & Holmes, submitted). In light of the clinically 
relevant phenomenon of intrusive trauma memory, we need to study the function in order to 
achieve a nuanced view on the possibilities and consequences of changing intrusion 
development in psychological treatment and research.
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Theoretical evaluation of research findings 
 This dissertation investigated the cognitive processes underlying intrusion 
development using an analogue trauma paradigm. Two influential information processing 
theories of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and a pragmatic 
model based on the converging implications of these theories (Holmes & Bourne, 2008) 
formed the theoretical background of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, these models were 
outlined and available studies of information processing and intrusion development using the 
trauma film paradigm were reviewed.  
 
Intrusion development according to information processing models of PTSD 
 Chapter 3 aimed to confirm the role of peri-traumatic visuospatial processing in 
intrusion development by ruling out the alternative hypothesis that movement per se is related 
to intrusion development. Indeed, performing a configurational movement task while viewing 
an aversive film did not modulate intrusion frequency in the following week compared to 
performing no concurrent task. In contrast, performing a visuospatial movement task 
(complex pattern tapping) decreased the frequency of intrusive images, and, interestingly, also 
deliberate recall of the film. The results thus provide support for the role of visuospatial 
processing in intrusion development. However, the results conflict with the dual 
representation theory (DRT; Brewin, et al., 1996) in that the visuospatial task decreased 
deliberate recall as well as intrusion frequency. Although the findings support an image-based 
memory system underlying intrusive images (the SAM system), the decrease in intrusive 
images is not compatible with a decrease in deliberate recall (the VAM system) as proposed 
in the DRT. The findings of Chapter 3 are more in line with the notion of data-driven 
processing in the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and the role of 
visuospatial processing in intrusion development as suggested by the pragmatic model 
(Holmes & Bourne, 2008). 
 Chapter 4 explored the role of peri-traumatic verbal processing in intrusion 
development. Interfering with verbal processing during the encoding of an aversive film 
reduced both intrusion frequency and deliberate recall of the film scenes after one week. Our 
manipulation to enhance peri-traumatic verbal processing was unsuccessful, as it appeared to 
be a very difficult task for participants. The finding that a verbal concurrent task decreased 
Chapter 11: Summary and general discussion 
 151
both intrusion frequency as well as deliberate recall of the film is clearly in contrast with the 
notion that peri-traumatic verbal processing, to the extent that it underlies conceptual 
processing, 'protects' against intrusion development. Thus, our findings do not match with the 
role of conscious conceptual peri-traumatic processing driven by verbal resources as 
suggested by the dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996), the cognitive model of 
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), and the pragmatic model of intrusion development (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). Our findings contradict two earlier studies (Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 
2004, Experiment 3; Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, submitted) that found an increase 
in intrusion frequency from peri-traumatic verbal interference. Rather, our findings seem to 
suggest that cognitive load (i.e., a reduction in central executive functioning) reduced 
encoding of the film resulting in fewer trauma information in episodic memory. Such an 
interpretation is more in line with general theories of attention and memory (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1994; Cowan, 1995; Conway, 1996). Clearly, more research is needed to clarify these 
differences.  
 Chapter 5 tested the hypothesis that rehearsing analogue trauma information reduces 
intrusion frequency by enhancing memory processing after viewing an aversive film. 
Participants indeed reported fewer intrusions and enhanced deliberate recall for the film part 
for which they had received a chronological verbal recognition memory test immediately 
post-film, confirming the hypothesis. Chapter 5 thus provides support for a 'protective' role of 
post-traumatic verbal processing. This is in line with all three information processing models 
of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Holmes & Bourne, 2008) stating that 
trauma information should be processed conceptually in order to integrate the information 
into existing knowledge structures, which would decrease the proneness for automatic 
activation. 
 
Mental imagery and intrusion development 
 In Chapter 6, it was explored whether intrusive visual images could emerge from 
listening to a verbal description of a traumatic event and whether these images could be 
modulated through interference with encoding. Confirmatively, participants reported intrusive 
visual images of the narrative in a one-week diary. Furthermore, performing a visuospatial 
task or a verbal task while listening to the description reduced intrusion frequency compared 
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to no concurrent task after one week. This finding overlaps with Chapter 3 and 4 in which 
both a visuospatial and a verbal task decreased intrusion frequency of a trauma film, 
suggesting a role of central executive functioning in the encoding of intrusive images that is 
not modality-specific.  
 Chapter 7 aimed to further explore the working mechanisms underlying intrusive 
visual images from a verbal description of a traumatic event. Preferred visual (but not verbal) 
processing style was found to be positively related to intrusion frequency when participants 
imagined a traumatic verbal report. This is not surprising, considering the fact that intrusive 
images are often visual in nature (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). 
Additionally, participants in the imagery condition reported more avoidance of the traumatic 
story and increased negative cognitions about the world. Speculatively, self-relevance may 
play an important role in intrusion development. This interpretation is supported by the 
finding that intrusive images include only highly meaningful moments of the traumatic event 
(Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, Clohessy, Wenninger, & Winter, 2002). A theoretical background 
for the role of self-relevance is provided by the Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In the SMS model it is hypothesized that intrusive images may reflect 
active goals of the self that are threatened by the trauma (see also Chapter 10). This 
potentially serves the function of preserving self-coherence by rehearsing and thereby 
confirming pre-trauma beliefs that are not in line with the reality of the trauma (see Chapter 
11).  
 By focusing on intrusive visual images from a description rather than from direct 
visual input of an analogue trauma, Chapter 6 and 7 clearly extend the information processing 
models of PTSD. These models are based on an assumption of direct perceptual input, but 
apparently, mental imagery can be used to create visual images in the mind that appear as 
intrusive images later on. Direct input from the visual system is clearly not a requirement for 
intrusion development. This finding points out a limitation of information processing models 
of PTSD as these do not explain intrusive images from mental imagery.  
 
Other cognitive processes in intrusive images: Thought suppression and attentional bias 
 Whereas Chapter 3 to 7 mainly focused on the aetiology of intrusive images, Chapter 
8 and 9 are more relevant for their maintenance. In Chapter 8 it was investigated whether an 
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intrusive image from an aversive film would be more difficult to suppress than a non-intrusive 
image. The goal of this study was to distinguish between an 'intrusion' as a result of encoding 
processes (i.e., intrusive images of an event) and an 'intrusion' as a direct result of thought 
suppression efforts. The findings suggested that thought suppression success was dependent 
on individual ability rather than on the intrusive character of the to-be suppressed target. 
Thought suppression success was highly and positively related to intrusive images of the 
aversive film that participants reported in a one-week diary. Furthermore, prolonged 
activation of the intrusive image after suppression efforts was also positively correlated with 
the intrusion diary, indicating an effect specific for intrusive (versus non-intrusive) images. 
The findings support the role of thought suppression in the maintenance of intrusive images. 
Both the individual ability to suppress targets as well as the intrusive character of the image 
appeared to be important for the occurrence of intrusive images in the diary. The role of 
thought suppression in the maintenance of intrusive images has been suggested by both the 
dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996) and the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000).  
 Chapter 9 explored whether an attentional bias exists for threat stimuli after exposure 
to threat pictures. Participants who had previously viewed negative pictures (Trauma group) 
showed an attentional interference bias of a neutral target on encounter with a threat stimulus. 
This bias generalized to threat stimuli that shared no perceptual similarities with the initial 
analogue traumatic event. Threat pictures that were viewed prior to the attentional bias task 
additionally benefited from enhanced processing. These effects were not found for 
participants who had previously viewed neutral pictures only. The effects were not due to 
mere familiarity and only occurred after exposure to threat stimuli (i.e., viewing the negative 
pictures). Finally, attentional control (attentional shifting specifically) was positively related 
to enhanced processing of both familiar and new threat stimuli in the Trauma group. The 
findings presented in Chapter 9 are in line with the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) where it is suggested that the feeling of 'current threat' in PTSD is a result of the 
generalization of a fear reaction and enhanced priming due to stimuli that are associated with 
the trauma but are objectively non-threatening. 
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Potential functions of intrusive trauma memory 
 The research findings summarised above provide more insight in the development of 
intrusive trauma memory, and add to our knowledge of how to decrease these unwanted 
occurrences. However, it is also possible that intrusive trauma memory serves potentially 
important functions. In the theoretical Chapter 10, potential functions of intrusive trauma 
memory described in the literature were reviewed. Three potential functions were found. 
First, information stored in intrusive images can provide significant information necessary for 
the emotional processing of a traumatic event. Second, the occurrence of an intrusive image 
may serve as a warning signal. This proposition was based on the observation that intrusive 
images are often of the moment right before the traumatic event, when it became clear that the 
situation took a turn for the worse. Third, intrusive images may serve to protect the coherency 
of the self. Traumatic information conflicts with a person's valued goals. In order to integrate 
the traumatic information in autobiographical memory, personal goals may have to be 
adjusted (sometimes for the worse) and this can be a painful emotional process. The 
maintenance of intrusive images may aid self-coherence by prolonging these sometimes 
radical changes. 
 
A psychological model of intrusion development: Mii 
 As has been discussed above, the current information processing models of PTSD 
(e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996; Holmes & Bourne, 2008) cannot fully 
account for all the research findings presented in Chapters 3 to 9. First, no support was found 
for the importance of modality-specific peri-traumatic processing or for two separate memory 
systems (see Chapters 3, 4, and 6). Second, the information processing models of PTSD 
cannot account for intrusive images without direct input from the visual system, i.e., through 
mental imagery. Third, the present models do not explain why we have the specific intrusions 
that we have. Overall, the findings presented in this dissertation are more in line with non-
clinical models of autobiographical memory, such as the Self-Memory System (e.g., Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) that consider intrusive memories to be experience-near episodic 
memories that have not been integrated into conceptual knowledge structures. The SMS 
model also elaborates on the meaning of intrusive images in an enticing way. However, such 
general models of autobiographical memory lack the inclusion of specific cognitive processes 
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that are clinically relevant, such as avoidance. In sum, the findings presented in this 
dissertation stretch the scope of existing models of intrusion development and require revision 
of our view on intrusions. To account for these issues a new psychological model of intrusion 
development is presented here (see Figure 1). The model also encourages trans-diagnostic 
research as it is a model of intrusion development outside of the context of a specific 
psychological disorder.  
 
Figure 1. The psychological model of intrusive images (Mii). 
 
 The psychological model of intrusive images (Mii) is mainly based on the dual 
representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), the cognitive model of PTSD 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000), and the Self-Memory-System model of autobiographical memory 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). During a traumatic event, several trait and state 
characteristics of the individual determine what information is attended to and encoded. 
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Examples are attentional biases for particular information, preferred processing style (e.g., 
verbal or visual), avoidance behaviour (e.g., selective attention), as presented in Chapter 7 and 
9. Note that the encoding process does not necessarily need to involve primary sensory input 
(i.e., direct experience) but can also involve secondary experiences brought to life with mental 
imagery. The trauma information is initially stored as an episodic memory. Characteristically, 
episodic memory is highly detailed and becomes frequently active in consciousness so that 
the information can be processed conceptually into a more abstract form, such as schemas 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). During this time, matching stimuli can automatically 
trigger the trauma memory representation and an intrusive memory is experienced in 
consciousness (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
 However, in contrast to the dual representation theory of PSTD (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Brewin, 2001), the Mii suggests that the trauma information can also be accessed deliberately. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it depends on the retrieval route, rather than on encoding 
differences, whether an intrusive or non-intrusive 'regular' memory experience occurs (Rubin, 
Boals, & Berntsen, 2008). Normally, the episodic memory is conceptually processed and 
integrated into long-term memory. That is, the information is organized, for example, in a 
chronological order as presented in Chapter 5. Furthermore, information that is important for 
and complies with self-related goals in the autobiographical memory system (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is integrated within the knowledge structures in long-term memory 
and the autobiographical knowledge base. There may be at least two processes that can 
undermine the adequate processing of the trauma information and thus underlie the 
maintenance of intrusive re-experiencing. First, conceptual processing may be hampered by 
cognitive avoidance behaviour such as thought suppression. Thought suppression2 not only 
prevents conceptual processing of the information in the long-term but also leads to an 
immediate increase in intrusive memories by ironic processes, as described in Chapter 8. 
Second, trauma information that conflicts with or threatens the self (e.g., I have control over 
events) is not easily brought in line with the existing autobiographical knowledge base. 
                                                            
2 As suppression efforts may have differential short- and long-term consequences it is not presented in the Mii 
model for lay-out purposes. However, short-term thought suppression effects would be noticed in the 
contents of awareness, whereas long-term effects would play a role in the conceptual processing of episodic 
information. 
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Therefore, the information may remain in its highly detailed form because it is not fully 
processed conceptually. That is, the threat to the goal-system of the self needs to be reduced 
first in order for the information to be integrated in long-term memory (see Chapter 10 on the 
potential function of intrusive trauma memory to preserve self-coherency), for example, 
through cognitive restructuring. If successful, the trauma information is integrated within the 
autobiographical knowledge structures. At this stage, the trauma information, in turn, 
influences the self and self-related goal structure that derives from the autobiographical 
knowledge structures (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The self-related goal system, in 
turn, influences the interaction between the person and the environment through individual 
differences as mentioned earlier.  
 The Mii describes the development and maintenance of intrusion development for, for 
example, PTSD. It also allows for intrusive experiences in the aftermath of trauma that will 
not persist and are part of a normal post-traumatic reaction. The Mii is not limited to PTSD 
and can also account for intrusions in other clinical disorders as well as non-clinical intrusive 
experiences. A main assumption of the Mii is that mechanisms underlying intrusive images 
are qualitatively similar across disorders and in everyday life occurrences. Differentiating 
characteristics such as persistence and associated distress are thought to arise from differences 
in variables such as the emotional impact of the event, coping behaviour (e.g., avoidance) and 
discrepancy between the information and self-relevant goals.  
 The Mii does not include specifications of peri-traumatic processing. There are three 
reasons for this. First, the Mii assumes that all information is initially encoded in episodic 
memory, including information from all available modalities. It is mostly after the traumatic 
event that the information is elaborated on conceptually. Thus, there is no need for a 
distinction between different types of processing. Rather, the self-relevance of the information 
determines whether the information is processed conceptually post-trauma or whether it still 
remains active in its original form until some goal-discrepancy is resolved. Consequently, an 
intrusive image will be experienced when the trauma information is stored as a highly detailed 
episodic memory and a matching stimulus is encountered. In turn, deliberate recall is 
achieved by verbal search. This is easier when the trauma information is integrated within 
long-term memory as this facilitates top-down search (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Second, the findings presented in Chapter 6 and 7, show that intrusive images can also 
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develop from mental imagery in the absence of direct visual input. If, then, direct visual input 
is not a necessary ingredient for intrusion development, it does not have a central role in a 
model of intrusion development. Third, the combined findings of Chapter 3, 4, and 6 suggest 
that it may be more general central executive processes that are involved in the encoding of 
information during a(n analogue) traumatic event and not modality-specific resources. 
However, distinguishing different forms of peri-traumatic processing may well be important 
(though perhaps not sufficient) in actual traumatic events. The use of a mild stressor (e.g., a 
trauma film) as an analogue trauma limits further conclusions on this issue.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 The Mii focuses on intrusion development specifically rather than on all diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD and therefore does not provide a full explanation of all PTSD-related 
symptoms. Conversely, this has the advantage that the Mii can also be tested across 
psychological disorders. Recently, there has been more interest in studying intrusive 
memories in, for example, OCD, social phobia, depression, and bipolar disorder (e.g., Brewin, 
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). The Mii provides a testable view on intrusion 
development across disorders and daily life. 
 The Mii is the result of embedding the findings presented in this dissertation within 
existing cognitive frameworks of PTSD (i.e., Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The Mii is therefore not exhaustive but rather leaves room 
for extension. At the very least, the results presented in this dissertation need to be replicated 
and further explored. For example, in what other ways can post-trauma conceptual processing 
be aided and are there different kinds of conceptual evaluations that can be distinguished in 
this process? Importantly, the main assumption in the Mii about the relationship between 
intrusion development and self-relevance has hardly been studied experimentally. An 
interesting field of research that may become important in the future is the content of intrusive 
images (in contrast to quantitative frequency). The present dissertation has added to the 
knowledge of intrusion development, but why do people experience the specific intrusions 
that they do? 
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Conclusions 
 The main contribution of this dissertation for the field of intrusive memory has been 
the empirical investigation of prominent information processing models of PTSD on this issue 
(e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al., 1996). The studies presented above have provided 
limited support, but also disconfirmation and extension of these models. Most importantly, 
the main findings did not provide convincing support for a modality-specific encoding of 
analogue trauma information nor for a separation of encoding of intrusive versus deliberately 
recalled memories. Rather, the findings are more in line with non-PTSD models of 
autobiographical memory, such as the Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Central executive function, regardless of modality, appeared to underlie the encoding 
of the analogue traumatic material, thereby modulating both intrusive and deliberately 
recalled information. However, models of autobiographical memory lack inclusion of other 
clinically relevant processes such as avoidance. Based on the empirical data that resulted from 
the efforts made in this dissertation, a new psychological model of intrusive images, the Mii, 
was presented. The Mii can generate hypotheses and drive empirical studies of psychological 
mechanisms underlying intrusion development in a trans-diagnostic fashion. Especially the 
notion of conceptual processing, and meaningfulness, of traumatic information for the 
individual will be a fruitful future enterprise.
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Theoretische evaluatie van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
Dit proefschrift verkende de cognitieve processen onderliggend aan de ontwikkeling 
van intrusies gebruik makend van het trauma film paradigma. Twee invloedrijke PTSS 
theorieën (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) en een pragmatisch 
model gebaseerd op de overlappende implicaties van deze theorieën (Holmes & Bourne, 
2008) vormden de theoretische achtergrond van het proefschrift. In Hoofdstuk 2 werden deze 
modellen uiteengezet en werd een overzicht gegeven van de bestaande studies naar 
informatieverwerking en de ontwikkeling van intrusies die gebruik maakten van het trauma 
film paradigma. 
 
De ontwikkeling van intrusies volgens informatieverwerkingsmodellen van PTSS 
 Het doel van Hoofdstuk 3 was om de rol van peri-traumatische visuospatiële 
verwerking in de ontwikkeling van intrusies te bevestigen door het uitsluitend van de 
alternatieve hypothese dat beweging per se is gerelateerd aan de ontwikkeling van intrusies. 
Inderdaad bleek dat het uitvoeren van een configurationele bewegingstaak tijdens het kijken 
naar een aversieve film de frequentie van intrusies niet moduleerde in de volgende week 
vergeleken met het niet uitvoeren van een gelijktijdige taak. Het uitvoeren van een 
visuospatiële bewegingstaak (complex patroon tapping) verminderde echter de frequentie van 
intrusieve beelden en, interessant genoeg, ook het bewust gestuurde herinneren van de film. 
De resultaten steunen dus de rol van visuospatiële verwerking in de ontwikkeling van 
intrusies. Echter, de resultaten zijn in strijd met de dual representation theory (DRT; Brewin 
et al., 1996) in dat de visuospatiële taak zowel het bewust gestuurde herinneren als de intrusie 
frequentie verminderde. Hoewel de bevindingen een beeldgebaseerd geheugensysteem 
onderliggend aan intrusieve beelden (het SAM systeem) ondersteunen is de vermindering van 
intrusieve beelden niet in overeenstemming met een vermindering in het bewust gestuurde 
herinneren (het VAM systeem) zoals voorgesteld in de DRT. De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 
3 komen meer overeen met de notie van datagedreven verwerking in het cognitieve model van 
PTSS (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) en de rol van visuospatiële verwerking in de ontwikkeling van 
intrusies zoals voorgesteld door het pragmatische model (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
 Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht de rol van peri-traumatische verbale verwerking in de 
ontwikkeling van intrusies. Interferentie met de verbale verwerking tijdens de codering van 
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een aversieve film verminderde zowel de frequentie van intrusies als het bewust gestuurde 
herinneren van de film scènes na een week. Onze manipulatie om peri-traumatische verbale 
verwerking te verbeteren was niet succesvol, want het bleek een zeer moeilijke taak voor de 
proefpersonen. De bevinding dat een verbale concurrerende taak zowel intrusie frequentie als 
het bewust gestuurde herinneren van de film verminderde is duidelijk in strijd met de notie 
dat peri-traumatische verbale verwerking, in zoverre dit onderliggend is aan conceptuele 
verwerking, tegen de ontwikkeling van intrusies ‘beschermt’. Onze bevindingen komen dus 
niet overeen met de rol van bewuste peri-traumatische verwerking gedreven door verbale 
capaciteiten zoals voorgesteld door de dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996), het 
cognitieve model van PTSS (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), en het pragmatische model van intrusie 
ontwikkeling (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Onze bevindingen zijn in strijd met twee eerdere 
studies (Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004, Experiment 3; Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & 
Holmes, submitted) die een stijging in intrusie frequentie vonden door peri-traumatische 
verbale interferentie. Onze bevindingen lijken eerder aan te geven dat cognitieve lading (een 
vermindering in de centraal executieve functie) de codering van de film verminderde wat 
resulteerde in minder trauma informatie in het episodisch geheugen. Een dergelijke 
interpretatie komt meer overeen met algemene theorieën van aandacht en geheugen (Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1994; Cowan, 1995; Conway, 1996). Er is duidelijk meer onderzoek nodig om deze 
verschillen op te helderen.  
 Hoofdstuk 5 testte de hypothese dat het herhalen van analoge trauma informatie de 
frequentie van intrusies vermindert door de verwerking in het geheugen na het kijken van een 
aversieve film te verbeteren. Proefpersonen rapporteerden inderdaad minder intrusies en 
betere bewust gestuurde herinneringen voor het deel van de film waarvoor zij een 
chronologische verbale geheugentest (herkenning) hadden gekregen meteen na de film, wat 
de hypothese bevestigde. Hoofdstuk 5 ondersteunt dus de ‘beschermende’ rol van post-
traumatische verbale verwerking. Dit is in overeenstemming met alle drie 
informatieverwerkingsmodellen van PTSS (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Holmes & Bourne, 2008) die stellen dat trauma informatie conceptueel verwerkt zou moeten 
worden om te kunnen integreren met de informatie in bestaande kennisstructuren, wat de 
gevoeligheid voor automatische activering zou verminderen.  
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Mentale verbeelding en de ontwikkeling van intrusies 
 In Hoofdstuk 6 werd onderzocht of intrusieve visuele beelden kunnen ontstaan door 
het luisteren naar een verbale beschrijving van een traumatische gebeurtenis en of deze 
beelden gemoduleerd kunnen worden door interferentie met de codering. Proefpersonen 
rapporteerden inderdaad intrusieve visuele beelden van het verhaal in een weekdagboek. 
Verder verminderde het uitvoeren van een visuospatiële taak of een verbale taak tijdens het 
luisteren naar de beschrijving de ontwikkeling van intrusies na een week vergeleken met geen 
concurrerende taak deze bevinding overlapt met Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 waarin zowel een 
visuospatiële als een verbale taak de intrusie frequentie van een trauma film verminderde, wat 
een rol van de centraal executieve functie suggereert in de codering van intrusieve beelden die 
niet modaliteitspecifiek is.  
 Hoofdstuk 7 had als doel de werkzame mechanismen onderliggend aan intrusieve 
visuele beelden van een verbale beschrijving van een traumatische gebeurtenis te 
onderzoeken. Een voorkeur voor een visuele (maar niet verbale) verwerkingsstijl was positief 
gerelateerd aan de frequentie van intrusies wanneer de proefpersonen zich het traumatische 
verbale verhaal verbeeldden. Dit is niet verrassend, aangezien intrusieve beelden vaak visueel 
van aard zijn (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark, 2007). Verder rapporteerden 
proefpersonen in de verbeeldingsconditie meer vermijding van het traumatische verhaal en 
meer negatieve cognities over de wereld. Een speculatie is dat zelfrelevantie een belangrijk 
rol zou kunnen spelen in de ontwikkeling van intrusies. Deze interpretatie wordt ondersteund 
door de bevinding dat intrusieve beelden alleen van zeer betekenisvolle momenten van de 
traumatische gebeurtenis zijn (Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, Clohessy, Wenninger, & Winter, 
2002). In het SMS model wordt de hypothese gesteld dat intrusieve beelden de actieve doelen 
van het zelf zouden kunnen reflecteren die bedreigd worden door de trauma (zie ook 
Hoofdstuk 10). Dit kan potentieel de functie van het behoud van zelfcoherentie ondersteunen 
door het herhalen en daarbij bevestigen van overtuigingen vóór de trauma die niet 
overeenkomen met de realiteit van de trauma (zie Hoofdstuk 11).  
 Hoofdstuk 6 en 7 breiden de informatieverwerkingsmodellen van PTSS duidelijk uit 
door de focus te leggen op intrusieve visuele beelden van een beschrijving en niet op beelden 
die ontstaan uit directe visuele input van een analoog trauma. Deze modellen zijn gebaseerd 
op een aanname van directe perceptuele input maar blijkbaar kan mentale verbeelding 
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gebruikt worden om visuele beelden in ons hoofd te creëren die later als intrusieve beelden 
verschijnen. Directe input van het visuele systeem is dus duidelijk geen vereiste voor de 
ontwikkeling van intrusies. Deze bevinding duidt op een beperking van de 
informatieverwerkingsmodellen van PTSS omdat deze intrusieve beelden van mentale 
verbeelding niet verklaren.  
 
Andere cognitieve processen in intrusieve beelden: Gedachteonderdrukking en aandachtsbias 
 Waar Hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 7 zich voornamelijk richten op de etiologie van 
intrusieve beelden zijn Hoofdstuk 8 en 9 relevanter voor hun instandhouding. In Hoofdstuk 8 
werd onderzocht of een intrusief beeld van een aversieve film moeilijk te donderdrukken zou 
zijn dan een niet-intrusief beeld. Het doel van deze studie was om een onderscheid te maken 
tussen een ‘intrusie’ als resultaat van coderingsprocessen (intrusieve beelden van een 
gebeurtenis) en een ‘intrusie’ als een direct resultaat van effecten van pogingen tot 
gedachteonderdrukking. De bevindingen stellen dat het succes van gedachteonderdrukking 
afhankelijk was van individuele vaardigheid en niet van het intrusieve karakter van het te 
onderdrukken target. Succes van gedachteonderdrukking was hoog positief gerelateerd aan 
intrusieve beelden van de aversieve film die proefpersonen rapporteerden in een 
weekdagboek. Verlengde activering van het intrusieve beeld na de onderdrukkingspoging was 
tevens positief gecorreleerd met het intrusiedagboek, wat een specifiek effect voor intrusieve 
(versus niet-intrusieve) beelden aangeeft. De bevindingen ondersteunen de rol van 
gedachteonderdrukking in de instandhouding van intrusieve beelden. Zowel de individuele 
vaardigheid om targets te onderdrukken als het intrusieve karakter van het beeld bleken 
belangrijk te zijn voor het vóórkomen van intrusieve beelden in het dagboek. De rol van 
gedachteonderdrukking in de instandhouding van intrusieve beelden is oorgesteld door zowel 
de dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996) als het cognitieve model van PTSS (Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000). 
 Hoofdstuk 9 verkende of er een aandachtsbias bestaat voor bedreigende stimuli na de 
blootstelling aan bedreigende plaatjes. Proefpersonen die eerder negatieve plaatjes hadden 
gezien (Trauma groep) lieten een interferentie aandachtsbias zien van een neutrale target bij 
het tegenkomen van een bedreigende stimulus. Deze bias generaliseerde naar bedreigende 
stimuli die geen perceptuele kenmerken deelden met de oorspronkelijke analoge traumatische 
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gebeurtenis. Bedreigende plaatjes die waren bekeken voor de aandachtsbias taak kregen een 
voorkeur en werden beter verwerkt. Deze effecten werden niet gevonden voor de 
proefpersonen die eerder alleen neutrale plaatjes hadden bekeken. De effecten konden niet 
worden toegewezen aan bekendheidseffecten en waren alleen aanwezig na blootstelling aan 
bedreigende stimuli (het kijken van de negatieve plaatjes). Ten slotte was aandachtscontrole 
(specifiek het verschuiven van de aandacht) positief gerelateerd aan het beter verwerken van 
zowel bekende als nieuwe bedreigende stimuli in the Trauma groep. De bevinding uit 
Hoofdstuk 9 komen overeen met het cognitieve model van PTSS (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) waar 
gesteld wordt dat het gevoel van ‘huidige bedreiging’ in PTSS een resultaat is van de 
generalisatie van een vreesreactie en verhoogde perceptuele priming door stimuli die 
geassocieerd zijn met de trauma maar objectief gezien niet bedreigend zijn.  
 
Mogelijke functies van intrusief trauma geheugen 
 De onderzoeksbevindingen die hier boven staan opgesomd verschaffen meer inzicht in 
de ontwikkeling van intrusief trauma geheugen, and dragen bij aan onze kennis hoe deze 
ongewilde verschijningen te verminderen. Het is echter ook mogelijk dat intrusief trauma 
geheugen mogelijk belangrijke functies heeft. In het theoretische Hoofdstuk 10 worden 
mogelijke functies van intrusief trauma geheugen uiteengezet zoals deze in de literatuur 
vóórkomen. Er werden drie mogelijke functies gevonden. Ten eerste kan de informatie die is 
opgeslagen in intrusieve beelden significante informatie bevatten die nodig is voor de 
emotionele verwerking van een traumatische gebeurtenis. Ten tweede zou het verschijnen van 
een intrusief beeld kunnen dienen als een waarschuwingssignaal. Dit voorstel was gebaseerd 
op de observatie dat intrusieve beelden vaak van het moment zijn vlak voor de traumatische 
gebeurtenis, wanneer het duidelijk werd dat de situatie verslechterde. Ten derde zouden 
intrusieve beelden de zelfcoherentie kunnen beschermen. Traumatische informatie is in 
conflict met belangrijke waarden van een persoon. Om de traumatische informatie te kunnen 
integreren in het autobiografisch geheugen moeten persoonlijke doelen wellicht worden 
aangepast (soms in negatieve zin) en dit kan een pijnlijk emotioneel proces zijn. De 
instandhouding van intrusieve beelden zou de zelfcoherentie kunnen ondersteunen door deze 
soms radicale veranderingen te vertragen.
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